

## THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

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## FREE WILL AND RIGHT ACTION

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## I

Few features of human nature have been so unkindly treated by philosophers as free will. Quite apart from the thinkers who maintain that our belief in free will is a delusion, even those who proclaim its truth, and try to explain what it is, often present us in the end with a mangled corpse which is altogether unrecognizable for the living reality of freedom of which we are conscious. It is evident that we are going to discuss a question which might easily bedevil us.

In some sense or other free will is certainly a fact of human consciousness; the philosopher's job is to explain in what sense or senses we may be said to act freely. We know that we are responsible for at any rate some of our actions. We do not merely "do things," as any sentient being may be said to do things; but some of our actions belong to us in a more intimate way than any action can be said to belong to a cat or a dog. We feel in some manner ultimately responsible for them; and it is this ultimate responsibility which gives to praise and blame, reward and punishment, a different meaning as applied to men from that which they have in relation to animals. Such, in a few words, are the facts which have to be accounted for in an analysis of free will.

It will help us to see the problem more clearly if we consider the way in which Aristotle approaches it at the beginning of the third book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. He does not, it is true, solve the problem, nor does he even formulate it very clearly; we may agree with Sir David Ross when he writes: "On the whole we must say that he shared the plain man's belief in free will but that he did not examine the problem

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very thoroughly, and did not express himself with perfect consistency."<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless he has the rare merit of both saying something about the question and saying nothing obviously false, and so his tentative exposition is an excellent basis for further investigation.

Aristotle is trying to determine what kind of action is ethically significant, and so he asks what kind of action deserves to be called *ἐξούσιον*, which is usually translated as "voluntary," although, as we shall see, it has for Aristotle a wider sense than "voluntary" usually has for us. This must first be distinguished from that which is forced on the agent from without and in which his own tendencies have no part. When you are carried off by bandits, your movements are in a sense your activity, but you are certainly not performing a voluntary action. What, however, if you do something which is in itself repugnant to you for fear of a worse alternative? Such is the action of a man who throws cargo overboard during a storm in order to lighten the ship and so save the lives of the crew. Aristotle answers that conduct must be judged in its full concreteness, and in these particular circumstances you do in fact choose to do this rather than face a worse alternative, and so the action should be described as voluntary.

Besides the kind of action which is strictly forced on the agent, an act done through ignorance is also involuntary. In the measure that you are ignorant of the nature of your act, or of its circumstances, or of its effects, you are not responsible for it. It is true that your ignorance may itself be culpable; if you are violent because you are drunk, you are not thereby excused, and your actions may be said to be performed in ignorance rather than through ignorance. Nevertheless, it is for your ignorance in conjunction with its effects that you are responsible, rather than for the effects in isolation.

An action, therefore, is voluntary when it is the result neither of force nor of ignorance; that is, when it is the expression of a conscious tendency of the agent. This definition is verified in the behaviour of young children and of animals as well as in that of rational agents, and in actions performed on the impulse of the moment as well as in those deliberately chosen. The ethical thinker must go a step farther and discuss the nature of choice.

Choice is not purely conative; it cannot simply be identified with desire or passion or wish. Nor is it purely intellectual; it cannot be identified with an opinion about the value of an object or the rightness of an act. For it is only too plainly possible to think that an object is good or that an act is right without choosing to prosecute the object

<sup>1</sup> W. D. Ross, *Aristotle* (London: Methuen & Co., 1930), p. 201.

or to perform the act. Hence choice must be thought of as partly intellectual and partly conative; it is voluntary action preceded by deliberation.

The field of choice, then, is limited by the possibility of deliberation. But, says Aristotle, we do not deliberate about events of which the issue is already certain, nor do we deliberate about events whose issue we have no conception how to affect. We deliberate only about things which are, or are thought to be, within our control. And even here, when we know what we want and know for certain how to get it, there is no more room for deliberation. Deliberation, therefore, supposes that the issue of our action is in some sense indeterminate in advance; it is precisely the process of thought in which we consider whether we shall do this or that, act in a certain way or not, when our decision is not dictated by certainty of end and means. Consequently the choice depends on ourselves.

Now, actions are called virtuous or vicious when they are the result of a choice and according as the choice is right or wrong. Hence virtue and vice are voluntary and chosen, and depend on ourselves. We are able to say yes or no, and we are responsible for the answer. This conclusion is substantiated not only by the experience of individuals, but also by the social system of rewards and punishments, which supposes that men are responsible for making themselves virtuous or vicious. Crimes done in ignorance are punished when the offender is held to be responsible for his ignorance, and not otherwise.

It might, however, be objected that everyone acts in accordance with the kind of man he is, and so cannot be held to be ultimately responsible for what he does. Aristotle answers that his moral character consists largely of habits which are the result of past choices and must, therefore, be laid to his account. A man cannot throw off his habits at will, it is true, but he might have avoided acquiring them in the beginning.

But the imaginary opponent pursues his objection farther. Everyone desires what seems good to him, and whether what seems good to him really is good or not depends on the kind of moral vision he possesses. Even in the beginning, before he has acquired habits of virtue or of vice, it depends on the kind of moral vision with which he was endowed by nature; and so we do not have to stop short at the individual himself in tracing the origin of his conduct. Aristotle's answer is by no means clear or satisfactory. He points out that this would destroy a man's responsibility for his virtues as much as his responsibility for his vices. If, then, he claims responsibility for his virtues, he must accept responsibility for his vices also. So Aristotle concludes with a renewed affirmation that virtue and vice are voluntary and depend on ourselves.

We may now, perhaps, see more clearly what it is that we are investigating. We are not concerned with actions in which we are merely the instruments of an external force or with actions performed unconsciously or in ignorance of their nature; the actions which we have to examine are those in which we are conscious of what we are doing and deliberately choose what we shall do. For such actions we usually attribute to ourselves and to others a very special kind of responsibility. But should we have the right to do so if they could be completely explained by a causal series going back beyond ourselves? It seems not, and yet to suppose a break in causation appears to be in flagrant contradiction with our conception of the causal order of the world. What, then, is the analysis of free will?

## II

The attempt has often been made to close the way to a recognition of the distinctive character of free will by showing that praise and blame, reward and punishment, would have their uses even if all our actions were necessitated. Hobbes takes this line in a work which does not altogether live up to its comprehensive title: *Of Liberty and Necessity, a Treatise wherein all Controversy concerning Predestination, Election, Free-will, Grace, Merits, Reprobation, etc. is fully decided and cleared*. He maintains that to praise or blame means nothing but to call a thing good or evil; and both Hobbes and Mill insist that, apart from free will, punishment would still be justified by the purposes of reformation and deterrence.

Such objections miss the point. For the question is not whether praise and blame, reward and punishment, would have any meaning or function if determinism were true, but what is their actual meaning and function in the moral sphere. If all volition were necessitated, they would still undoubtedly have the uses attributed to them by Hobbes and Mill; but they would not have the place which they in fact hold in the estimation of men.

Reformation and deterrence are obviously of great importance in any account of punishment, but they are not the whole account. In an adult human being, reward and punishment are thought to be not only socially advantageous, and not only of benefit to the individual, but they are thought to be merited. The ethical nature of retribution has not always been convincingly explained, but it is impossible to account for punishment without it. The point that we are making will best be appreciated in a comparison of reward and punishment as given to animals and to small children with the same as given to adults.

We use rewards and punishments as means of training a dog, but we acknowledge that he cannot make himself other than he is. The

burden of praise and blame does not finally rest upon this individual dog; we look for the entire source of his qualities, good and bad, in his pedigree and physique, his previous environment and training. So also with young children who are not yet moral agents. Rewards and punishments, within limits, are useful means of educating them to a sense of what is expected of them; but we do not really blame infants for being greedy or not wanting to go to bed or whatever it may be. Few things, indeed, could be worse for their education than the injustice of premature moralizing and the excessive punishments which tend to accompany such an attitude of mind on the part of their elders. Gradually, as they grow older and begin to recognize the rightness of right and the wrongness of wrong, our attitude changes and, in respect of an adult, is altogether different. For him reward and punishment acquire their full meaning: they are deserved. Punishment is not merely corrective and not merely deterrent; it is merited. It is his own fault, we say; he has brought it on himself; he has only himself to blame. When a man's wrongdoing can be traced to circumstances or upbringing or heredity, we pity, but we do not blame. Such a man may have to be restrained by society, or punished in the way that a child is punished; but the opinion of mankind makes a clear distinction between this case and that in which no adequate excuse can be found, where the wrong-doer is himself the source of his wrongdoing and deserves in the full sense whatever the consequences of his action may be. Hence the account of punishment given by such thinkers as Hobbes and Mill is defective, for it omits the factor of responsibility.

A similar comment must be made on what Hobbes has to say of praise and dispraise. For praise of a good man is very different from praise of a good piece of workmanship. And praise of a virtuous action is very different from praise of a clever idea. A moral judgment about a man is directed in a peculiar way towards his individual personality; his virtues and vices are thought to belong to him in an even more intimate way than his intellectual qualities. Moral praise is more than praise in general, and blame more than dispraise in general. We do not blame a chair for collapsing under us, but we do blame a man for betraying the trust we reposed in him. For the man could have helped it; the chair could not.

So we are brought back to the source of these distinctions, the notion of responsibility. We cannot yet say how free will should be analysed, but we can say that it must have a distinctive analysis of its own. Any theory which makes no difference between moral judgments and other judgments of value is a plain falsification of the facts.

## III

If we now consider a few of the unsuccessful attempts which have been made to account for the distinctive character of volition, this may help to indicate in what direction a more adequate solution should be sought. Locke begins by proposing a very simple conception of liberty.

... so far as a man has power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind; so far is a man free.<sup>2</sup>

Assuming that this is all that freedom means, the question whether a man's will be free or not becomes "unreasonable because unintelligible." Liberty is one power, and will is another; one does not belong to the other, but both belong to the man. Will is the power of choosing a course of action, and liberty is the power of acting in accordance with choice, and so "the question is not proper whether the will be free, but whether a man be free."

In our own day Professor Moore suggests that a similar view may be sufficient to account for our consciousness of free will. He expresses the criterion of right and wrong in the formula that an action is right when its total consequences are at least as good as any other which the agent *could* have done in the circumstances, and wrong when this is not so. *Could have done* means for him at least *would have done, if he had so chosen*. As to the question whether *could have done* or *could have chosen* have any more absolute meaning, he declares himself in doubt, and in doubt too about what this meaning might exactly be. But he does not think it impossible to give a meaning to free will without it, since it remains true

- (1) that we often *should* have *acted* differently, if we had chosen to; (2) that similarly we often should have *chosen* differently, if we had chosen so to choose; and (3) that it was almost always *possible* that we should have chosen differently, in the sense that no man could know for certain that we should *not* so choose.<sup>3</sup>

We must submit, however, that this is evidently inadequate to our sense of moral responsibility, for the power to do as one chooses is simply freedom from external compulsion. If this were all that is meant by free will, the hopeless inebriate or drug addict would be as free now to take his drink or drugs or not to take them as he was before he surrendered himself to the bonds of habit. He does as he chooses; but the point is that, although no doubt he can wish, he cannot, or

<sup>2</sup> John Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, chap. xxi, sec. 8.

<sup>3</sup> G. E. Moore, *Ethics* (London, Williams & Norgate), p. 220.

can hardly, choose otherwise than as he does. To say that he would choose otherwise, if he chose so to choose, does not help matters, since he cannot really choose to choose otherwise than as he does. Nor does our ignorance of the necessitating causes at work make the act free if there actually are necessitating causes.

Liberty to do as one chooses does not, then, amount to free will. Locke, however, goes on to offer another and rather less inadequate explanation. He suggests that liberty consists in a power to suspend the prosecution of desire and to examine the possibilities before us. We act wrongly when we follow impulse precipitately, but rightly when we have submitted the matter to due examination. This, at any rate, introduces the factor of deliberation; but it is still questionable whether the suspension of activity is absolutely free or psychologically conditioned; and Locke allows that the judgment which ensues upon deliberation determines the final choice. Hence his theory is still unsatisfactory.

The difficulty of reconciling free will with the principle of causality has often been met by some sort of duplication of the self. The origin of this type of theory is, of course, to be found in Kant. For Kant the category of causation is of universal application in the sphere of phenomena; that is to say, all phenomena are to be brought under laws of invariable temporal sequence. Nevertheless we have to account for the fact of duty, for the unconditional or categorical imperative of morality. Now, ought implies can; morality implies freedom. There is no room for freedom in the laws governing phenomena; hence we must look for its source in the real or noumenal self. The moral law must be a purely rational law laid down for itself by the rational will, and right action is action which is not only in conformity with the moral law but performed out of pure reverence for it. For Kant, then, freedom does not consist in any indeterminacy, but in the independence of the rational will, which is timeless, from the category of causation, which applies only to phenomena succeeding one another in time.

Bradley's view of free will involves a similar duplication of the self. Could a man still be held responsible, if the thesis of determinism were true and his actions could be predicted with certainty from his antecedents and present circumstances? Bradley suggests that the prediction of his supposedly free actions to which the plain man would object is prediction based on anything which is not himself, but not prediction based on his known character. In order, therefore, that an act may be called free, it must have its ultimate source in the self of the agent. But the self, Bradley insists, is not a mere collection of thoughts and feelings and volitions. The real self is something over and above these; they proceed from it, and not it from them. Hence you cannot predict a man's

future from his past and his environment, and to claim to be able to do so is to outrage the plain man's sense of accountability. The freedom of the will consists precisely in the fact that the self is more real than its acts, but it is responsible for its acts because it manifests itself in them.

A more blatant sort of duplication is to be found in the theory expounded by Professor Lossky in his book on *Freedom of Will*. He makes a sharp distinction between real being, which consists in spatio-temporal and temporal processes, and ideal being, which transcends space and time. Ideal being, again, is divided into the abstract ideal being which belongs to mathematical entities and concrete ideal being such as the human self. Lossky places all causal efficacy outside spatial and temporal processes in the substantival agents which set them going, and on this basis it is quite easy to maintain that events in space and time are merely the occasion, not the cause, of our volitions. The human will, therefore, is not determined by the external world or by physical laws or by physiological processes or by innate character or by the past history of the self, but it determines itself freely in face of the situations set up by all these factors.

A great many criticisms might be made of these theories in detail, but it will be sufficient to confine ourselves to two main points. In the first place, they do not seem to be genuine theories of free will at all. These supratemporal selves are not progressively self-determining, but mysterious unities ever the selfsame. To replace natural necessity by rational necessity, as Kant does, and as his successors tend in their various ways to do, is not to introduce freedom. Secondly, we have not two selves, but one self. The self, indeed, is a unity; yet it is a unity which embraces, but is not exempt from, the divisions of space and time. Freedom is unreal unless it is found in the essentially temporal activity of the one real self.

Moreover, as we saw earlier, free will does not consist merely in freedom from the nonself, freedom to do as one chooses. Free will must be given a meaning in terms of this act of will here and now. The purpose of these criticisms has been to enforce this conclusion and to prepare the ground for an analysis of the act of volition.

#### IV

Let us recall once again that we are not concerned with everything that a man does, nor even with all his conscious acts, for many of these are purely instinctive, like ducking at a cry of "Heads!" We are concerned with acts which are preceded by some measure of thought, which are deliberate in some sense of the word; this need not include what is sometimes described as exploring every avenue and leaving no stone

unturned, but it involves some genuine intellectual apprehension of the value or disvalue of the act. All volition, therefore, presupposes a recognition of the goodness of good, an awareness of the universal in the particular.

It is because we apprehend a good in general that deliberation and choice are possible. A thinking mind is free from the necessity of following instinctive desire and is able to judge the objects of its tendencies. Moreover it judges them by a standard which exceeds them. For no finite good is without defect, and the mind is capable of recognizing the defect as well as acknowledging the positive value. The mind, then, dominates any good presented to it in a finite way, in the sense that it judges this good by a standard which exceeds it and has a tendency which is not exhausted by it. This superiority, which is the presupposition of deliberation and choice, is already a certain freedom.

Such considerations are very familiar in the writings of the Scholastics, but it does not appear that we can stop with them and go no farther. For freedom understood in this way is not by itself incompatible with psychological determinacy of the outcome of deliberation. If I have a motive for making a decision and no proportionate motive for rejecting it, however finite the good to be obtained through it, I shall certainly make it. If all our acts were free in no fuller a sense than this, they would all be traceable to the victory of the strongest motive and, finally, to causes outside ourselves. In that case we should not be ultimately responsible for anything that we do or for any part of what we are. But our conviction that for some acts the ultimate responsibility is our own is much too clear to be explained away in this manner. It seems, therefore, that we should look for a class of volitions which are free in a different and fuller sense.

A line of thought used by St. Thomas may suggest the direction of inquiry.

In contingent matters the reason can decide in either way, as appears in dialectical argument and rhetorical persuasion. Now, particular objects of activity are contingent, and consequently the reason may judge in either way about them and is not determined to one side or the other. Hence the very fact that man is rational entails the possession of free will.<sup>4</sup>

Let us see what precisely this comparison suggests. In the theoretical sphere a necessary truth, as soon as it is fully understood, can only be affirmed with certainty. When there are only probable arguments, but strong ones, a proposition is affirmed, but with a degree of conviction

<sup>4</sup> ST, I, 83. 1.

less than certainty. When there is evidence on either side and we have no reason for regarding one side as outweighing the other, we remain in doubt. But suppose that we have to act. There is now no possibility of half acting or remaining in suspense; we must either do this or not do it. If the desirability of either side is such as to nullify the desirability of the other, it is certain which side we shall choose. When both sides continue to be desirable from different points of view, we still have to choose; but we have no necessary motive for choosing this rather than that. There is motive for either alternative, and the merits of each are a motive for the exclusion of the other; but there is nothing to determine which we shall choose. The making of a choice is necessary, but the direction of the choice is free. When the choice is made, it is something of our own which belongs in a special way to ourselves, something for which we are ultimately responsible.

We might suppose an entirely trivial case of free choice. I am able, say, to get from one place to another by omnibus or by underground railway; I cannot afford a taxicab and I am not going to walk. The underground will be faster, but the omnibus will save me from a number of steps and several synthetic gales and will give me something to look at on the way. If I were Buridan's ass, I might remain in hesitation and never make the journey at all; more probably, with an animal, some accidental diversion of attention determines the direction of activity. Since I am a man, however, I see that there is nothing to choose between the alternatives and, precisely for that reason, freely choose at random.

In such a case the end is already determinate, and freedom of choice arises simply from the equal efficacy of alternative means. If this were the only case of free choice, the freedom of the will would evidently be of no importance at all. The important case of free choice is that in which the alternatives are of different moral worth. Here the choice is not merely between means, but between ends; and here we see the relationship of free will to the possibility of right action.

## V

If we are going to understand moral freedom, we must appreciate that good or value is not a genus whose character is equally verified in all kinds of value and which is always quantitatively comparable; there are different kinds of value which are not comparable by a single standard. Aristotle realized this when he said that "there are three things which lead to choice and three which lead to avoidance: the noble, the expedient, and the pleasant, and their contraries, the base, the harmful, and the painful."<sup>5</sup> The attraction exerted by these different

<sup>5</sup> *Nic. Eth.* ii. 3. 1104b 7.

kinds of good and the repulsion exerted by their contraries are themselves of different kinds. The pleasant is the immediate good corresponding with my present impulse; the expedient is the means to my future good; the noble is the absolutely good. Since men are individuals who are distinct and whose existence is spread over time, they are not moved exclusively by impersonal, objective value. My personal advantage has an attraction for me which is of a different kind from the attraction of what is absolutely good, and my present pleasure makes a special appeal which may be in opposition to my future advantage. There may, therefore, be an irreducible opposition of motives of mere pleasure or of personal advantage and of motives of absolute goodness, and this is the case of moral free choice. Right action is that which is done for the sake of the noble, *τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα*.

Thus moral choice involves a disparity of ends, which arises from the integrity or limitation of the goods which solicit the will. The extreme instance of limitation is the often violent impulse to immediate pleasure. In so far as the agent takes his own future and the good of others affected by his action into account, the good which solicits his will is more adequate; but, since he is an individual existing in time, the attraction exerted by a more adequate good is often less compelling. The absolutely good in the sphere of moral choice is what is good when everything which is both knowable and relevant is taken into account; it is that which tends to the fulfilment of the natures both of the agent and of the others affected by his action. Here again, the fact that it is the greatest good does not entail that it exerts the greatest attraction on a finite individual at a given moment.

Moral freedom, involving a disparity of ends, is not confined to the case of equality of attraction. Since moral ends are of different kinds, the psychologically stronger motive does not nullify the weaker. A moral conflict may be more or less difficult; sometimes the absolutely good motive is strong enough to make the right decision easy; but sometimes it is psychologically so comparatively weak that a heroic effort is required to comply with it. It is even possible, by a kind of diabolism, to choose moral evil defiantly when it would be easier to do what is right. These conclusions will readily be seen to have a concrete application to the facts of the moral life.

In general, therefore, we must distinguish two senses of freedom in relation to the will. In the wider sense, in which all volitions are free, freedom consists in the power to deliberate and to judge the possible courses of action presented to us; this kind of freedom is inherent in the nature of rational will. In a stricter sense we are free when the result of deliberation is not psychologically determined, but leaves us

to choose between mutually exclusive alternatives where the attraction of neither is sufficient to nullify the attraction of the other. The kind of case which matters is that in which the alternatives are of different moral worth and there is a genuine disparity of ends. We must choose, but the direction of choice is our own, and we are in the fullest sense responsible for it.

## VI

The attack on free will has taken two principal forms, one based on universal causation and the other on the identification of freedom with caprice. The objection based on the principle of causality is clear enough. Everything that comes to be is causally determined, and this applies to volitions as much as to anything else. Hence, while we may be ignorant of the causes of some volitions, they must have causes. A genuinely free choice is a metaphysical impossibility.

It is true that, if a choice is free in the full sense of the term, it is not determined by its temporal antecedents. But there does not appear to be any evident principle that what comes to be is wholly determined by temporal antecedents; it is evident only that, if anything comes to be, it has a sufficient ground in what is at any rate logically prior to it. Now, on our analysis of free will, it is causally determined that there shall be a choice. There is motive for whichever possible choice is adopted and, consequently, motive for the exclusion of the others. Moreover we may say that it is causally determined that the direction of the choice shall be not determined but free. The actual choice is free because it proceeds simply from the simultaneous agency of the existent rational subject. Hence the being of the volition is sufficiently grounded in being which is prior to it, and, without being determined by temporal antecedents, it is motivated by them. There could be an objection from the principle of causality only if this were gratuitously and falsely interpreted as a maxim that everything that comes to be is wholly determined by temporal antecedents.

Since Hume's assault on the causal principle this objection has usually been differently expressed. Whatever may be thought, we are told, of the metaphysical status of causality, experience shows that human conduct is just as capable of being brought under general laws as anything else. Regular sequences are observed alike in the material world and in human behavior. Hence there is no ground for attributing a freedom to the will which does not belong to the objects of physical science. This form of objection has been expressed by Hume himself, by Mill, and more recently, for example, by Bertrand Russell.

In this connection it must be recalled that not all volitions are free in the full sense of the word as we have defined it, and that, where

there is freedom, it is always freedom within a certain range of possibilities, sometimes wider, sometimes narrower. Consequently there is plenty of room for approximate and statistical generalizations about human conduct. Our position would be affected only if all conduct could be brought under general laws and if it were always true that, with complete knowledge of the antecedent situation, human choices could be predicted with certainty. There is no ground at all for making such assertions. Indeed it is notoriously more difficult to arrive at generalizations about human behavior than about physical events, and generalizations about human behavior seem on the face of them to be approximate. We are entitled, after a rational analysis of free will, to suggest as a ground of this difference the clear truth of human freedom within a certain range of possibilities. The difference in availability of generalization between the physical and the human sciences is rather a consideration in favor of the freedom of the will.

The other main basis of attack on free will is, as we have said, an identification of freedom with caprice. An undetermined choice is held to be equivalent to an unmotivated choice, and consequently a free volition is thought to be an unintelligible caprice which would have no relation to the character of the agent and would in no way serve to explain the sense of moral responsibility. Thus Hume identifies liberty with chance; Kant thinks that an agency exempt from general laws would be a monstrosity; Bradley declares that such a power of free choice would make a man not accountable for his actions, but wholly unaccountable.

The persistence of this type of objection is curious, for the difference between free choice and chance or caprice seems very evident. The objection would hold only if free choice were unmotivated, and no defender of free will maintains such an absurdity. We speak of chance or accident when an event occurs with no apparent ground, and, if there could be an instance of real or absolute chance, it would be an event which really occurred without any ground. Such an event would certainly be a monstrosity; but in a free choice there is a sufficient, although not a necessitating, motive for whichever alternative is chosen, and it is necessary also that a choice should be made. The will is motivated; but, since there is a conflict of motives, the choice is free. This choice—as proceeding not from antecedent determination, but from the spontaneous agency of the subject—belongs not less but more to the self. So far from being without intelligible relation to the self, it is precisely that sort of manifestation of the self, which, since it is freely adopted, belongs most completely and exclusively to the self, and for which the self is strictly accountable. Free will involves a genuine indeterminacy, but it is plainly distinct from chance or caprice.

## VII

In the light of what has been said we may conclude with a few words on the place of free will in human life. Not all our acts are free, and not even all our volitions are free in the full sense of the word. The kind of choice in which the alternatives are of widely different character and effect, and in which after prolonged deliberation we yield ourselves with full consciousness to one side or the other, is comparatively rare. The necessity of making such a choice is a moral crisis. Yet on most occasions there is a certain range of indetermination, and we are continually making ourselves a little different from what we might have been. Besides, every action tends either to contribute to the formation of a habit, or to increase or reduce the strength of one which has already been acquired, so that it affects the range of indetermination within which choice will operate in the future. Hence, in the end, we are responsible for a considerable part of what we are.

Nevertheless, if we were to try to assess accurately whether and how far a man is responsible for some particular action, we should have to take into account all the factors of his nature and upbringing and all the circumstances of the moment. This is not a task which it is possible to face with confidence. The assessment of responsibility is difficult enough in our own case and, unless we hold a position which compels us to attempt it, it is only reasonable to renounce the effort in the case of others.

The possession of free will is precious, because it enables a thinking being to contribute to the making of himself what he is to become. Nevertheless, since it carries with it the power to do evil as well as the power to do good, this kind of freedom is not a final good. The final good is a freedom from evil in which the choice of good becomes habitual, but which, since it is an outcome of right free choices in the past, is the flowering of the personality and not a constraint upon it. Such is the state of Plato's consummate philosopher, who, since he is fixed in the contemplation of the Idea of the Good, infallibly does what is right. But it is not yet the state of men as we know them. For most men at most moments there are some modes of action too heroic to be chosen, and some too vile. The best are those who, through long continuance in the right, have already begun to approximate to that ideal of freedom which transcends the initial possibility of choosing evil rather than good.

# THE MIND OF KIERKEGAARD

## IV. BECOMING A CHRISTIAN IN CHRISTENDOM

JAMES COLLINS

### 1. CONVERGENCE ON THE PROBLEM OF CHRISTIANITY

All roads in Kierkegaard lead to the tableland of religious existence. After following his investigations in various fields of secular concern, we are brought to a standstill unless we are willing to probe into the religious implications of his previous findings. His thought derives whatever cohesion and breadth it possesses from this persistent orientation. It justifies his lifelong study of Hegelianism, romanticism, moralism, and socialism; for these can be viewed as the prevalent misinterpretations of, or substitutes for, religion and the life of the spirit.

Kierkegaard listened attentively to the replies formulated by his contemporaries in answer to Kant's most fundamental question, *What is man?* He shared with them the conviction that we are undergoing a revolution in our anthropological notions and that all the accepted ways of regarding man must be critically revised.<sup>1</sup> But he was left unsatisfied by the proposed revisions as well, for they did not seem to rest on an integral understanding of human nature. Reconstruction along the lines of aestheticism, for instance, would take account of our sensibilities, our thirst for beauty, and the insistent pressure of the passionate drives which so profoundly affect our conscious attitudes. Yet a one-sided and disjointed personality would result if due allowance were not also made for practical reason and the ideal of self-discipline for the sake of the moral good. The desired synthesis of moral and aesthetic interests is not, however, to be made on any basis furnished by one or the other outlook.

As worked out in German philosophy, the impasse between Fichte's moral idealism and the aestheticism of the early Schelling called forth

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<sup>1</sup> M. Buber, *Between Man and Man* (London: The Macmillan Co., 1948), sec. 5, locates Kierkegaard's religious thought against the background of the post-Kantian inquiry into the nature of man.

Hegel's magnificent attempt at synthesizing all human values in a dialectical system. The various phases of this dialectic were identified by Hegel with the pulsations of the divine life and substantial being itself, introducing into God a principle of unrest, self-estrangement, and tragedy. In philosophical self-consciousness this entire process is assimilated and overcome by being understood in all its contradictory richness. Man, as the agent who realizes the law of reason and history, is the ground and manifestation of divinity. The act of worship and the act of plenary philosophical speculation tend to coincide, and both in turn can be interpreted as terminal operations in the self-explication of the absolute mind.<sup>2</sup>

Among Hegel's first critics, Feuerbach saw most clearly that absolute idealism transforms the traditional notions of God and man beyond recognition, and hence also the meaning of the Christian religion. Whereas Hegel prided himself upon having transcribed the entire content of revelation in terms of his philosophy of religion, Feuerbach countered that this accomplishment, if successful, canceled any claim of Christianity of embodying truths revealed by some transcendent source. What can be adequately derived through a strict philosophical method has neither need nor leeway for invoking supernatural authorization. Furthermore, humanity is no longer constrained to project its own conception of absolute perfection into some heavenly, otherworldly being. There is now sufficient moral strength and devotedness among men to dispense with a transcendent God and rely solely upon the inspiration and instruments which man furnishes himself. Theologism can henceforth be reduced safely to anthropology, the new universal science. In accord with this pronouncement, D. F. Strauss applied to Scripture the identification of God with humanity's highest interests and ideals. The figure of Christ must be taken in a thoroughly "humanistic" way as an embodiment of human aspirations and only in

<sup>2</sup> R. Kroner, "The Year 1800 in the Development of German Idealism," *Review of Metaphysics*, I (1948), 1-31, summarizes the relation between Hegel and the older exponents of idealism. J. Hyppolite, *Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit de Hegel* (Paris: Aubier, 1946), p. 525, text and n. 1, remarks that Hegel tends to assimilate God to man in a kind of absolutist humanism and to eradicate the Christian distinction between the here-below and the beyond-the-world by limiting all transcendence to the "horizontal" sort, directed only toward the temporal, historical process. Atheistic existentialists also try to suppress the movement toward "vertical" transcendence (from man to God) in their analysis of human experience. Kierkegaard comments on the Speculative reduction of the distinction between the "here" and the "hereafter" (*Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, trans. D. F. Swenson [Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1941], pp. 505 ff.). J. Royce's *The Problem of Christianity* (2 vols.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1913) is the best American example of the idealist interpretation of revelation in exclusively philosophical terms.

this sense as divine. It was only a short step for Marx to locate "the really human man" not in an idealized moral individual but in the social fabric woven by men working together in the technical exploitation of nature. So understood, the human situation allows no room for religion as a bond with a transcendent God, who is above nature and man. Salvation is the work of our own hands—the harmonious society which our labor and the weight of history will inevitably bring forth.<sup>3</sup>

Kierkegaard kept abreast of the scriptural and philosophical radicalization of Hegel's teaching, and to some extent was also familiar with the socialist replacement of religion by worldly zeal and mass endeavors. Just as his view of existence was advanced against Hegel's theologizing metaphysics, so his category of the individual and the analysis of Christianity were intended as an answer to the new philosophical anthropologies. On one point, indeed, he agreed with the Hegelians of the Left as against those of the Right. Once granted that Hegel did succeed in incorporating Christianity into his system, then the inferences drawn by the radical Hegelians do follow with inexorable logic. God, man, and their relationship or lack of it must then be interpreted according to the requirements of a purely immanentist and rationalistic set of principles. The unavoidable conclusion is the substitution of humanity for God and the claims of temporal society for the obligation of religion. In this respect, orthodox Hegelian theologians remain orthodox only in virtue of their muddleheadedness. But these results obtain only if the original premise is sound—and this Kierkegaard (unlike the Hegelian divines) denied on the basis of his analysis of existence and the individual.

The truths of Christian religion are existential; that is, they concern the order of real becoming, freedom, history, and individual striving. As such they resist inclusion in a system of philosophical idealism just as vigorously and effectively as does the act of existing itself. What Kierkegaard established about the incompatibility between Hegelianism

<sup>3</sup> For Marx's early critical notes on Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* and Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity*, cf. *Three Essays by Karl Marx*, trans. R. Stone, (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1947), essay 3. Here Marx also outlines his own synthesis of humanism and naturalism. Kierkegaard, for his part, is always careful to explain that Christ, as the God-Man, is not a union of God and humanity-at-large, but of God and this human individual situated in an actual historical context (*Training in Christianity*, trans. W. Lowrie [New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1941], pp. 84, 123). Neither Hegel nor Feuerbach respected this fact, and hence neither of their explanations of the Incarnation touches on the real issue. Thus Marx is making an uncritical assumption when he believes that Christianity is sufficiently explained by his predecessors and that to refute them is to dismiss religion and theology. Kierkegaard's belief in Christ as the God-Man is analyzed by T. Croxall, *Kierkegaard Studies* (London: Lutterworth Press, 1948), pp. 193 ff.

and the sphere of existence is also applicable here. Hegel's treatment of revelation is based upon an embarrassing *ignoratio elenchi*, since it is an attempt to apply Systematic principles to a region which by nature falls outside their province.<sup>4</sup> What misleads idealistic theologians is their haste in explaining dogma in terms of Systematic concepts, without first inquiring whether or not Christian truth can validly be "mediated" and transferred to so foreign a terrain. This failure to criticize the suppositions of idealistic philosophy of religion suggested to Kierkegaard that the professed defenders of Christianity might be as mistaken about its real nature as are its detractors on the Left.

A similar double-barrelled criticism of the Hegelians follows from Kierkegaard's view of the individual. When he states that an appreciation of the individual person cannot be gained from the absolutist standpoint, he means both that atheistic humanism and socialism are inhumane and that idealist theology has lost sight of the genuine human subject of redemption. The former group does not see that man retains his authentic proportions only as living in God's acknowledged presence, whereas the latter compromises man's distinction from God and God's gracious freedom in saving man. It is as futile to catch up the work of redemption in the rhythmic determinism of a Speculative dialectic as it is to try to distill the "essence of Christianity" without admitting that humanity is not *eo ipso* divine. Neither approach respects the dignity of the individual man or the transcendent element in Christianity. But it is better to confess openly to atheism and disdain for the mere individual than to pretend to be a strong supporter of Christianity and personal rights.

Some historical evidence for his low opinion of the alliance between Christianity and idealism might be found by Kierkegaard in the succession of ineffectual idealistic theologies and philosophies of religion, "empirical" as well as absolutist. That they have failed to preserve men in their Christian faith is due not merely to accidental limitations, but to an essential deficiency. The revealed and historical nature of Christian truth does not survive transplanting to an idealist soil. It is idle to pose the question whether Kierkegaard would allow *any* mutual aid to pass between a philosophy of religion and Christianity.<sup>5</sup> The one

<sup>4</sup> For a criticism of the circular assumption that "Christianity is the Speculative interpretation of Christianity," cf. *Postscript*, pp. 335 ff. For Kierkegaard's lifelong criticism of Hegel's philosophy of religion, cf. H. Reuter, *Sören Kierkegaards religionsphilosophische Gedanken im Verhältnis zu Hegels religionsphilosophischem System* (Leipzig, 1914).

<sup>5</sup> C. Fabro, *Problemi dell'esistenzialismo* (Rome: Editrice A.V.E., 1945), pp. 109 ff., notes the limited way in which Kierkegaard understood the problem of philosophy and religion. An instance is his treatment of immortality. In his

philosophy with which he was thoroughly acquainted and which he accepted too readily as the definitive form of all philosophy was, in principle, incapable of respecting the independence of Christ's person and teaching. Added to this is Kierkegaard's own failure to distinguish between the idealist notion of Speculation and the speculative attitude which is at the root of all sound philosophizing. He regarded the attempts of natural theology to "prove God's existence" speculatively as insults perpetrated before his face rather than as humble efforts to bring natural intelligence to as full and explicit a possession of truth as is possible in its own order and manner. Similarly, he looked upon all apologetic appeal to reason, Scripture, and history as an attempt at strict proof of the content of revelation and hence as a supplanting of faith. His strictures on this score, however, were provoked by the pusillanimity of many believers in a rationalistic age and by the mere lip service which many apologists paid to the traditional distinction between a proof of the preambles to faith and an alleged proof of the revealed supernatural truth itself.

Kierkegaard's constructive thoughts on natural religion are set down in the many discourses which accompany his pseudonymous books and which are published under his own name. These discourses deal largely with the common foundations of religiousness and its ethical aspects.<sup>6</sup> Here he stresses the indispensable undergirding of all religious life: a valuing of God above all the goods and fortune of temporal existence, a recognition of one's own dependence on God and unworthiness before him, a willingness to convert oneself effectively from self-interest to his service, a frank admission that everything we achieve is God's gift and we ourselves his handiwork. Instead of exploring the possibility of a philosophical basis for these meditations, however, Kierkegaard is directly interested only in securing the distinction between natural and revealed religion. The viewpoint on existence, as set forth in the *Postscript*, emphasizes not only its non-systematic character but also its connection with faith as a paradoxical affirmation of the presence of the eternal in time. This provides a dividing line between all other

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eagerness to associate immortality with the winning or losing of eternal life through free acts, Kierkegaard not only repudiates the unconcerned Hegelian conception of immortality (a concealed but inevitable eternity, which we cannot but enjoy), but also rules out any treatment of the question which does not concentrate upon the formal equation between immortality and the moral-religious judgment of God on man. Cf. *Postscript*, pp. 152 ff.; also see *Christian Discourses*, trans. W. Lowrie (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1940), pp. 212 ff.

<sup>6</sup> This background of Kierkegaard's specifically Christian views is carefully described by T. Croxall, *op. cit.*, Part II; see also E. Geismar, *Lectures on the Religious Thought of Søren Kierkegaard* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Press, 1937), Lect. 4.

religions and Christianity, as founded on belief in the Incarnation. This distinction between religions of immanence and the unique religion of transcendence is re-enforced by an analysis of the individual and the quality of inner life. The proper nature of sin, faith, and other capacities of the human spirit remains obscured until illuminated by the Christian good news of man's call to share freely in the divine life through Christ.

From 1849 onwards until his death in 1855, Kierkegaard was occupied almost exclusively with the task of renewing the meaning of Christianity for his contemporaries. In doing this, however, he was forced to compare and contrast his religious conception with the prevailing one which shaped the policies of the Church of Denmark. The religious books which he wrote during this period are pointed tracts for the times rather than timeless, unpolemical expositions of doctrine.<sup>7</sup> Yet in large measure they avoid being unrewardingly parochial and ephemeral, for they spring from a lifetime of reflection and dialectical inquiry into the structure of the religious mode of existence. Only at the very end of his authorship—after launching the open and relentless attack on the Danish Establishment—did Kierkegaard sacrifice perspective in order to score a hit or test the limits of his personal courage. Even then, he did not leave his later readers entirely without means for righting the balance and drawing profit from his excessive moments.

## 2. THE SITUATION OF BEING IN CHRISTENDOM

The Christian religion was fortunate during the nineteenth century in having been critically reappraised and sometimes attacked by men of outstanding intelligence. Its power of self-reform might not have functioned vigorously, had it not been for the lessons learned under duress from open enemies like Marx, Proudhon, and Nietzsche. Their error lay not in denouncing the compromises and deformations which had undoubtedly crept in, but in losing hope that they could be eradicated through an internal renewal of the Christian life. Their despair led them to repudiate the traditional religious view of man and to substitute for it a secular humanism based, as they thought, on this-worldly means and aims alone. But other critics, just as lucid and merciless in their analysis of the situation, were careful to point out

<sup>7</sup> The main books are: *Two Minor Ethico-Religious Treatises*, printed together with *The Present Age*, trans. A. Dru and W. Lowrie (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1940); *Sickness unto Death*, trans. W. Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1941); *Training in Christianity; For Self-Examination* and *Judge for Yourselves!*, printed together with *Three Discourses, 1851*, trans. W. Lowrie (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1941); and *Attack upon Christendom, 1854-1855*, (articles originally appearing in the *Fatherland* and the *Instant*, but gathered together under this title in the English translation), trans. W. Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1944).

that the true horror of "bourgeois civilization" consists in its very claim to be Christian. Léon Bloy, calling himself the obedient servant of an alien Fury, lashed out with the studied intemperance of one who feels himself, together with the simple ones of the world, being deceived and made unclean by such a profanation.<sup>8</sup> He sounded the Johannine call to penance and change of heart—not in an anti-Christian direction but toward a rediscovery of those Christian verities which have been lost from sight.

Kierkegaard belongs in the company of the latter kind of solvents of the modern religious settlement. He wanted to do away, not with Christian truth, but with the false persuasion that it has prevailed generally among Western men and that the accepted social institutions are genuinely Christian in inspiration and effect. This conviction had crystallized in the notion of Christendom: a Christian society of nations and a Christian ordering of the whole range of temporal activities. In the conduct of international and civic affairs during his own day Kierkegaard found little to correspond to the liturgical idea of *fines Christianorum*. His attention was centered more on cultural than political matters, however, since he was chiefly alarmed by the completely secularist attitude in society and by the acute stage which the class struggle had entered in our era. As actually organized, society provided a substitute for the conscientious management of personal life under God's law. The pressure of social forces tended to reduce individuals to an irresponsible and insignificant dead level. Only the anonymous group counted as the bearer of values and determinant of ends, and these ends were exclusively mundane ones.

The scandal was not only that individuals were surrendering their integrity and freedom cheaply, but also that the churches condoned and were party to this betrayal, furnishing the Grand Inquisitors of Christendom. They had forgotten the correlation between personal existence and Christian perfection. It is well to bring out clearly this aspect of Christian humanism behind Kierkegaard's polemic, since he himself sometimes obscured it in his eagerness to defend God's rights to our lives against the claims of the world. He often speaks of "the inhumane and the un-Christlike" in a single breath and, on the other hand, declares that the Christian notion of the individual is the most humane view of man.<sup>9</sup> One fundamental reason for his hostility to the ecclesi-

<sup>8</sup> A comparison between Kierkegaard and Bloy is suggested by F. O'Malley, "The Passion of Léon Bloy," *Review of Politics*, X (1948), 100-4.

<sup>9</sup> See *Works of Love*, trans. D. F. Swenson and L. M. Swenson (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1946), p. 61; *Training*, p. 92; *Postscript*, p. 219. Such texts should be borne in mind when one also reads (*Training*, p. 119) that even to thoughtful persons, Christianity often seems to be "hostile to man."

astical establishment is its failure to promote that maximum inwardness, liberty of spirit, and personal consecration to God which comprise for him the chief marks of religious maturity. Hence he placed the state church, as he experienced it, on a par with the state itself. Both perform a minimal function in regulating the external relations between men, but both threaten to swamp the individual in the totality by depreciating his unique self-responsibility. To this extent, these social forms must be severely limited and transcended by those who seek to preserve the religious relationship with God.

Kierkegaard did not distinguish adequately between the actual ecclesiastical order in his own land and the Church as a universal vessel and bond of grace; but there are indications in his writings that the distinction is not entirely absent from his mind.<sup>10</sup> Sometimes he spoke about the Church in a quite general and ideal way, rather than as found "especially in Protestantism, more especially in Denmark." As a young man, he hazarded the opinion that when the present age of excessive individualism (which has provoked an equally exaggerated collectivism) passes away, there will be a renascence of the idea of the *ecclesia*. It will be restored to its rightful place as a counterbalance to religious isolation and as a counterforce against worldliness. Indeed, the category of the individual and that of the religious congregation are complementary poles of religious existence, so that an adequate expression of Christian religiousness depends on their mutual tension and demands upon the soul. What is missing from Kierkegaard's outlook is any sense of the Church as a present actuality, as something more than an idea to be developed later on in the concrete order, when circumstances are more favorable. He was so deeply involved in the Danish situation,<sup>11</sup> with its danger of religious *Schwärmerei* in connection with the religious community, that he found no opportunity to follow up the remark that only in the case of the Church as the *genus electum, gens sancta*, does the "race" or social whole again assume a primacy over the human individual. He saw only the taint of Hegelianism in his earlier statement that Christ died for each individual, but "for me" as belonging

<sup>10</sup> Among other passages, consult *Postscript*, p. 492, n.; *The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard*, a selection, ed. and trans. A. Dru (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1938), Nos. 85, 121, 141, 192; *The Point of View for My Work as an Author*, trans. W. Lowrie (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1939) p. 153, n.

<sup>11</sup> On the Danish Lutheran Church, cf. E. Dunkley, *The Reformation in Denmark* (London, 1948); J. Andersen, *A Survey of the History of the Church in Denmark* (Copenhagen, 1930). It was Kierkegaard's contemporary N. Grundtvig who fostered unrestrained enthusiasm for the religious community. On Kierkegaard's later years, cf. W. Lowrie, *Kierkegaard* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1938), Parts V and VI.

to the "many," the company of redeemed men joined together in organic union.

Kierkegaard pointed to no definite historical realization of the religious community. But he did meditate at great length, especially toward the end of his life, upon the contrast between medieval Catholicism and Protestantism. Catholicism was not treated by him as one of the serious alternatives in our time, but only as having taught us some valuable historical lessons, which will be useful in determining the future course of Christianity. The claim of the Catholic Church to be in every age the *una sancta*, the sanctifying union of men in Christ's mystical body, is not examined. But within the limits of his sketchy acquaintance with the Church, Kierkegaard's reflections are usually penetrating and sympathetic. Catholicism's great virtue is to have shown the need for the communal factor in religious life, so that men may share with each other the burden of a responsible use of freedom in regard to an eternal outcome. Sooner or later, Kierkegaard predicted, Protestantism must begin to cultivate the social aspect of religion either in the form of small, intense conventicles or in a genuine church, having authority and a full sacramental order. Only the most gifted and exceptional individuals have the strength and even the duty to stand alone with their conscience before God.

The obligation to worship in a visible corporate way is, then, not unconditional for Kierkegaard; but he does not furnish the exact criteria for determining which persons are dispensed from the common duty. He would like to achieve a synthesis between the religious community represented by Catholicism (apart from any political implications of a Christendom united under pope and emperor) and the reforming vigilance of a lone, conscientious individual like Luther (apart from the state churches and supporting princes entailed by historical Lutheranism). The former would supply the traditional objective norm of faith, the latter the corrective against human abuses.<sup>12</sup> In actual fact, Kierkegaard has no further recourse to the "norm" than as a foil to the situation in Denmark and as a stimulus to ideal planning. It is never consulted as a concrete standard which is truly authoritative and compelling for him. Rather, the contrast which Catholicism erects between the Church and the world is used as a club against the Lutheran Establishment. In the more relevant Kierkegaardian sense, "Christendom" signifies the unholy alliance concluded by official Protestantism with the state, an alliance which spells the end of the older notion of an implacable enmity between the Christian spirit and the powers of this world.

<sup>12</sup> *Journals*, No. 1327.

In the bitter series of articles contributed to the *Fatherland* and the *Instant* during his last year of life (1854-55), Kierkegaard constantly hammers home the point that the Established Church is built upon a compromise where no compromise is possible without renouncing authentic Christianity. He is excessive here, as he often was in the earlier polemical writings; and, furthermore, many of the issues are of strictly local and passing importance. Yet when all qualifications are made, there remains a substantial core which Christians today will find worth salvaging and taking to heart. We cannot expect adequate guidance from him in the positive work of bringing all things under the headship of Christ; he was unable to settle for himself how his own plentiful natural talent might be reclaimed. But he is a master at ferreting out the pitfalls which await those who do try to redeem the natural order and impenetrate the world with Christian purpose and grace. It would be unfortunate to become dissuaded from this program by a reading of these broadsides, but the task of redeeming time for eternity should not be undertaken without a sober appraisal of the attendant dangers and deceptions. Kierkegaard is the bad conscience to which Christians must listen lest they become complacent about the religious *status quo* and forget about that meaning of the "world" in which it remains forever an enemy of religion.

The state church is in reality a department of the state and hence does not afford believers an independent foothold in their effort to secure the primacy of the spiritual. Its effect upon the mind is a confusing one. On the one hand it counsels us to deny the world and become crucified to the world, whereas its own daily example preaches something else which comes closer to being an amiable settlement on the world's terms. Behind his satirical and often unjust remarks about infant baptism, marriage and a married clergy, fashionable congregations and court preachers, the priesthood of all where it means nothing special to be a priest, and comfortable attacks upon medieval asceticism by those who enjoy comfortable "livings," Kierkegaard is agitated lest the shepherds be guilty of perpetrating a gigantic fraud and the sheep be led astray into thinking that all is well in this easy-going climate. The opposition between the Church and the world, taken as the seat of evil, is whittled down and smoothed away when it amounts to no more than an inspiring renunciation during the weekly sermon. When sacrifices are no longer demanded, vows no longer respected, suffering no longer prized as a component of the religious life, then Christianity is being replaced by an aesthetic representation of the Christian drama. This is a token that the established order has deified itself in practice, allowing no place for a transcendent God before whom we exist in inwardness and in fear and trembling.

The basic charge is that the established order undermines moral seriousness and the transcendence of Christianity by secularizing the entire religious outlook of men.<sup>13</sup> People come to see no difference between assuming the rights and duties of temporal citizenship and being reborn in Christ. The latter seems to involve no "dying from the world," except in a poetic sense, no need to appropriate a new principle of life and a new viewpoint through costing choices, no unremitting warfare with oneself and with the corrupting influence of the world. Christendom glosses over the lines of battle, satisfies us that the victory is already won—and so hands us over to the enemy as to a trustworthy friend. This, Kierkegaard understood as an act of high treason calling for his midnight cry of alarm. Salvation is not given to us automatically when we prove ourselves to be solid pillars of worldly society, nor does it ever come wholesale without asking each of us to pass singly through the wicket. To be born in Christendom is a description of the *terminus a quo* of the Christian's search for life eternal, not a passport which assures effortless entry therein by its own authority.

Kierkegaard's attack upon Protestant Christendom has led some readers to turn away entirely from Christianity and others to move closer toward Catholicism. He himself followed a much less forth-right course, a course which he did not propose as a model for others to follow. He preferred to stand *in discriminine rerum*, on the razor edge of the religious situation, pointing out the "normality" of the Catholic teaching on the Church, the sacraments, and religious authority without inquiring more closely into its claim of truth or sharing visibly in its life. His own vocation was to remain a gadfly among Protestants, reminding them that their only justification is to provide the incorruptibly critical conscience of the Christian community, not to convert the reforming principle itself into a counternorm and countertradition. This led him to assume an ambivalent attitude toward Luther,<sup>14</sup> listening with edification to the passionate and paradoxical preacher, who spoke from the depths of his personal religious experience, and satirizing the ecclesiastical politician and theologian who set the main lines of the Protestant Establishment. Not only Lutheranism but also the back-to-Luther movement of his own day seemed to Kierkegaard to betray a misunderstanding of Luther's significance as a single witness. They erect an obstacle to the integral development of the religious individual. Each man is called upon to relate himself to God unconditionally and

<sup>13</sup> "The deification of the established order is the secularization of everything. . . . The established order desires to be totalitarian, recognizing nothing over it, but having under it every individual" (*Training*, p. 92).

<sup>14</sup> One typical judgment is that Luther "is an extremely important patient for Christianity, but he is not the doctor" (*Journals*, No. 1325).

at his own risk, thus preparing for a future union with others in a common spiritual life.

### 3. FIRST, SEVERITY—THEN, GENTLENESS

The "category of suffering" is employed catastrophically in the religious sphere to dissolve the illusion of Christendom, just as that of the individual is used in social matters to break the power of the irresponsible crowd. Kierkegaard's strategy is to quote at its highest the price of becoming a Christian, stressing the severity of the test which must be passed rather than the consolation which follows. Thereby the contrast between what Christianity demands and what the Establishment deems to be sufficient is made plain, even though the distinction between the commands and the counsels is sometimes overlooked. This accords with the earlier teaching on the need to make a break with one's given natural state by subjecting it to critical reflection and the test of freedom. This is an indispensable step in the development of personality, but is not a sufficient one from the moral standpoint. One can deliberately choose to be confirmed in evil. The moral qualification enters when the individual seeks to establish the right relation between various ends and values, giving an unconditional primacy to the absolute good. Such an ordering of interests involves the possibility of having to relinquish certain attachments which conflict with one's search for the absolute. The morally mature person must be ready to make the sacrifice and must already have detached himself from every uncritical adherence to finite goods.

From his study of the various existential attitudes, however, Kierkegaard found that actual suffering is more likely to be met with at the aesthetic level and that the presence of such suffering is an indication of the close relation between the lover and genius and the religious way of life. But the aesthetic individual remains more or less an unwilling victim of suffering, because of his inability to grasp the full sense of his exceptional situation. Its meaning becomes clear only when one's life is viewed religiously in the light of God's holiness and his desire that we become perfect. Kierkegaard proposes a curious criterion for determining the marks of religion and Christianity.<sup>15</sup> Find a point which is under fire by an atheist of the nineteenth century and which is also defended by a seventeenth-century man of faith—and you have found an incontrovertibly religious belief. Such is the case with suffering, which is a scandal to a Feuerbach and a matter of glory to

<sup>15</sup> *Stages on Life's Way*, trans. W. Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1940), pp. 409, 415-16.

a Pascal, but to both a distinguishing note of the Christian mode of existing.

In the degree that it promotes a meditative inwardness, Christianity makes us aware of God's supreme goodness and of our own distance from, and hostility towards, his holiness. A sense of one's own sinfulness leads religiously neither to morbid despair nor to rationalization. It issues in a voluntary acceptance of suffering as a way of atoning for sin to God the just judge and of approaching closer to God the redeemer. In a series of discourses entitled *The Gospel of Suffering* Kierkegaard establishes the relation between guilt, suffering, and the triumph of faith much after the manner of Luther's dialectical treatment of the theme of the sinner as believer.<sup>16</sup> In the religious situation, we learn to regard our attempts at being autonomous as a personal offence against the majesty of God, from whom alone we have our sufficiency. Since our original condition is one in which we do build our existence upon our own foundation and pattern, it is already qualified religiously and morally as guilty. Hence the need for "death," for a deliberate renunciation of the self-centered attitude as a prerequisite of living in a spiritual way. Kierkegaard considered any religious teacher who failed to emphasize the place of severity and suffering in religious growth as lacking in honesty or insight. Frequently, as with the Hegelian divines, it was a case of not recognizing "idolatry,"<sup>17</sup> a purely immanent and pantheistic view of oneself and God, where it is all too evident. This misunderstanding often leads to a confusion between existential suffering on the part of a finite man and sinner, and the corrective, but only ideal, operation of the dialectical "principle of negativity."

Kierkegaard placed more emphasis on the need of faith in order to recognize sin than he did on the fact itself of sin. He saw the con-

<sup>16</sup> The parallel with Luther on this matter is brought out by P. Mesnard, *Le Vrai visage de Kierkegaard* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1948), pp. 367 ff. For Luther's doctrine on sin and faith in relation to Kierkegaard, cf. T. Bohlin, *Kierkegaards dogmatische Anschauung*, German translation (Gütersloh, 1927), chap. viii.

<sup>17</sup> The relevance of Luther's concept of "idolatry" is noted by P. Ramsey, "Existenz and the Existence of God: A Study of Kierkegaard and Hegel," *Journal of Religion*, XXVIII (1948), 157-76. Ramsey, like T. Bohlin (*op. cit.*, chap. vii), relies too heavily upon a comparison between Kierkegaard and the Hegel of the *Philosophy of Religion*. But he does suggest that Hegel's conception of religious worship is the idolatrous one of a spirit which stays essentially at home with itself, and that only here does the line of cleavage between Kierkegaard and idealism stand forth clearly. Kierkegaard's treatment of this theme is best worked out in *Sickness*, pp. 108 ff., 130 ff. This fundamental antagonism between Kierkegaard and Hegel escapes C. Van Til, *The New Modernism* (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1946), chap. iii, who tries to unite them in a common attack upon Christianity.

sciousness of sin fast disappearing among men in proportion as Christian faith is displaced by mass opinion and the rationalistic philosophies of religion. The full nature and horror of sin are only grasped by him who sees the individual man as a genuinely finite and free agent and who relates human action to God in the person of Christ. For the believer, Christ's life on earth is not a myth of the "creative community" nor an illustration of the workings of the absolute Concept in the world. Man as a sinner is at personal enmity with Christ, and man as a sufferer is professing the reality of the forgiveness of sin by following in the way of Christ. Kierkegaard, who was a close student of the *Following of Christ*, reminds Christians that they are cross-bearers who walk with Christ in the path of self-denial and acceptance of suffering for his sake. Suffering is the great training school for eternity. Its burden may be heavy, but there is no other way of learning the lessons of repentance and obedience to God, and the power of faith. The Christian is no masochist, as Nietzsche supposed, since suffering is a means and a springboard, a touchstone of companionship with Christ. After severity comes gentleness; after death, life. "There is in life one blessed joy: to follow Christ; and in death one last blessed joy: to follow Christ to life!"<sup>18</sup>

His own experiences with the press and the Establishment also taught Kierkegaard that the world by nature hates the principle of love and strives to suppress religious truth whenever it can. Any softening of this opposition aroused his suspicion, and any failure to inculcate it in Christian minds seemed to him a piece of unrealism, or worse. He came more and more to regard the Christian existence in the world as one of bearing witness even as the martyrs did, of being prepared at any time to sacrifice one's reputation, livelihood, or life itself. Of himself, he said that Denmark has need of "a dead man." Moreover, the

<sup>18</sup> *The Gospel of Suffering*, trans. D. F. Swenson and L. M. Swenson (Minneapolis: Augsburg Press, 1947), p. 20; see also the entire second series of *Christian Discourses*, devoted to the Christian "joy of it." A survey of Kierkegaard's religious writings requires a drastic modification of M. Grene's dictum (*Dreadful Freedom: A Critique of Existentialism* [Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1948], p. 38) that Kierkegaard's individual is aware of himself as a mere nullity grasped in a "pure and unmixed suffering," which far outweighs the joy. This describes only the Godforsaken aspect of human existence, which is less truly human than the positive result of the right use of freedom. F. Sheen, *Philosophy of Religion* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948), p. 352, characterizes Kierkegaard as the source of recent theologies and philosophies of the Frustrated Man. It must be added, however, both that Kierkegaard regards such frustration as a moral-religious consequence of forsaking God and that he presents a way of overcoming this condition, however inadequate his remedial advice. Sheen shows (chap. xi) how the problematic character of man can serve as an avenue to faith.

Christian should take the initiative in the conflict rather than wait for the world's good pleasure to bring it to his door. The converse side of suffering, then, is confidence in eternity and God's governance. Although the Christian good news is disquieting rather than tranquillizing, it also gives a man the power to "stand out" from the herd and to become "heterogeneous," in the sense of striving to realize something more than the common measure of natural human perfection. Without despising the latter, Kierkegaard refused to identify it with the Christian measure of man's capacities and duties. His own positive statement of the Christian requirement is formulated in his teaching on contemporaneity with Christ. This is the truth for which we should be willing at all costs to bear witness.

#### 4. BECOMING CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH CHRIST

At the height of his polemic against the established order, Kierkegaard admitted to being supported by one central and decisive thought: that each individual believer can and must become contemporaneous with Christ. The philosophical basis for this conviction had been established a decade previously in the *Fragments*, which is a nineteenth-century *Cur Deus Homo*, cast in the hypothetical mode. On the supposition that the Incarnation has taken place, what relation do believers of various generations hold toward Christ and each other? The answer is framed within Kierkegaard's general teaching on the historicity of existence and the credal character of historical apprehension.<sup>19</sup> An event is called historical so far as its existence is or was due to a process of temporal becoming. Since becoming involves both an element of contingency or uncertainty and one of factual certainty, the historical process is correspondingly grasped only by an act of belief. Now the nature of belief will be further specified by the kind of historical becoming under consideration. In the case of an ordinary temporal event, belief "in the first degree" or the usual historical acquaintance is sufficient. Here a premium is placed upon the testimony and reliability of eyewitnesses. The probability of the assent is in proportion to the more or less exact and exhaustive accumulation of relevant facts by

<sup>19</sup> The close connection between the meaning of existence and the meaning of becoming a Christian is emphasized by R. Harper, *Existentialism: A Theory of Man* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1948), p. 57. For the existential background of this view of history, cf. my article, "Three Kierkegaardian Problems: I, The Meaning of Existence," *New Scholasticism*, XXII (1948), 371-416. This existential analysis of time and history has left a definite mark upon recent German theology, as can be gathered from Parts C-D of H. Schrey's *Existenz und Offenbarung* (Tübingen: J. Mohr, 1947). For Kierkegaard's general effect upon crisis theology, cf. M. Channing-Pearce, *The Terrible Crystal* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1941).

such eyewitnesses or later scholars, upon whom the present generation must rely, as upon intermediaries. No more than a high degree of probability can ever be obtained through such procedures.

The Incarnation is a historical fact and hence a proper object of belief. Yet it is no ordinary historical event, but the coming of the eternal in time, the assuming of mortal flesh by the infinite God in an actual, historical situation. Hence it can be apprehended only through an act of belief "in the second degree," or religious faith in the strict sense. The divine nature of Christ is not present incognito in his human nature in the sense that it is cleverly concealed from all but the best-trained philosophical minds. Its presence is rather an absolute mystery and paradox, being inaccessible to even the most ingenious and sublime efforts of merely natural intelligence and yet available to anyone and everyone who prays for the power to recognize it. Faith lies on the other side of reason's "death" or frank acknowledgment of its essential inability to grasp this truth. Moreover, faith comes as a gift from God himself: he gives the very condition for apprehending his incarnate presence. The situation in which an individual is given faith to confess the Incarnation, the presence of the eternal God as an individual man in history, is termed by Kierkegaard the Instant.

The meaning of contemporaneity is proportioned to the historical fact itself.<sup>20</sup> In the case of the Incarnation, Kierkegaard distinguishes between believers and all other interested people, maintaining that only the former class is contemporaneous with Christ in his full historical reality and that all members in this class are equally contemporaneous with him. The only way to become contemporaneous with this theandric event is by believing in it. Thus one might have seen and heard Christ on earth without coming to believe in him, and hence without participating in the historical truth of the Incarnation. Such an eyewitness would be as remotely distant from the person of Christ as would any unbelieving historian or historically-minded philosopher of later ages. To be contemporaneous with Christ as with one ordinary historical event among others is only a possible occasion for having faith in him, the occasion which was given to his followers on earth and to those who put him to death. But the former became disciples only by believing in him and only in this way became fully contemporaneous with him.

The special historical character of the Incarnation is also seen by comparing it with other facts which are known to men. A "fact" may convey a purely eternal truth, a purely temporal one, or one which is

<sup>20</sup> *Philosophical Fragments; or, A Fragment of Philosophy*, trans. D. F. Swenson (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1936), pp. 44 ff., 70 ff., 83 ff.

at once thoroughly temporal and thoroughly eternal. An eternal act is essentially not a historical fact at all. It dominates the entire historical process and can be known in all ages simply because it is outside of time entirely and revokes the meaning of history. An ordinary historical event is completely temporal in its constitution, and knowledge of it is subject to the vicissitudes and limitations of time. Historical apprehension based on such a fact is never more than probable, although the probability may be constantly heightened by our historical studies. Now the Incarnation neither transpires outside of history nor is wholly subject to the immanent conditions imposed by time. Because it is a genuinely historical fact, it must be approached as an existential and historical truth. But because it is also the presence of eternity in time, this fact can (and can only) be known by the act of faith, which banishes all doubt and is more certain than any immediate perception. Faith is not an act of the will, in the sense of wishful believing or sheer willfulness of credence. But it does involve the will so far as it regards an existential truth, transcends the natural scope of reason by means of a "leap" of personal decision, and requires the free acceptance of the conditions of faith from God.

The main consequence which Kierkegaard drew from this discussion concerns the difference between the various generations of believers. God himself gives the power to share in the Instant, and God is master of the temporal process. Hence the very same condition of faith is given immediately by God to all who believe in Christ, even though they live at a later time.<sup>21</sup> What Christ's own earthly presence was to his first disciples—an occasion for receiving faith, but not faith itself—is now supplied by the testimony of believers, the tradition "handed down from the fathers." The power to believe, however, is God's direct gift to each individual disciple and makes every believer of whatever historical period contemporaneous with Christ in his uniquely historical actuality. Ordinary history is not thereby annihilated, nor is the difference overlooked between having Christ's earthly presence as the occasion of faith and having the witness of tradition among believers. But the mystery of Christ is shared by all who join in the Instant or the actual believing, and is shared by all contemporaneously.

This is Kierkegaard's answer to Hegelian theologians and biblical scholars, such as Daub on the Right and Strauss on the Left. It contains one serious deficiency; but, apart from that, the advantages are many in helping to restore a sane attitude in the wake of theological and historical rationalism. The actual truth of faith in the incarnate

<sup>21</sup> Polemical use of this implication is made in *Training*, pp. 67 ff.; *Attack*, pp. 239 ff., 280 ff.

God is left unsettled in the *Fragments*, whereas in the religious works it is taken as the most radical existential truth. But Kierkegaard, in his concern to dissociate faith from bare rational assent and pretended philosophical demonstration of revelation, is suspicious of any intellectual motives of faith. Probability is removed not by an intellectually certain adherence of both mind and will to the revealed truth, but by the sheer courage and tenacity of the leap of personal commitment to a way of life. This leap combines an extreme "objective uncertainty" or absence of philosophical proof and an equally extreme "subjective certainty" or adhesion of the will and the whole personality to the demands of such belief upon our existence. In setting faith off from Speculative reason, Kierkegaard fails to bring it into normal relationship with a nonidealistic natural theology and to give the intellect its full and explicit share in grasping revealed truth. He is not anti-intellectual, for he hints that if reason is confident enough in God to break through its own autonomy, it will discover itself to be in secret accord with faith. But the office of reason in laying the foundations of natural religion and in preparing for faith is dispensed with, being given no further consideration.<sup>22</sup>

On the other hand, Kierkegaard's view of faith and history helps to correct some misconceptions to which the procedure of Christian apologists sometimes gives rise. This can be confirmed by indicating three trends in the apologetics of his day and of later times which his views are intended to challenge and amend. (a) Necessary as it is to cultivate the historical approach to Scripture, this reconstructive work should not be taken as equivalent to a complete recapturing of the historical truth of the Incarnation or as the only path to attaining this truth. Historical studies are bound by their nature to treat

<sup>22</sup> Kierkegaard's scattered observations on the nature of faith have been collated by W. Ruttenbeck, *Søren Kierkegaard, der christliche Denker u. sein Werk* (Berlin, 1929), chap. viii. The leading theological opinions, especially those of recent times, have been analyzed by R. Aubert: *L'Acte de foi* (Louvain, 1945). In a study on "Existentialism and Religion," *Dublin Review*, No. 440 (1947), 50-63, F. Copleston observes that faith cannot be based solely on personal choice and that the existential report on man's religious activity should be only a supplement to the traditional method of natural theology. For a good discussion of Kierkegaard's notion of faith from the standpoint of Catholic theology, cf. C. Fabro, "Foi et raison dans l'oeuvre de Kierkegaard," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, XXXII (1948), 169-206. See also the Church's pronouncement (1855) against Bonnetty's traditionalism, stressing the mutual help of faith and reason, together with the need of investigating matters concerning God and the soul by means of a rational method (Denzinger, H., *Enchiridion Symbolorum* [ed. 21-23; Friburgi Brisgoviae: Herder & Co., 1937], Nos. 1649-52). It is stated here that the Scholastic approach is rational without being rationalistic and that it does not lead to pantheism or naturalism. There is a middle way between fideism or traditionalism and rationalistic pantheism.

Christ's life according to the general canons of historical research. The outcome can, however, never lay bare the heart of the divine-human mystery, although it may suggest sound reasons why we may believe. Neither can the work of unfavorable biblical critics affect the ground of faith itself. The Incarnation and life of Christ have a unique historical significance which does not wait upon the results of biblical controversies and research in order to be apprehended beyond doubt by men. Sacred history contains more than the historians and critics can ever formally ascertain or convey. (b) The proofs of credibility, philosophical and historical, must never be allowed to render the act of believing superfluous or a mere conclusion of intrinsically necessitating premises. Similarly, the testimony of other believers and the weight of tradition must not intervene as though they constitute the formal motive of faith. In this respect, there are no disciples at second hand, although there are disciples of an earlier and a later age of Christian tradition. Kierkegaard brings again into prominence the supernatural character of faith and the need for *Deus revelans* as the sufficient motive for believing—points which were being ignored by the philosophizing apologists whom he read. As he expresses it: "The successor believes *by means of* . . . the testimony of the contemporary, and *in virtue of* the condition he himself receives from God."<sup>23</sup> (c) Finally, the study of the historical life of the church may sometimes lead astray, if the church is treated only in accordance with ordinary historical methods and is not regarded also with the eyes of faith. If only the first standpoint is cultivated in an effort to prepare the groundwork of faith, the consequence is liable to be a confusion of high probability and admiration with faith itself. Furthermore, the passage of centuries is apt to make the presence of Christ seem remote and hazy. By highlighting the contemporaneity of all believers with Christ, Kierkegaard found a way to arouse a lively sense of Christ's closeness to, and personal concern for, every Christian throughout history. But he did not see that the jejune notion of the Church entertained by the reigning apologists also demanded radical revision in the direction of a more Christocentric and organic interpretation of the nature of the Church.

This explanation also fits in admirably with other facets of Kierkegaard's mind, notably his views on existential truth, equality, and the individual. The Incarnation is a historical event and hence must be treated in an existential way. For this reason, Kierkegaard always speaks of *becoming* contemporaneous with Christ and *becoming a* Christian, not in order to reduce faith to approximation, epistemologi-

<sup>23</sup> *Fragments*, p. 87.

cally, but as a warning that existential truth has unending consequences in one's daily conduct.<sup>24</sup> While a man remains in time, he cannot be said to have comprehended the mystery of Jesus or to have conformed his life adequately to the model which Jesus furnishes. Progress toward holiness is never brought to an end in history, and yet God's will is that each of us strive to become holy. Kierkegaard would have supported Santayana's dictum that "the need of deliverance and the immediate personal possibility of it are the twin roots of the whole gospel."<sup>25</sup> The Kierkegaardian conception of the absolute equality of all individuals in God's sight is confirmed by the further affirmation that we can all become equally contemporaneous with Christ. Significant differences between men are the work of freedom, not the senseless discriminations of fate. Whether we make the venture of faith and continue to take faith as the guiding principle in our life depends upon God's grace in such a way that it also engages our freedom.<sup>26</sup> A Christian man ought to be "freedom's ordinary" in realizing the kingdom of God on earth.

The existential conception of the individual can shed light in two ways on the problem of religious contemporaneity. In the first place, faith is specified as bringing a man into relation with God precisely as with an actual, historical individual. The uniqueness of Christianity is founded on the personal presence among us of the eternal being as a temporal existent. This incarnational closeness should elicit in our hearts a singular wonder, humility, and devotion. The immanence of God to his creation, which Kierkegaard is inclined to pass over in his

<sup>24</sup> Indeed, Kierkegaard's more usual phrase is: "To become and to be a Christian" (*Training*, pp. 190, 219), i.e., to be a Christian in an existential way through the continued exercise of freedom or the properly human mode of becoming in actuality what one professes in thought and intention. Hence he could not speak of himself as being a Christian unless this qualification were added. On the striving or becoming which is characteristic of man's way of being, cf. C. Nink, "Der Strebecharakter des menschlichen Geistes," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, LVII (1947), 362-80. Nink shows that the difference between the theistic and atheistic views of man does not revolve about the fact of process, but about whether it is orientated to God or to *das Nichts*. Commenting on the true and the false "all" or totality of values proposed to man, Kierkegaard observes that "it is not by the aid of nothing one can succeed in seeing that the false all is nothing. There is a pretended wisdom whose secret is nothing, and which yet thinks it can see that all is nothing" (*Christian Discourses*, p. 150). This is a repudiation, in advance, of the world view of Sartre and the early Heidegger.

<sup>25</sup> G. Santayana, *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels*, (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1946), pp. 70-71.

<sup>26</sup> J. Wahl, *Études kierkegaardgiennes* (Paris, 1938), pp. 315 ff., brings out well the Kierkegaardian insight that faith is both a gift and an act, both grace and free choice. This point has been developed by L. Lavelle and G. Marcel.

more speculative and polemical writings, is nonetheless firmly established at the base of his position on Christian faith. It does not receive due emphasis because of his dread of pantheism and his lack of a philosophical theory of God's power and presence. The eternal being of God is conceived by Kierkegaard as transcendent in such a way that the Incarnation not only surpasses philosophical, or at least idealist, reason, but is in flat, scandalous contradiction to it. Kierkegaard is unnecessarily hostile to the "undialectical," Franciscan type of piety, which dwells upon Christ's sacred humanity and his nearness in all things to us.<sup>27</sup> This is traceable to his mistaken fear that familiarity and childlikeness in religion will cancel out the tremendous mystery of the Incarnation, the supernatural quality of faith, and the need of suffering. His constant self-torture before the Hegelian element in his own breast thus prevented him from developing all the implications in the correlation between faith and individual existence. The shallowness and sentimentality of the prevailing religious mood led him to reject an authentic form of Christian piety which does, in fact, refuse to separate the Child of Bethlehem from the crucified Lord.

The problem of the individual enters in a second way, from the side of man the believer. From this angle, the formula of Christianity is expressed as the relating of oneself as an individual to God. The Instant is present whenever a man ceases to be thoughtlessly dominated by the herd instinct and when, as an individual, he turns from exclusive care for himself to care for God's majesty and holiness. This turning or conversion of mind and will to God is an inalienable affair of "the single one," since it constitutes a free, personal consecration to God. But Kierkegaard infers that therefore each individual has his relation to God in isolation from other believers. Inadvertently, he is laying down the conditions of union with God instead of accepting them integrally from him. Both as an individual act and as one which reduces all human accessories to the status of occasions, the Kierkegaardian act of faith gives little significance to the Church. Each believer enjoys his peculiar relation to the historical Incarnation in such a way that, although this is the common lot of all believers, still it does not lead to a mutual sharing of religious life, except as a prospect

<sup>27</sup> Cf. the mocking Conclusion to the *Postscript*, an attack on "childish Christianity" which eliminates the sound along with the corrupt. But one need not go to the other extreme of saying, with M. Buber (*op. cit.*, p. 179), that Kierkegaard assures man's creatureliness only by making God a quasi-gnostic figure, a stranger to his own creation or a sufferer outgrown by the world. There is in Kierkegaard a root difficulty about the relation of the created world to God which he is too impatient to attempt to elucidate in a philosophical (but not necessarily idealistic) way.

for the future.<sup>28</sup> Kierkegaard is troubled by the idealistic totality which would suppress the personal response or sublimate it along with others into something more impersonal and necessitated. He gave little thought to the possibility that Christ may have provided more definite conditions and means of union with him, so that we are to become jointly contemporaneous with him in the church as the prolongation in history of his incarnational presence. The religious community which Kierkegaard envisaged would be more the work of men in the future than of the Holy Spirit in the present.

### 5. EDUCATION IN RELIGIOUS EXISTENCE

The German literati, philosophers, and theologians whom Kierkegaard consulted were at least agreed on the importance of education in the formation of men and the advancement of civilization.<sup>29</sup> Kierkegaard did not enter into their disputes about the orientation and organization of the university, but in his characteristic way gave attention only to the problem of the religious education of the individual. The deliberate narrowness of his approach here, as in other cases, is meant as a protest against the neglect of certain issues and as the most practical way of exploring them within his limited resources. The religious books of the last period are all contributions toward "training in Christianity" (as the title of one of them announces). Kierkegaard used the pseudonym "Anti-Climacus" lest he appear presumptuous and distract attention from the pressing question, How should I train myself? to the less importunate one, Who is telling me to do this? In his old role of poet and thinker, he tried to evoke the Christian ideal as a pitch of perfection not reached by himself, but yet laid upon all professing Christians to strive toward.<sup>30</sup> Like a detective who has

<sup>28</sup> Kierkegaard holds both that the goods of the spirit are by nature communicable through the sharing power and impetus of love (*Christian Discourses*, p. 121), and that intercourse with God is absolutely nonsocial (*ibid.*, p. 334), an individual responsibility higher than any fellowship (*Training*, p. 218). The fellowship of the Church is, for him, still a desired goal which has no present concrete actualization. Significantly, he speaks about brotherhood with God in and through Christ (*Christian Discourses*, p. 46), but not about a mutual human brotherhood in Christ. Because Kierkegaard does not admit that there now exists a visible communion of the faithful, he praises the Catholic position on sacramental grace (as a corrective of the excesses of Lutheran "pure interiority") only in an ideal way, without immediate historical reference or practical application. On his deathbed, Kierkegaard refused the ministrations of the Danish Church.

<sup>29</sup> F. Lilge, *The Abuse of Learning* (New York, 1947), offers a concise account of the nineteenth-century German controversies—stemming from von Humboldt and Fichte—concerning the nature of university education.

<sup>30</sup> Kierkegaard usually insisted that the genius and the exceptional individual do not, as such, possess the plenary power of religious authority (*Myndighed*, the Biblical *exousia*). This lies only with Christ and the Apostles; cf. the

gained the confidence of delinquents through his own unassuming ways, Kierkegaard sought, by a fresh reading of the original documents, to expose the forgery of those who have been tampering with the text of Christian existence. His restatement of the Christian call to perfection rests on three major biblical themes: becoming sober, taking Christ as one's model, and loving God with all one's heart.

a) *Christian Sobriety*. Heidegger and Sartre take as a fundamental datum and point of departure for their analyses of man the "fallen" or "abandoned" quality of human experience. In doing so, they have done violence to one aspect of Kierkegaard's religious thought and of the Christian tradition in general. Kierkegaard would dispute their right to regard this condition as an immediate, essential deliverance of existence. For him, man's feeling of aloneness and dizzy lack of orientation are the results of an original decision to abandon God rather than necessary traits of existence. Our life cannot but be out of joint and the world a frightening maze, as Kafka described them, when the relation with God is suppressed.<sup>31</sup> This can be done either

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*Ethico-Religious Treatises.* Kierkegaard's own vocation was to call attention, without authority, to the religious and Christian truths about existence (*Point of View*, p. 155). Thus he acted as a "poet of the religious," a "poetic reflector of the Christian," not as an authoritative teacher. But toward the end of his life, he was attracted by the idea that such fullness of power does reside with the witness to the truth who is ready to sacrifice his life for it. His attention was drawn to the problem of individual authoritativeness in religious matters by the claim of a Danish pastor, A. Adler, to have received a divine revelation. Kierkegaard never conceded authority to Protestantism or to the Bible apart from the Church. He was groping for a synthesis of objective authority and individual compelling testimony, corresponding to the two poles of faith. On his notion of *Myndighed*, cf. E. Hirsch, *Kierkegaard-Studien* (2 vols.; Gütersloh, 1933), Part II, chap. iv, sec. 2.

<sup>31</sup> For a theistic interpretation of Kafka, cf. W. Ong, "Kafka's Castle in the West," *Thought*, XXII (1947), 439-60. C. Neider, *The Frozen Sea: A Study of Franz Kafka* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1947), would discourage any religious approach to Kafka, probably as a reaction to Max Brod's preoccupations. Does St. Thomas find a place for the existentialist view of human anguish and unrest? Writing in *La Croix*, July 16, 1947, P. Blanchard asserts that the universe of St. Thomas is that of peace, unity, light, and love, and that there is no trace of existential anguish in his soul (cf. the note "Is There a Thomist Existentialism?" in *Blackfriars*, XXVIII [1947], 425). This overlooks both the treatise on the passions, as related to contingency and freedom, and the fact that the seeker of wisdom attains his unified view only through inward struggle with conflicting standpoints and alleged evidences. A caution against artificial tranquillity in philosophizing has been suggested, from very different premises, by J. Maritain, *Court traité de l'existence et de l'existant* (Paris: Hartmann, 1947), pp. 230-32, and by K. Jaspers, *Der philosophische Glaube* (Munich: R. Piper & Co., 1948), pp. 126 ff. A comparison between the Christian existentialist and the Augustinian treatments of man as a being of anguish and of thirst for peace is made by A. Solignac, "L'Existentialisme de saint Augustin," *Nouvelle revue théologique*, LXXX (1948), 3-19.

by a postulatory atheism or by open revolt or by the slow, grinding process of compromise and forgetfulness. St. James warns against this in speaking about the man who beheld himself in a mirror and then forgot what manner of man he was. When the bond with God is broken or neglected, the human predicament takes on a senseless, frustrated, and wounded aspect.

Various philosophical measures for dealing with this situation have been proposed since Kierkegaard's day. The existentialist prefers to elaborate in all lucid hopelessness upon the absurdity of man and the world (Camus), to propose a new *mystique* of the superman spinning out his own fine web of rationality and purpose (Sartre), or to retreat from reason in favor of a dark, poetic contact with being itself (Heidegger, in his most recent phase). From the opposite quarter, the pragmatic naturalist makes a show of common sense and daylight reasonableness by admitting as genuine problems only those which arise in a specific social context and which admit of practical solution through recognized scientific methods. This would systematically discredit beforehand the whole discussion about dread (which arises precisely because of the essential risk of freedom), guilt (which refuses to be explained away in a nonethical way), death (which is not resolved through any practical course of action, no matter how much it may be in our concern) and suffering (which is there not only to be alleviated but also to be embraced and sought). One advantage of Kierkegaard's religious standpoint is that it saves him both from merely bathing in the flow of existentialist sentiment and from turning his back upon the many levels at which the difficulties of existence present themselves to us. In contrast to the anguished cry of existentialism and the bland surgery performed upon man by naturalism, his answer is crisp and yet comprehensive: Be ye therefore sober.<sup>32</sup>

Like all basic Christian counsel, this injunction, taken from the Apostle Peter, has a paradoxical, arresting quality about it. For no one is more assured of his levelheadedness and closeness to the facts than the man who pays no worship to the living God or who does so quite discreetly and without personal strain. Yet he is also the man found unprepared to meet the crises of personality development meaningfully and maturely. Existential courage, naturalistic efficiency, and bourgeois shrewdness are purchased at the cost of a blinkered acquaintance with man. By hugging so closely to the shores of the finite, such a training leaves a person unprepared for the deeper shocks of existence; for it does not inform him that there is no effective recourse to one-

<sup>32</sup> This is the theme of Part I of *Judge for Yourselves!*, and is in continuity with the first part of *Self-Examination*.

self without the acknowledged concourse of God. An education of this sort does not help a man evaluate himself properly or meet the unavoidable test of living in the presence of the infinite. At every moment, he is at the crossroads of moral and religious choice without admitting the need of making a decision for or against God or the sacrifice involved in such a choice.

To become sober in a Christian way is not to be exempted from the common human situation, but only to become fully appraised of its seriousness and to seek God's help in meeting it. It is a case of understanding oneself as being nothing when cut off from God and yet as being under an unconditional obligation to obey and trust him. This does not mean a blunting of intelligence and enterprise; it does require the dissociation of our confidence in our human abilities from the additional assertion of self-sufficiency. Kierkegaard considers the fear of the transcendent to be the most formidable enemy of human sanity and dignity in the modern world. It relies for its appeal upon a specious disjunction between the utmost use of our own resources and reliance upon God. The former can be achieved only when these resources are realistically assessed and when man does not hesitate to raise questions about his ultimate placement in existence. When this is done, there is occasion for admitting our creatureliness and for placing ourselves unreservedly on the side of God's power and governance.

We are become sober in Christian faith, for here we seek to know ourselves in the light of God's appraisal of us and our own foundation in his being. The obverse side of contemporaneity with Christ through faith is contemporaneity with oneself, a grasp of the individual as the point of intersection for temporal and eternal interests. Where this integral view is lacking, these two sets of values are in unresolved conflict or "drunkenness." This condition undermines the personality even when the rights of eternity are denied. Irresolution and a cloven mode of being are the alternative to the believer's self-mastery. Kierkegaard supports St. Augustine's warning that a return to God must use as its stepping stone man's own restoration to himself.

b) *Christ the Pattern.* Kierkegaard agrees with the existentialists in underlining "this tremendous danger in which man finds himself by being man."<sup>33</sup> Man is a warring field for good and evil, but if it

<sup>33</sup> *Christian Discourses*, p. 345; cf. p. 227. On Christ as the pattern of religious existence, cf. *Judge for Yourselves!*, Part II; *Training*, pp. 231 ff. Also, see R. Thomte, *Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1948), pp. 174 ff.

were not for the danger in which freedom places him, there could be no question of salvation. The worldly wise live as though there were no such risk and choice, but then they cannot be drawn up to Christ. For he will neither seduce nor drag men to himself, but only draw them through the discipline of freedom as responsible selves. He asks every man first to enter into himself, so that in his own inwardness he may conform with the Pattern. To do so is to become a follower of Christ, one who is on the road to perfecting the likeness and presence of God in him.

There are two escape routes for evading the Pattern without making an outright denial: to approach Christ Speculatively or merely aesthetically. What Kierkegaard discovered about the general inadequacy of the Speculative and purely aesthetic relationships to existence applies forcibly in the case of the most existential situation. He compared his opposition to the scientific-professorial attitude toward Christianity with Luther's protest against an extreme calculus of good works. But what was for Kierkegaard's Luther a personal passion for faith and God's freedom soon became ossified as a doctrine of *sola fides*, which meant in effect the abandonment both of good works and of the demands of faith. Hence the new stress upon the following of Christ was proposed by Kierkegaard as a reinstatement of faith and the activities to which faith and love impel the Christian. These works of charity are forever postponed when faith in Christ is treated as a Speculative problem still awaiting solution by the Hegelian professors of theology (the supplacers of the apostles, martyrs, and doctors of old). As long as everything is still "in suspense, under consideration," there is an indefinite delay in the task of modeling one's life upon that of Christ. One is always awaiting the outcome of further investigation—and in the meantime, it is most prudent to drift along with the current in the most comfortable fashion.

The difference between abstract and existential truth is reaffirmed by Kierkegaard in a religious context.<sup>34</sup> To heed the words of Christ "in truth" does not mean merely to ascertain his message as a theoretical proposition. The saving truth is not a reduplication of being in the

<sup>34</sup> *Training*, p. 201. These two kinds of truth are not incompatible, but neither are they identical. Kierkegaard does admit the legitimacy of a "Christian learning" (*Judge for Yourselves!*, p. 204, n.), which would cultivate the natural, philosophical, and theological sciences without confusing such accomplishments with the religious perfecting of oneself. But this Christian humanism belonged to the medieval past, is not a living attitude today, and can be reinstated only in so distant a period that Kierkegaard does not feel obliged to follow up his suggestion. Here, as in the problem of the Church, there is a polemical narrowing of perspective which refuses to explore any path which is not an immediate issue, even though its intrinsic possibility is acknowledged.

mode of thought alone, for then it would be sufficient to think correctly or to have bare faith without an overflow in charity and its works. There is required a further expression of being in the mode of one's own way of existing, so that truth in this sense is present only when one's *life* corresponds in some way to the example of Christ. This is a moral-ontal view of truth rather than a strictly noetic one. The difference lies in the application or nonapplication of will, a difference which also marks off the following of Christ from aesthetic admiration of such an enterprise. Whereas the follower is one who is personally involved and pledged to imitate what he admires, the mere admirer remains personally aloof and uncommitted. The admirer is related to the Pattern through the medium of imagination only, dreaming about this ideal perfection but without making a proportionate response in personal conduct.

In visualizing this moral and religious perfection, imagination works under a twin handicap. It experiences difficulty in picturing the sufferings which may be entailed by a wholehearted dedication to the life proposed by the Pattern, and it is inclined to underestimate the force of the world's opposition. Yet Kierkegaard is unwilling to exclude imagination completely from the education of a religious personality. The importance of the aesthetic factor in his own formation was sufficient to deter him from eliminating it entirely. Moreover, the attitude of admiration from a distance is easily transformed on the religious level into one of adoring distance even in the midst of intimate love of God. This reminder of our creatureliness compensates for the ethical tendency toward self-identification with the moral ideal within one. In justification of a limited role of imagination in religious training, Kierkegaard pointed out that Christ the Pattern attracts us to himself gently and gradually. We first approach him as an ideal placed on high, giving little thought to the intervening distance marked by our own deficiencies and failure to pass the test of everyday fidelity. Moral resolution is needed to persevere in the effort to follow our model precisely under the stringent conditions of temporal existence. Then we find that he is not only beckoning to us "from on high" in his exaltation, but also helping at our side and behind us through the redemptive power of his earthly life.

Religious growth depends upon our meeting the God-Man on his own terms: in his lowness as well as his glory, in a lifetime of following as well as the instant of consecration. The trial of suffering is not due to any harshness on Christ's part, but to the fact that we remain in the world even when we follow in his steps. We belong to the *ecclesia militans*, in that each of us must express in a hostile environ-

ment what it means to be a Christian.<sup>35</sup> By the very definition of the Christian vocation, then, the religious person must reproduce in his life not only unlikeness but opposition to the world, and must, in turn, expect a similar aggressiveness from the world's side. Faithfulness to God's will on the part of his servants cannot avoid leading to conflict any more than did the faithfulness of Christ. Yet we must accept this consequence of the imitation of Christ voluntarily and with the possibility that it will cause scandal to those who admire him from afar.

Kierkegaard's recounting of Christ's life is austere and highly selective. He passes over in silence those portions of the Johannine Gospel which record Christ's solicitude and effective prayer for unity and community among believers, lest they weaken his insistence upon the spiritual combat as an individual, solitary struggle. In the presence of Christ's gentler sayings and relations with people, he is uncomfortable and displays considerable ingenuity in explaining such occasions away as accommodations to Jewish piety or to the childlike and aesthetic factor in human nature. He once wrote a treatise on whether a man has the right to let himself be put to death for the truth. He would have derived equal benefit from an inquiry into whether a man (indeed, a writer) has the right to restrict himself in public print to a polemically selective explanation of Christ and Christianity. Kierkegaard's reply would perhaps be that this is the only way in which a reformation and renewal can be begun; for otherwise people will mistake comprehensive balance for compromise, consolation for dispensation from taking up one's cross. In addition, he could point to the many prayers, devotional meditations, and stray hints which are of aid at least to later generations in filling out his religious standpoint.<sup>36</sup> In his reflections upon the love of God, Kierkegaard comes close to the motive center of the following of Christ and the religious spirit among men.

c) *The Love of God.* Although he did not always honor his own thought, Kierkegaard confesses that, Christianly speaking, there is no more religious value in melancholy cultivated for its own sake than in lightmindedness.<sup>37</sup> This holds true also of the contrast between severity

<sup>35</sup> *Training*, pp. 194, 206-7. Kierkegaard contrasts the militant status of actual believers with the premature peace and rest of the *beati possidentes*, who have already entered into the church triumphant with the aid of their imagination and the fullness of absolute idealism. On the contrary, existence always remains a test, just as the world always remains inimical to religious truth—but, Kierkegaard adds, 'divine governance is the working of all-powerful love for the good end of man' (*Training*, pp. 189, 226).

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Kierkegaard's *Prières et fragments sur la prière*, as well as his fragments on *Christ*, two collections made from his Journals and Papers and translated into French by P.-H. Tisseau (Bazoges-en-Pareds, 1937).

<sup>37</sup> *Training*, p. 154. The belief that God is love and governance (cf. *supra*,

and gentleness, if they are divorced from a radical love of God lying deeper than either alternative. Kierkegaard took advantage of the ambiguity in the phrase, "the love of God," signifying thereby both the loving nature of God and the response which we make to him. That God is loving and providential was a conviction implanted in him as a child by his father, a conviction which helped to modify the rigorous, almost terrifying, account of the Redemption which was also taught him. The thought of God's loving care for us certainly gave him a good deal of personal consolation amidst his own tribulations and provides the theme for many of his finest religious discourses. Our trust in God and obedience to him are grounded in a recognition of his goodness toward us. If we are visited with opposition and suffering in the world, we are also able to take heart from the love which he has for us and his coming in the flesh for us.

The fact that God's omnipotence is that of a divine lover is also the foundation of our religious freedom. If God had not created us out of infinite love as well as infinite power, he could not and would not have "held back," have given us a certain initiative in coming freely to him or turning away. That we should freely want to give our love to God is, for Kierkegaard, first of all a deep expression of our utter need for him. In infinite measure, he is our creditor, whereas our only valuable possession is the disposition of our selves. It is through Christ that we can approach God as a loving person as well as creator. Hence Kierkegaard sometimes observes that Christ is not only the Pattern but also the Redeemer, the one who gives us access to God and power and grace to conform to his example throughout temporal existence. A favorite text is the sentence that all things work for the good of him who loves God.<sup>38</sup> For all his sternness and dialectical play upon this theme, Kierkegaard does convey something of the original confidence in God and free dedication of our service to him under all

n. 35) and that strife in this world is due to the hostile environment in which divine and human love finds expression helps to save Kierkegaard from the charge of "antivital asceticism" lodged against him by C. Koch, *Søren Kierkegaard*, French trans. (Paris, 1934), pp. 201 ff., a charge which is shown to be groundless by R. Jolivet, *Introduction à Kierkegaard* (Abbaye S. Wandrille, 1946), pp. 167 ff. In view of Kierkegaard's extensive teaching on the love of God, it is unaccountable that P. Ortegat (*Intuition et religion: Le Problème existentialiste* [Louvain: Editions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1947], pp. 188-89) should declare that Kierkegaard puts an end to any effective union between God and man and to any belief in God as a self-giving love who bestows himself on man. This estimate is arrived at only by confining attention to the "philosophical writings" and by inferring the rest from a peculiar conception of his Lutheran upbringing.

<sup>38</sup> *Christian Discourses*, pp. 197 ff. On the relation between divine omnipotence and love in the creation of free beings, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 132 and 187, n. 1.

conditions. This is the only kind of "free man's worship" which is both free and worshipful.

Religion is a search after kinship with God, and this is most intimately attained in Christian existence. Christian doctrine is itself based upon the person of the God-Man. Christian existence is one of sharing in the divine life through brotherhood with Christ. Despite a harassing fear of the "sentimental, bourgeois" corruption of this keystone of faith, Kierkegaard places it at the critical place in his conception of religious life. To exist religiously means to become united individually with Christ and to strive to impenetrate our temporal life with his loving presence and power. This is also the ultimate lesson which the study of existence teaches us.

## NOTES AND DISCUSSION

### *DE POTENTIA, 5. 8*

#### A NOTE ON THE THOMIST THEORY OF SENSATION

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J.

We must remember that a body has a two-fold action. It has one action according to the property of a body, namely, its action through motion (for it is proper to a body to move and act after it has been moved). It has another action, according as it approaches the order of separate substances and participates somewhat of their way. Thus, lower natures usually participate in something of the proper character of higher natures, as we see in some animals which share in a kind of likeness to prudence which is proper to men. This second action is the action of a body, which is not directed to the transformation of matter, but to a certain spreading of the likeness of a form in medium. This latter is like the spiritual intention which is received from a thing in sense or intellect. This is the way in which the sun illuminates the air, and color multiplies its likeness (*species*) in the medium.

But both these ways of action in sublunary bodies are caused by the heavenly bodies. For fire by its heat changes matter, through the power of the heavenly body; and visible bodies multiply their likenesses in the medium through the power of light, whose source is in the heavenly body.<sup>1</sup>

Cardinal Cajetan was apparently the first to discover a special philosophical doctrine of sensation here. The philosophical explanation of sensation, he thinks, needs to include the activity of the separated substances. The ground is: intentional *esse* is higher than merely natural *esse*; hence intentional *esse* cannot be caused by material things; hence sensible things cause the sensible species in the sense because they act through the power of the separate substances which is communicated to material things by the medium of light.<sup>2</sup> This doctrine was adopted

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<sup>1</sup> *De Pot.*, 5. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Cajetan, *Scripta Philosophica: In II De Anima*, 11; ed. P. I. Coquelle, O.P. (2 vols.; Rome: Angelicum, 1939), II, Nos. 265-66, 252-54.

by John of St. Thomas,<sup>3</sup> and has been restated by Simon,<sup>4</sup> Maritain,<sup>5</sup> Legrande,<sup>6</sup> and Garrigou-Lagrange.<sup>7</sup>

If this interpretation is correct, then one of two judgments must be passed on most Thomist writers. Either their explanation of sensation is seriously inadequate, or they are no longer truly Thomist. Either accusation is serious.

There are two ways, in general, of attacking this problem. One is to study the text and context carefully, to see what can be derived from it. The second is to study the general historical situation, to see what St. Thomas was trying to do.

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Cajetan's authorities are Aristotle, Averroes, St. Albert, and St. Thomas. In Aristotle himself, the theory is, to say the least, not readily discernible. In St. Thomas's commentary on this passage (lectures 12-14) there is no reference to such a doctrine. Cajetan refers only to *De Pot.*, 5. 8, and does not mention the passage in the *Commentary on the Sentences* to be discussed later.

Averroes says: ". . . in materia non sunt intentiones in actu, sed in potentia . . . necesse erit motorem extrinsecum esse" (*In II De Anima*, c. 5, t.c. 60 [Lyons: Giunta, 1542], fol. 66v), and "per intentionem rerum sensibilium, non per ipsas res sensibles" (*ibid.*, t.c. 62, fol. 67r). Averroes says nothing about the relation between this extrinsic motor and sensible things. Cajetan attacks him as if he said that the extrinsic motor were the sole, or a coordinate, cause; he insists that sensible things are the *instruments* of the extrinsic motor. Averroes could well enough be interpreted in exactly the same sense.

St. Albert says that the senses are moved by the object, "in quantum unumquaque illorum est in esse intentionale" (*In II De Anima*, tract. 4, c. 1, ed. Borgnet [Paris: Vives, 1890], V, 293). Previously he had noted Averroes's question about an extrinsic motor, though he supposed that Averroes had not answered it. "Dixerunt unum esse movens in omnibus sensibus . . . Quidam enim dixerunt hoc esse lucem . . . Alii autem antiquiores his dixerunt quod virtus animae est agens eas intentiones spirituales" (*ibid.*, tract. 3, c. 6, p. 241). St. Albert's own determination of the question is unique: "non habent motivum aliquod extrinsicum . . . Agens autem formam tantum non est agens materiale, sed potius ipsa forma, et sic agit se per hoc quod ipsa est essentia simplex suiipsius multiplicativa: et sic omnis forma multiplicat intentionem suam" (*ibid.*, p. 244).

<sup>3</sup> Joannes a Sancto Thoma, *Philosophia Naturalis*, IV, 6. 3 (ed. Reiser, III, 188-89); cf. *ibid.*, 8. 4 (p. 266b).

<sup>4</sup> Yves Simon, *L'Ontologie de connaître* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1934), pp. 153-55.

<sup>5</sup> Jacques Maritain, *Les Degrés du savoir* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1932), p. 229, n. 1. M. Maritain speaks of a "divine motion."

<sup>6</sup> Joseph Legrande, S.J., *L'Univers et l'homme dans la philosophie de saint Thomas* (2 vols.; Bruxelles: L'Édition Universelle, 1946), de Brouwer, II, 28: "Toute 'species' sensible se forme donc sous l'influence que les anges donnent aux corps célestes de rayonner, en douant leur lumière d'une propriété qui est déjà, quoique à son degré le plus infime, une participation de leur activité immatérielle." Legrande makes much of St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, d. 13, 3; this text will be discussed later.

<sup>7</sup> Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., "Le Réalisme thomiste et la mystère de la connaissance," *Revue de Philosophie*, new series, II (1931), pp. 139-43.

## THE LANGUAGE OF THE TEXT ITSELF

Reading the text carefully, we find one word which may give ground for the theory of Cajetan, the word "intention." The adjective "spiritual" should not give us pause. Since St. Thomas uses this adjective (or the similar word "immaterial") to describe the process of sensation, we can be confident that he means "not wholly material," "not wholly sunk in the matter."<sup>8</sup>

What about the word "intention"? André Hayen, S.J., has tried to show that the word is analogous.<sup>9</sup> St. Thomas himself flatly calls it an equivocal term,<sup>10</sup> and H. D. Simonin has shown that it has several irreducible meanings.<sup>11</sup>

One of the uses of "intention" will be most revealing. In *De Potentia*, 5. 1, St. Thomas discusses the conservation of things in being. The sixth objection says that things which are can remain after their causes cease, but that things which only become always depend on their causes, as light depends on a luminous body. In his answer to this objection, St. Thomas calls an image in a mirror, and light in air, "intentions." It should be fairly clear that this use of "intention" is the same as that in the main text. In his answer, St. Thomas has been classifying the kinds of forms: some are perfect in species and being; some in species but not in being; some are imperfect in both species and being. It is to this third class to which the "intentions" mentioned belong.<sup>12</sup> In this usage, therefore, "intention" denotes not a more perfect, but a less perfect, kind of being.

Another usage of the word "intention" is to designate the power of the principal cause as in the instrument.<sup>13</sup> Now, it is surely absurd to say that the power of the principal cause is more perfectly present in

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 10, 1. 4, where *spiritualitas* is said to mean "subtilitas," and to be opposed to "grossus"; and *ST*, I, 36. 1 and ad 1, where it is said "spiritus enim corporeus invisibilis est et parum habet de materia."

<sup>9</sup> André Hayen, S.J., *L'Intentionnel dans la philosophie de saint Thomas* (Bruxelles: L'Édition Universelle, 1942), p. 217.

<sup>10</sup> *De Ver.*, 21. 3 ad 5: "aequivoce accipitur utrobique."

<sup>11</sup> H. D. Simonin, O.P., "La Notion d' 'intention' dans l'oeuvre de s. Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, XIX (1930), 445-63.

On the meanings of *intention* in medieval usage, cf. A. M. Goichon, *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sina* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1938), No. 469, pp. 253-54; Averroes, *In II De Anima*, c. 11, t.c. 60, 62; Clemens Baeumker, *Witelo, ein Philosoph und Naturforscher des XIII Jahrhunderts* (*Beiträge*, Baeumker, Band 3, Heft 2, [Münster: Aschendorff, 1903]), pp. 32, 151.

<sup>12</sup> *De Pot.*, 5. 1 obj. 6 and ad 6.

<sup>13</sup> *In IV Sent.*, d. 1, 1. 4. 2. St. Thomas keeps the idea that the instrumental power is incomplete and imperfect in the instrument, but in his later works abstains from calling it an intention; cf. e.g., *ST*, III, 62. 4 ad 4; 65. 5 ad 1.

the instrument than it is in the principal cause itself—yet this follows if intentional being is always more perfect than material being. St. Thomas himself calls this kind of intentional being “not a complete being, having an *esse* fixed in a nature, but an incomplete being.”<sup>14</sup>

What is meant by calling the likeness in the medium an intentional being? First, an intentional being as such cannot cause physical effects.<sup>15</sup> Secondly, an intentional form does not make its subject really this or that kind of being.<sup>16</sup> Thirdly, “intention” is another word for “species,” that is to say, representation.<sup>17</sup>

Finally, there is a text in the *Summa Theologiae* which should be decisive because it raises the kind of question that Cajetan raised.<sup>18</sup> In discussing the origin of intellectual knowledge, St. Thomas touches on the relation between sensible things and sensation. According to St. Augustine, sensible things do not produce the images necessary for knowledge, because a cause is always greater than its effect, and soul is more noble than body. St. Thomas formally calls this a Platonic position. Then he explains his own Aristotelian stand.

[Aristotle] held that sense does not have a proper operation in which the body does not communicate, so that “sensing is not the act of the soul alone,” but of the composite. And he held a similar position about all the operations of the sensitive part. Since, therefore, there is no difficulty in this, that sensible things outside the soul should cause some effect in the composite, Aristotle agreed with Democritus that the operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impressions that sensible things make upon the sense. He held that this impression was not made by way of flowing images, as Democritus had held, but by some activity.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>14</sup> “Non est ens completum habens esse fixum in natura, sed quoddam ens incompletum, sicut est virtus immutandi visum in aere, in quantum est instrumentum motum ab exteriori visibili, et hujusmodi entia consueverunt intentiones nominari, et habent aliquid simile cum ente quod est in anima, quod est ens diminutum” (*In IV Sent.*, d. 1, 1. 4. 2).

<sup>15</sup> Cf. “Respondeo. Dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod lumen in aere non habet esse naturale, sicut color in pariete, sed esse intentionale, sicut similitudo coloris in aere.—Sed hoc non potest esse propter duo . . . Secundo, quia lumen habet effectum in natura, quia per radios solis calefiant corpora. Intentiones autem non causant transmutationes naturales” (*ST*, I, 67. 3).

<sup>16</sup> Cf. the preceding text, and also: “Secundum esse spirituale, idest, species sive intentio qualitatis, et non ipsa qualitas; sicut pupilla recipit speciem albedinis, et tamen ipsa non efficit alba” (*In IV Sent.*, d. 44, 2. 1. 3).

<sup>17</sup> Cf. text in note 16; H. D. Simonin, “La Notion d’ ‘intentio.’”

<sup>18</sup> *ST*, I, 84. 6.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* It is interesting that in his commentary on this article, Cajetan merely gives an outline of the argument, but no discussion, and no reference to his own theory.

The sensible thing is more noble than the organ of an animal, if we compare the former to the latter as being in act to being in potency, for example, an actually colored thing to the pupil, which is colored in potency.<sup>20</sup>

In these texts, the question of the equality (nobility) of cause and effect is raised precisely and accurately. St. Thomas solves it, not by putting an immaterial cause to account for the "spirituality" or "immateriality" of the effect, but by designating accurately just in what way the sensible things cause sensation. The sensible, material thing causes sensation by actuating the potency of sense toward a determinate object.

#### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Almost every author that St. Thomas consulted dealt heavily in light and the heavenly bodies. Clemens Baeumker, in his classical study of Witelo, has brought to our attention the medieval metaphysics of light.<sup>21</sup> Plotinus, Avicenna, Averroes, Isaac Israeli, Dionysius, St. Bonaventure, Grosseteste, all held a metaphysics of light in one form or another.<sup>22</sup> Against this, St. Thomas took an early, firm, and consistent stand.<sup>23</sup> He denied that light was the (or a) substantial form of material things or of the sun.<sup>24</sup> He denied the univocal use of light in the material and spiritual orders.<sup>25</sup> He denied that light was the unique form of causality.<sup>26</sup>

Nevertheless, St. Thomas had to face the fact that all these great thinkers had stressed the function of light in the universe. In addition to the thinkers mentioned, St. Thomas read about light and its influence in Aristotle, William of Auvergne, Alhazen (either directly or in the

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 2.

It is said that certain Averroistic Masters of Arts at Paris taught the doctrine of a separated "sensus agens." In St. Thomas himself references to this doctrine seem to be extremely rare; he mentions the "sensus agens" in *ST*, I, 79, 3 obj. 1.

His answer is in terms of his own consistently held doctrine: "Ad primum ergo. Dicendum quod sensibilia inveniuntur actu extra animam; et ideo non oportuit ponere sensum agentem."

<sup>21</sup> Baeumker, *Witelo*: Plotinus, p. 460; Avicenna, pp. 389-93; Isaac Israeli, pp. 383-84; Dionysius, pp. 377-79; St. Bonaventure, pp. 394-406; Grosseteste, pp. 357-97.

<sup>22</sup> Plotinus, *Enneads* i. 1. 6; i. 6. 9; vi. 5. 7. Avicenna, *De Caelo et Mundo*, c. 14. Isaac Israeli, *Liber Diffinitionum*. Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, c. 4, No. 5. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, d. 13, 3. 2. Grosseteste, *De Luce*. Averroes, *In II De Anima*, t.c. 60, 62, 67.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *In II Sent.*, d. 13, 1. 2-3; *In II De Anima*, lect. 14; *Quodlibet. VI*, 11. 19; *ST*, I, 67, 1-3.

<sup>24</sup> *In II Sent.*, d. 13, 3; *In II De Anima*, lect. 14; *ST*, I, 67, 3.

<sup>25</sup> *In II Sent.*, d. 13, 2; *In Joannis Evangelium*, c. 1, lect. 3; *Quodlibet. VI*, 11. 19; *ST*, I, 67, 1.

<sup>26</sup> *Quodlibet. VI*, 11. 19.

*Perspectivae* based on him); he heard about it from his teacher, St. Albert; and he found it given an important place in St. Augustine.<sup>27</sup>

Moreover, experimental evidence seemed to show the far-reaching influence of light. Obviously, without light we cannot see. Most plants die when deprived of light; seasonal variations of daylight affect the growth cycles of plants; indirectly, therefore, light influences all living things.

Light comes to us from the sun and the stars. It seems to be directly visible; yet when it is in a medium (air, water), it is not usually seen.

With all this evidence before him, and the extensive and differing discussions of his predecessors and contemporaries, it should not be too surprising that St. Thomas gave a partial acceptance to some of the theories. In an early text, he admits somewhat more than he did in the texts we have previously been considering.

Some say that light . . . is only an intention . . . and this opinion has many arguments for it (*valde probabilis est*). . . . But it does not seem to be wholly true.

And so others say—and I believe we must agree with them—that light is an accidental form, having a fixed and firm *esse* in nature. They say that as heat is the active quality of fire, so light is the active quality of the sun itself, and that in other things it is present, according as they share more with the sun, which is the fount of all light. And so Avicenna says that there is no action of the higher bodies on the lower except by means of light, as fire also acts by means of heat. And so *lux* and *lumen* differ, as heat in a subject that is hot by itself, and in a heated subject. And, since the heaven is the first source of change, it follows that all alteration in sublunar bodies occurs through the power of light, whether it be an alteration in natural *esse*, or according to sense. And in this way light gives generation to all bodies, as Dionysius says. In this way also it gives to colors a spiritual *esse*, according as they receive *esse* in a medium and in an organ. Hence, light itself has a spiritual power. And so it is also, as Augustine says, that light is the medium in every sense; in sight, primarily and immediately; for the visible quali-

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Baeumker, *Witelo*: on St. Albert, pp. 407-14; William of Auvergne, pp. 392-93. Cf. also, Arthur Schneider, *Die Psychologie Alberts des Grossen* (*Beiträge*, Baeumker, Band 4, Heft 5-6, [Münster: Aschendorff, 1903]), pp. 102-13; H. Siebeck, "Zur Psychologie der Scholastik," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, II (1889), 414-25.

Aristotle, *De Anima* ii. 7; William of Auvergne, *De Trinitate*, cc. 7, 14; *De Anima*, 7. 3; Alhazen, *Optics*, 2, 13 (Cf. Witelo, *De Intelligentiis, Perspectiva*, and further, St. Thomas, *Quodlibet. VI*, 11. 19); St. Albert the Great, *In II De Anima*, tr. 3, c. 12; St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, VII, 15 and 19; XII, 16.

ties are prior to the others, inasmuch as they are found in sublunar bodies according to their formal *esse* in proportion as they agree in perfection with the heavenly body, as is clear in the second book of *De Anima*, and the second book of *De Generatione*; but in the other senses through the mediation of the other qualities.<sup>28</sup>

Several points must be noted. St. Thomas in this article presents three opinions. The first (that light is a body) he rejects. He admits that the second has some strong arguments, but is not wholly adequate. To the third opinion, which he presents more fully, he seems to give only a kind of general approbation. Note, moreover, how he has put this opinion. (a) Light is not a substantial, but an accidental form. (b) Light is the means by which the heavenly bodies act on other things. (c) This action comprises generation, accidental change, and the production of the intentional *esse* in medium and organ. Yet, even here, there is no reference to the theory of Cajetan that light itself, and the heavenly body, must be considered as instrumentally moved by the separated substances. (d) In some kind of way, light is also concerned with all sensation.

On the second of these points, namely, the universal causality of light and of the heavenly bodies, there should be no difficulty with St. Thomas's doctrine. He is simultaneously accepting and criticizing the theories put forth by men who concerned themselves mainly with these questions.<sup>29</sup>

The third point is what we are interested in here. What is particularly noteworthy is that St. Thomas makes no mention of any *special* influence in these matters. Of course, in St. Thomas's world view, God, the separated substances, and the spheres concur in all sublunar activity. It is easy to see what is going on here; the separated substances and spheres can be taken in or out of this series as conditions warrant. Note the argument: (a) heavenly bodies act through light; (b) the heavenly body is the first source of alteration (diurnal and

<sup>28</sup> In *II Sent.*, d. 13, 1. 3 (ed Mandonnet, [Paris: Lethielleux, 1929] p. 334; ed. Romana, tome 6, fol. 43ra). The reading of Parma (VI, 501a) is defective; it leaves out the bracketed portion of the following phrase: "as heat [is the active quality of fire, so light] is the active quality of the sun itself."

<sup>29</sup> Avicenna, St. Albert the Great, and the Perspectivists in general appealed to experience, and to a certain extent to simple experiments in developing their theories of light. St. Thomas himself makes an interesting appeal to sense evidence. In discussing the theory that light is a solid body emanating in all directions from its source, he says: "what can be said about this fact, that when an [opaque] body is placed around a candle, the whole house is made dark?" (*ST*, I, 67. 2). It takes no great stretch of the imagination to see St. Thomas at his desk, with a flickering candle before him, and a piece of parchment in his hand.

seasonal).<sup>30</sup> Therefore light brings about generation, accidental change, intentional *esse*. In other words, because light is the source of all change, it is the source of this change; the thought is not that because intentions are immaterial, they therefore have an immaterial efficient cause.

The fourth point, that light is concerned in all sensation, at least indirectly, depends on the theoretical relation between the various qualities. St. Thomas accepts, without too much interest, the theory of the primacy of visible qualities over all other sensible qualities.

#### CONCLUSION

In the time of St. Thomas, natural science and philosophy of nature had not yet been differentiated.<sup>31</sup> But it is obvious that particular facts and particular theories have different parts to play in the elaboration of his thought. Thus, when St. Thomas, basing himself on medical evidence, says that the embryo of a horse cannot have an animal soul from the beginning, because its matter is not organized, we rightly say that this is not a philosophical error but a factual one. We can change his statement without in any way changing his philosophy.

The same kind of adjustment can be made in St. Thomas's statements about sensation. For example, we can now state rather precisely the function of light in the order of vegetative life and in the order of vision. In so far as our more accurate knowledge enables us to correct St. Thomas's considerably more deficient facts, we can adjust his philosophy of sensation, and yet truthfully maintain that we are Thomists.<sup>32</sup> But we must be aware of what we are doing: we cannot legitimately modify a reasoning process by an appeal to facts, nor can

<sup>30</sup> It is characteristic of the Avicennan universe that the heavenly bodies and the agent intellect are the source of the *forms* (substantial and intelligible) in the sublunar world. In addition the heavenly bodies have the function of initiating movement. St. Thomas on the contrary criticizes the Avicennan *defluxus formarum*, and rightly calls it a Platonic conception, cf. *ST*, I, 115. 1; 45. 8; 65. 4. In his own view, the heavenly bodies are primarily the source of motion and change; they are an *active principle* ("energy-source"?), while by their daily and seasonal variations they control the cycle of vegetation and the waking-sleeping life of animals and men. Secondarily, they must instrumentally account for certain formal effects, for example the properties of compounds (which were not explained by the heat or cold, the rarity or density of their elements, cf. *ST*, I, 115. 3 and ad 2); spontaneous generation, magnetism, and other similar phenomena which the medieval scientists could not explain.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Maritain, *Les Degrés de savoir*, p. 91.

<sup>32</sup> Thus, St. Thomas was inclined to favor the theory of Aristotle and Averroes (that light actuated the medium only) over that of Avicenna (that light actuated color) in *Quaest. Disp. de An.*, a. 4 ad 4, though in *ST*, I, 79. 3 ad 2, he seemed unable to decide. Considering modern evidence and theories, we can resolve the doubt in favor of Avicenna.

we produce or invalidate factual evidence by reasoning. That is why accurate knowledge of St. Thomas's thought, gained by textual and historical investigation, is a prerequisite for the further development of Thomism.

## THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE, II

BRIAN COFFEY

It has been found necessary to postpone presenting the survey of current scientific publications to which reference was made in our last article.<sup>1</sup> The present article deals with some particularly interesting aspect of actual scientific activity.

I

The rapid growth of fields of research, the development of which depends on the integration of the methods of distinct sciences, is a prominent feature of the scientific scene. Rocket research and the new field which has been called cybernetics are among the more interesting of these.

The growth of cybernetics is described in a most interesting book by Professor Wiener of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.<sup>2</sup> Cybernetics draws on the methods of pure mathematics, statistics, electrical engineering, and neurophysiology in order to study the problems of control and communication in the animal and in the machine. Professor Wiener describes first the history of the growth of cybernetics, after which he devotes a series of chapters to the mathematics of the subject, treating of groups and statistical mechanics, time series, oscillation, and feedback. He then considers the applications of the new methods in the construction of the most modern computing machines, in psychopathology, and in social communication. Chapter 5 contains a comparison between the behaviors of the human nervous system (in health and in sickness) and the modern computing machine. The author's concluding remark is worthy of note:

The mechanical brain does not secrete thought "as liver does the bile," as the earlier materialists claimed, nor does

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<sup>1</sup> "The Philosophy of Science and the Scientific Outlook," *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, XXVI (November, 1948), 23.

<sup>2</sup> *Cybernetics* (New York: Wiley, 1948).

it put it out in the form of energy, as the muscle puts out its activity. Information is information, not matter or energy. No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day (p. 155).

In dealing with the problem of the accessibility of information, at present a crucial one in any advanced research, the author holds that not all the information which is available to the race at any one time is accessible without special effort. Having referred to the tendency of libraries to become clogged by their own volume, he notes the suggestion of Dr. Bush that mechanical aids might be used to search through vast bodies of material (the problem of dominating the enormous output of new scientific fact in every field is here involved), and then remarks that while such aids probably have their uses they are limited by the impossibility of classifying a book under a special heading unless some particular person has already recognized the relevance of that particular heading for that particular book (p. 185). Professor Wiener, whose own wide grasp of a number of special fields was developed in that favorable atmosphere of interfaculty communication of knowledge without which university life becomes stultified, thinks that only an individual with a Leibnizian catholicity of interest would be able to perform the more difficult tasks of classification which become increasingly necessary as the sciences develop in the direction of greater specialization. Nothing that Professor Wiener has to say about the new computing machines provides any evidence for the opinion that it may ever be possible to dispense with human intelligence in the elaboration of a human science. The machines will never be anything more than most useful aids to the research of particularly qualified individuals.

The techniques of cybernetics will be used in the production of automatic factories similar to the one at present making radio sets in England.

The automatic factory, the assembly-line without human agents, are only so far ahead of us as is limited by our willingness to put such a degree of effort into their engineering as was spent, for instance, in the development of radar during the second world war (pp. 36-37).

A development of this kind would have unbounded potentialities for good or bad in human life, since the widespread use of automatic factories would involve radical changes in the present conditions of industrial labor. Competition, on an open market, between men and machines, would quickly have the effect of reducing men to the level of purely servile workers, so that whatever utility for men there may

be in the automatic factory would depend very much upon the basic values of the society which used them. Professor Wiener believes that we must find values other than buying and selling for society if the automatic factories are to increase the common good of men.

Professor Wiener's fundamental interests are cultural. The degree of specialization in a science which makes so many experts illiterate outside of their own minute specialty finds no merit in his eyes. Nor is he so sure as some of his friends have been of the social efficacy of the new ideas which he presents. He does not think that the methods of the natural sciences can be extended to the fields of anthropology, of sociology, of economics with any hope of achieving there success similar to that already obtained in the field of the natural sciences, for methodological reasons (methodology is his key to the problem of a unified grasp of the sciences). He says: "With all respect to the intelligence, skill and honesty of purpose of my anthropologist friends, I cannot think that any community that they have investigated will ever be quite the same afterwards" (p. 190). The reason given is that the social observer is too closely implicated in, and influences too strongly, the phenomena which come before his attention.

Concerning the use of statistical methods in social studies, Professor Wiener says: "In the social sciences we have to deal with short statistical runs, nor can we be sure that a considerable part of what we observe is not an artefact of our own creation" (p. 191). Investigations in the social sciences can never furnish us with a quantity of *verifiable*, significant information which begins to compare with that which we have learned to expect in the natural sciences. The applicability of this founded view to the Kinsey Report is obvious. It cannot be too strongly stressed that the continuation of Dr. Kinsey's work will not furnish a body of verifiable fact of the order which could be expected in the study of the sexual habits of porcupines (in which Dr. Kinsey has, it appears, promised to interest himself), nor will the development of Dr. Kinsey's research leave the field quite as it was before he began his work. The whole question here is, of course, whether it is for the common good that Dr. Kinsey should be allowed to continue to work. It is desirable that a number of people should interest themselves practically in the study of the social implications of Dr. Kinsey's work.

One might gain the impression that Professor Wiener's work is merely an account of a branch of applied science. This impression would be superficial. The human control and communication functions, on the side of the material cause, provide a proper object for experimental study by a complex method arising out of an integration of a number of special disciplines. Subjectively, the outcome for the man

who engages in the new research is a certain unification of his outlook upon the experimental sciences which he is obliged, by reason of the nature of his research, to view as a whole, together with a turning of the attention to extrascientific problems necessitated because the study of transient activity in the nervous system cannot be equated to the study of intellectual life.

## II

It will have been noted that social issues arise very rapidly in the consideration of the applications of cybernetics. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of actual scientific activity is the preoccupation of scientists with properly social problems. There is not a scientist but may find himself obliged, by reason of the progress of his science, to consider closely the relationship of his work to the other social activities of men. The editorial pages of *Nature* over the last year reflect this situation, as witness the following typical statement:

Not the least responsibility of men of science today, individually, collectively, is to join with all the forces which are helping to safeguard the free society, to renew the moral and spiritual forces upon which the creative powers of Western civilization depend.<sup>3</sup>

Naturally, the scientist is a citizen who has duties to the common good. But the unfortunate tendency of many scientists, as well as religious and moral leaders, is to subordinate pragmatically religious and moral activity to the secular purpose of saving Western civilization. This is equivalent to saying that we should return to the worship and love of God for the purpose of saving Western civilization. Some men have no doubts about man being the measure of all things.

## III

The degree to which rocket research has progressed is evidenced by the disclosure in an annual report (December 30, 1948) by Secretary of Defense Forrestal of an "earth satellite vehicle program." Men have dreamed before this of introducing an artificial satellite into the space between the earth and the moon. The present project is of a military inspiration. It reduces considerably the gap which still exists between ordinary human activities and the kind of thing which is described with so much enthusiasm and a sort of pre-Socratic vigor by the contributors (among them university professors) to *Amazing Stories*. On the side of plain facts it is worth noting that the first textbooks on rocket projectiles (modern type) are already on the market, among them

<sup>3</sup> *Nature*, November 20, 1948.

*Mathematical Theory of Rocket Flight.*<sup>4</sup> Rocket research, like cybernetics, draws upon a number of techniques and sciences; but while a certain unification of scientific outlook results, it is very doubtful whether it is healthy for intellectual life that subjective unification of the sciences should be in process of achievement in the casual conditions of particular human plans, when insight into the true unity of the sciences is lacking in so many minds. Force of circumstances would appear to be driving men to a practical realization of the Comtian conception of scientific activity.

On the side of fancy we note that in October last the British Interplanetary Society heard Dr. Olaf Stapeldon, a noted writer on imaginative scientific themes and a man whose thought is vivified by a deep religious feeling which, unfortunately, his mind interprets in a naturalistic sense. Dr. Stapeldon treated of themes long familiar to his readers, the desire of man to spread his race over the universe, his use of eugenic techniques to breed the type of colonists fit to meet the conditions of life on other planets and so on.

Dr. Stapeldon, like the author of *Possible Worlds*, believes in an absolute plasticity of the human body. It may be asked whether the rational animal can have a bodily form different from the human form. St. Thomas did not think it possible.

Another question which arises when men talk of interplanetary travel (and mention of a number of projects for such travel has been made in the papers during the last two years) is that of human policy as regards the intelligent beings, if such exist, that might be found on other planets or in other parts of space. What rights would men have over another inhabited planet? Cardinal Mercier thought that our main business with any inhabitant of another world would be the communication of our most fundamental concepts and principles, in the first instance. Too many of those who have written of these matters believe that it is the destiny of man to spread his seed through space and time in a race against entropy, for one to have much faith in the purity of the intentions of human space travelers. In view of the fact that space travel is a matter of serious consideration on the part both of individuals and of governments, it is time to reflect upon the religious, moral, and political implications of the proposed activity.

## IV

The astronomers have been much in the news recently. The new 200-in. telescope was dedicated last June on Mt. Palomar. Since then trouble

<sup>4</sup> Rosser, Newton, and Gross, *Mathematical Theory of Rocket Flight* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948).

has arisen, as it has been found that the mirror changes shape (in the order of millionths of an inch) when the telescope moves from position to position. It will take over a year to make the necessary adjustments before the telescope is in condition to be used for the purposes for which it was specially constructed. There is a fine account of this mighty instrument in a volume of the "Harvard Astronomical Series." The patience of astronomers, who have been willing to wait for sixteen years for the completion of this new tool of research is a fine example. One derives much pacification of mind from the consideration of the leisurely progress of a noble science which has been cultivated among men for several thousands of years.

## V

A matter which is well worth inquiring into is the recent series of announcements that the planet will soon be unable to provide sufficient nutriment for the needs of its ever-increasing population of men. The figure of an annual increase of twenty millions in the number of men is frequently put forward. At the same time a number of writers<sup>5</sup> have sounded the alarm over our present policy towards the soil. Sir Henry Tizard, speaking at the annual meeting of the British Association, stated that the safety of men depended now upon a large development of the biological sciences. A real problem exists in the demands of men to be fed. The future treatment of the soil is necessarily a matter for the long views of wisdom, and for policymaking which cannot allow scientists to ignore the exigencies of the common good. One is not surprised to find, however, the usual seekers after quick results coming forward with their bad plans. Thus, Dr. E. A. Hooton, the Harvard anthropologist, speaking at Stanford University last February, proposed a plan for universal birth control for the purpose of preventing the incompetent from reproducing their kind, weeding the social misfits from the educational system, and increasing the level of intelligence among those in charge of government. How very *republican*, very old, very stale. Contraception, eugenics, and euthanasia are the cheerful remedies proposed by vociferous fanatics when the occasion arises for a real display of social wisdom, such as is exemplified in the fine soil conservation policies in which this country leads the world. The late G. K. Chesterton's *The Ethics of Birth Control* is still a model of the reply to make to those who put forward their death-bearing plans under the aegis of science.

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<sup>5</sup> Such writers as Fairfield Osborn in *Our Plundered Planet* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1948) and William Vogt in *The Road to Survival* (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948).

## COMMUNISM AND THE CULT OF NONBEING

JOHN MACPARTLAND

Shall we in America forget the name of Cardinal Mindszenty as quickly as we have already forgotten that of Archbishop Stepinac of Yugoslavia? Indeed we do not realize that their cause is our cause, that we too are only another term to be divided up and synthesized in the march of the Communist dialectic. Yet Pius XI in his Encyclical "Atheistic Communism" said:

Our Venerable Predecessor, Pius IX, of holy memory, as early as 1846 pronounced a solemn condemnation, which he confirmed in the words of the Syllabus directed against "that infamous doctrine of so-called Communism which is absolutely contrary to the natural law itself, and if once adopted would utterly destroy the rights, property, and possessions of all men, and even society itself." Later on, another of Our Predecessors, the immortal Leo XIII, in his Encyclical *Quod Apostolici Muneris*, defined Communism as "the fatal plague which insinuates itself into the very marrow of human society only to bring about its ruin."<sup>1</sup>

Indeed, our priests and many of our writers continually urge us to beware, but we are too busy to pay serious attention either to them or to the facts of history which conclusively show that Communism lives only by splitting up and conquering every state in front of it. Perhaps in the last analysis our debonair attitude is based on the hope that Communism will come to rest here or there—somewhere on the other side of the Atlantic. The history of modern thought, on the contrary, shows that this hope is absolutely unfounded. To that history we now turn.

According to Thomist philosophy the mind lives with being. In short, the mind knows what things are. It sees that they come into, and pass out of, existence and consequently that they must be given existence by a being whose nature it is to exist, that is, the First Cause, or God. Because we know, then, that God gave us our being, we love him and serve him. In like manner—that is, from the nature of things—we see that it is our duty not to prevent other beings from doing the same, but rather to help them as Cardinal Spellman helped Cardinal Mindszenty, as the Holy Father would help Stalin. In short, we recognize the brotherhood of man, because we are all created by God, whom we

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<sup>1</sup> Pius XI, Encyclical *Divini Redemptoris*, March 19, 1937.

know from his effects which are evident to us because we know the natures of things. I repeat, it is because the mind lives with reality that it comes to these conclusions.

Modern philosophy, however, begins with Descartes's divorce of the mind from being.<sup>2</sup> Why? Because he wants to make reality conform to the type of knowledge which mathematics gives. Since mathematics deals with quantity, he conceives the manner of operation of the mind to be division. And he builds his own philosophy this way. Thus the mind is divided off from being, so that it can no longer see any foundation in reality for doing this rather than that; the body is separated from the mind so that the nature of man can no longer be known; and finally theology is cut off from the rest of the sciences so that God is put beyond human knowledge. Like Descartes, Kant cuts off the mind from being. Why? To make reality conform to the type of knowledge which physics gives. For him the manner of operation of the mind is *synthetic*. It joins empty concepts from the understanding with matter furnished by sense to make the phenomenon or object for the knower.

Here is the important point: Descartes and Kant refuse to let the mind live with reality; consequently, it can no longer see in the nature of things the necessity either for the existence of God or the moral law, so that the foundations for the brotherhood of man are destroyed. Instead the mind now becomes a dictator. And whether it lays down the law in the name of Descartes or Kant, Stalin or Hitler, the principle is the same: phenomena—what the being of man now becomes—are forced to obey. To be sure, when the point of view of the physical sciences is imposed on philosophy, men are broken up into phenomena, and dictators arise to synthesize the pieces.

Indeed, the practical world today is simply applying the principles of modern speculative thought. The mind, now divorced from reality, takes on a new life, a new manner of operation quite analogous to that of nutritive assimilation. For the plant lives by dividing things up and synthesizing the pieces bit by bit to the parts of its organism. And the mind has now taken on this new life in the Cartesian (divisive) and Kantian (synthetic) conceptions of its manner of operation. In short, cut off from reality and ultimately from God, the life of the mind is materialized. And the Hegelian dialectic shows how this life is lived on the speculative plane as it divides and synthesizes the categories of thought to its ever-growing organism. Marx brought this manner of life down to the practical world, and Communism lives it. Instead of

<sup>2</sup> See my article, "The March Toward Matter," *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, XXIV (November, 1946), 13-18, where a more technical and detailed treatment of Descartes and Kant is presented.

dividing up and synthesizing categories, Communism divides up and synthesizes states. And if it ceases to divide up and synthesize, like any organism, it dies. That is why those who hope it will stop here or there do not understand either its life or the parents from which it sprang.

Here is another striking way in which modern speculative thought ends in atheistic materialism today. For Hegel the bad infinite, like a line, is the one in which the mind would go on indefinitely dividing and synthesizing so that it would never reach reality. But the good infinite, like a circle, is the whole in which, in Hegel's view, this dialectical process takes place; hence there is no infinite regress, because the mind is in the whole or reality as he conceives it. But where does Hegel get this notion of the whole? He cannot get it from the dialectical process, for every synthesis is the basis for a new division. The answer is that the whole is postulated. And what is the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Marxian view? The Hegelian ideal whole clothed in a white garment to justify the blood that the Communist organism must spill to live its life of division and conquest. In short, by living a life of destruction Communism promises to bring about heaven on earth, thus terminating the contradiction from which the Hegelian dialectic began, i.e., being = nothing.

Too many of us are apt to view Communism as a strange evil which does not belong in the modern world, or as a monster peculiar to Russia. Monster it is, indeed; but it is the child of modern thought. If our analysis is correct, Communism is simply the realization of this materialization of the life of the mind which began when the mind was cut off from being and God—the materialized mind brought down from the speculative to the physical order and lived, the embodiment of the errors of modern philosophy since Descartes. From this deeper point of view, Communism is the name for modern civilization's becoming the victim of its own errors as it is devoured piece by piece by the monster it created. And Russia is to be pitied and prayed for, because, seen in this wider perspective, it too is only another term in the conquest of the modern world by the materialized mind. But for the love of God, there goes America!

That the modern world is atheistic today (the big movements characteristic of this age are Communism in Russia, atheistic existentialism in France, naturalism and humanism in America) simply means that the modern world could not be Christian and live the materialized life which it has accepted since Descartes. If, as we have seen, modern speculative thought is the original and pattern out of which our practical world today is growing, then America must beware. Your naturalists

and humanists—and there are many of them—are children who come from the same parents as Communism. They deny the same principles—the soul and God—which Communism is destroying in Europe. We must realize that when the materialized mind *cuts* the soul, the principle of life, out of men, they become passive, inert pieces of matter awaiting *synthesis* by a law dictated to them from without. In short, naturalism simply plants the seed out of which collectivism grows. Indeed it is expedient for our statesmen to guard against the organic embodiment of this materialized mind in Communism. But there will be no security either for us or for the world unless the cause, the materialized mind which is gnawing at the roots of civilization, is uprooted and destroyed.

The Thomist way, which is the same now as it was in the time of Descartes, is still the only way whereby the mind can discover its life. Return the mind to being! It is only in the light of being that the mind can see what it is, that it was made by God and for him, and there is no other foundation for the brotherhood of man.

#### CHRONICLE

THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY at Saint Louis University comprises the following members: Reverend Andrew Henry Bachhuber, S.J., A.M., S.T.L., instructor in philosophy (1948); Vernon Joseph Bourke, M.A., Ph.D., professor of philosophy (1946); Reverend John England Cantwell, S.J., A.M., S.T.L., assistant professor of philosophy (1939); Venant Cauchy, B.S., Ph.L., Ph.D., instructor in philosophy (1947); Brian Coffey, M.S., Ph.D., assistant professor of philosophy (1947); James Daniel Collins, A.M., Ph.D., assistant professor of philosophy (1948); Reverend Thomas Edwin Davitt, S.J., A.M., S.T.L., assistant professor of philosophy (1948); Leonard James Eslick, A.M., Ph.D., associate professor of philosophy (1948); John Alfred Gillett, M.A., instructor in philosophy (1948); Reverend Robert John Henle, S.J., A.M., S.T.L., assistant professor of philosophy (1947) and dean of the School of Philosophy and Science (1943); Paul Joseph Jacoby, A.B., Ph.D., instructor in philosophy (1946); Reverend William Michael Kegel, S.J., A.M., S.T.L., M.A., instructor in philosophy (1947); Reverend George Peter Klubertanz, S.J., A.M., S.T.L., Ph.D., instructor in philosophy (1948); Reverend Boleslaus Thomas Lukaszewski, S.J., A.M., S.T.L., instructor in philosophy (1947); Reverend Hubert H. McKemie, S.J., A.M., S.T.L., J.C.L., assistant professor of philosophy (1946); Reverend James Aloysius McWilliams, S.J., A.M., Ph.D., professor of philosophy (1930); Reverend Joseph Peter Mueller, S.J., A.M., assistant professor of philosophy (1943); Reverend John Joseph

O'Brien, S.J., A.M., S.T.L., Ph.D., Agrégé Gregorian University, associate professor of philosophy (1947); Reverend Francis Joseph O'Reilly, S.J., A.M., S.T.L., assistant professor of philosophy (1945) and regent of the School of Dentistry (1944); Elizabeth Stellwagen Schneider, A.M., instructor in philosophy (1948); Reverend Thurber Montgomery Smith, S.J., A.M., LL.B., Ph.D., professor of philosophy (1942) and dean of the Graduate School (1933); Reverend William Joseph Stackhouse, S.J., A.M., S.T.L., instructor in philosophy (1947); Reverend Michael I. Stritch, S.J., A.M., professor emeritus of philosophy (1943); Reverend William Ligon Wade, S.J., A.M., S.T.L., Ph.D., associate professor of philosophy (1948) and director of the Department (1943). The members of the Department are aided in their instructional work by eleven assistants and lecturers.

THE DAVID F. SWENSON - KIERKEGAARD MEMORIAL FUND has announced that it will give a yearly fellowship of at least five hundred dollars for the study of Kierkegaard. The fellowship is open to anyone, who may choose his own place of study but must have, as a requisite, a religious interest and a reading knowledge of Danish. Those interested should write to the Secretary of the Swenson-Kierkegaard Memorial Committee, Dr. Paul L. Holmer, Department of Philosophy, 300 Folwell Hall, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis 14, Minnesota.

THE "CLASSICS CLUB EDITIONS," published by Walter J. Black, are being made available for students in a low-priced edition, according to an announcement by Van Nostrand. Twelve titles have been announced. Some of them, of interest to philosophers, are listed in the Current Bibliography.

THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY of Marquette University sponsored a lecture by Robert M. Hutchins, chancellor of the University of Chicago, on March 6. He spoke on the subject of "St. Thomas and the World State."

ON DECEMBER 30, 1948, the "Prix du Renouveau français" was awarded to Mme. Raissa Maritain, poet, essayist, and novelist, and wife of Jacques Maritain, for *Les Grandes Amitiés*, the first volume of her memoirs, published in New York during the War. The prize consists in an award of fifty thousand francs given for a work in any prose form which reflects the traditional qualities of French literature. Georges Duhamel was chairman, and Daniel-Rops, Charles Silvestre, and Maxence van der Meersch members of the jury which made the selection.

TO COMMEMORATE THE TWO-HUNDREDTH anniversary (1948) of the publication of the *L'Esprit des Lois* and the two-hundred-and-fiftieth

anniversary (1949) of Montesquieu's birth, the Bibliothèque Nationale arranged a Montesquieu exhibit; and lectures analyzing the influence of Montesquieu's work on French, American, and British law were given at the Sorbonne and the University of Bordeaux.

THE COMMISSION OF THE FOURTH CENTENARY OF SUAREZ has announced a prize, which is subject to the following conditions. (1) A monograph or general study of Suarez's theology or philosophy is to be submitted. (2) The prize is open to all countries and nationalities, and (3) may be written in Latin, Spanish, Portugese, Italian, French, English, or German. (4) The work must be at the Instituto Francisco de Vitoria, del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, Medinaceli, 4, Madrid, not later than November 1, 1950. (5) The first prize will be fifty thousand pesetas; the second and third prizes, if awarded, will be twenty-five thousand. (6) The decision of the jury will be announced on January 5, 1951. (7) The works selected will be published in Spanish by the Commission within a year. The author is guaranteed twenty per cent of the published price of this edition; further editions, and editions in any other languages, will pertain wholly to the author.

THE FACULTIES OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY of San Miguel announce a new series on modern philosophy and philosophers, called "La Filosofía de nuestro tiempo." The general director of the series is the Reverend Ismael Quiles, S.J.; the publisher, Espasa-Calpe Argentina of Buenos Aires. The individual studies run about a hundred pages, and sell for \$3.00 m/n (paper). Already published (in 1948) are: Ismael Quiles, S.J., *Filosofar y vivir*; Juan Luis Segundo, S.J., *Existencialismo, filosofía y poesía*; Ismael Quiles, S.J., *Heidegger. El Existencialismo de la angustia*. To be published immediately: Joaquin Aduriz, *El Existencialismo de la esperanza*, and Ismael Quiles, S.J., *Jean-Paul Sartre. El Existencialismo del absurdo*. In preparation are studies of Karl Jaspers, Bertrand Russel, contemporary Thomism, Unamuno, Max Scheler, Dostoevski, and others.

THE UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE CUYO announced the First National Congress of Philosophy, held at Mendoza, Argentina, from March 30 to April 9, 1949. Prominent philosophers from Europe and the Americas were invited to attend. It is planned to publish the Acts of the Congress.

*Studium generale* I (1948), No. 6, carried a discussion of causality by R. Schottlaender, H. Winterstein, P. Partini, Max Hartmann, J. Marquardt, P. Mittasch, and H. H. Grete.

*Philosophia naturalis*, a new journal dealing with the philosophy of nature and the philosophical implications of the exact sciences, has

been announced. Its editors are: Dr. Eduard May (address: [13b] Niederpöcking über Starnberg Obb.), Dr. Wilfried Stache, and Dr. Hermann Wein (Westkulturverlag Anton Hain, Meisenheim am Glan).

*Symposium*, a new philosophical yearbook, is being printed by Karl Alber Verlag, Freiburg im Breisgau. It is under the direction of Professor Max Müller. Each volume, to appear in two fascicles, will be about six hundred pages. It is to contain major works of Christian philosophers.

*Scholastik* will soon resume publication.

The Deutsche Orientalische Gesellschaft will be refounded with its headquarters in Mainz. Its president is Professor Enno Littmann, Tübingen.

The Bavarian section of the Kantgesellschaft has again taken up its functions. It will not be restricted to Kant and Kantian thought, however.

A new series of philosophical works, under the title "Überlieferung und Auftrag," is being issued by Karl Alber Verlag, Freiburg im Breisgau, under the direction of Ernesto Grassi and Wilhelm Szilasi. The first volume of this series is *Wirklichkeit als Geheimniß und Auftrag. Die Exaktheit der Naturwissenschaften und die philosophische Erfahrung*, by Thure von Vexküll and Ernesto Grassi.

Since it is at present so difficult to obtain bibliographical information from Germany, THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN will from time to time indicate selected titles. These are the first to be listed:

BRUGGER, WALTER. *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*. Freiburg i.B., Herder. [A second edition, and translations into English and French—among other languages—are being prepared.]

DYROFF, ADOLF. *Einleitung in die Philosophie*. Edited by W. Szylkarski. Bonn: Schwippert, 1948. Pp. 452.

HESSEN, JOHANNES. *Max Scheler. Eine kritische Einführung in seine Philosophie*. Essen: Chamier, 1948. Pp. 134.

HOFFNER, JOSEF. *Christentum und Menschenwürde. Das Anliegen der spanischen Kolonialethik im goldenen Zeitalter*. Trier: Paulinus Verlag, 1947.

LANDGRAF, ARTHUR MICHAEL. *Einführung in die Geschichte der theologische Literatur der Frühscholastik*. Regensburg: Gregorius Verlag, 1948. Pp. 144.

METZKE, ERWIN. *Handlexikon der Philosophie*. Heidelberg: Kerle Verlag, 1948. Pp. 457.

NEWMAN-STUDIEN. First series, 1948. Edited by Heinrich Fries and Werner Becker. Nürnberg: Glock und Lutz. Pp. 345.

STEGMUELLER, FR. *Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi*. 2 vols. Würzburg: Schöningh, 1947. Pp. 848.

SZILASI, WILHELM. *Macht und Ohnmacht des Geistes. Interpretation zu Plato und Aristoteles*. Freiburg i. B.: Karl Alber Verlag, 1947.

VON NELL-BREUNING, OSWALD, and SACHER, HERMANN. *Zur christlichen Gesellschaftslehre* (pp. 91). *Zur christlichen Staatslehre* (pp. 143). Freiburg i. B.: Herder, 1948.

JOSEF GEYSER died on November 4, 1948. An obituary by Paul Wilpert appeared in *Klerusblatt* (Eichstätt) for December 15, 1948.

Msgr. Martin Grabmann died on January 4, 1949, in Eichstätt.

The Reverend André Bremond, S.J., formerly professor at Cairo and Maison St. Louis, Jersey, died on January 24, 1949, at Mongré, Villefranche (Rhone), France.

## A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO EXISTENTIALISM

VICTOR R. YANITELLI, S.J.

The term "introduction" is used advisedly. First of all, the bibliography in itself stands incomplete. Secondly, the many varieties of existentialism and the various phases of its growth and manifestation tend to expand bibliographical possibilities indefinitely; and articles and books are appearing even as this list goes to press.

Not all periodicals have been gleaned of their sometimes abundant harvest; only those have been used that seem to be readier to American hands, now that exchange with Europe has been made more regular. Even from those chosen, merely a sampling of what seemed to be more pertinent is offered here. The Dutch, Portugese, and Baltic and Balkan periodicals were left untouched for obvious reasons.

What has been attempted is a presentation in bibliographical form—broad and fairly deep—of existentialism in its larger outlines. Men like Louis Lavelle, Chestov, Camus, Nietzsche, Simone de Beauvoir, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty have not been treated specifically as existentialists themselves, but only as touching on the principal figures of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel, and Sartre. The literary aspect of existentialism has been omitted entirely; this includes the dramas of Marcel and the novels and dramas of Sartre. Articles that referred to these men purely from the point of view of literature were also omitted.

Finally, the two intimations of Catholic existential thought in the philosophies of St. Augustine and St. Thomas have been noted in the general bibliography. Occasionally a directive, rather than a critical, comment has been added after certain books or articles to serve as an aid to students into whose hands this list may come. It is also hoped that the bibliography will be a starting point for teachers and of some assistance to them in guiding their classes through the maze of contemporary existentialism.

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THE REVEREND VICTOR R. YANITELLI, S.J., is completing his theological studies at West Baden College, West Baden Springs, Indiana. He received his doctorate degree from Fordham University.

## GENERAL WORKS

ABBAGNANO, NICOLA. "Outline of a Philosophy of Existence," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, IX (1948), 200-11.

This is Marian Taylor's translation of an article by Italy's foremost existential critic. It gives the existential contrast between finitude and transcendence and the foundation of value in existentialism's approach to existence.

ALLERS, RUDOLF. "On Darkness, Silence, and the Nought," *The Thomist*, IX (1946), 515-72.

This is an experimental psychologist's approach through the experience of darkness and silence to the existential problem raised by the concept of nought in Kierkegaard and Heidegger.

ALVAREZ DEL VAYO, J. "Politics and the Intellectual," *The Nation*, September 28, 1946, pp. 346-49.

ANDERSEN, W. *Der Existenzbegriff und das existentielle Denken in der neueren Philosophie und Theologie*. Güterlock: Bertelsmann, 1940.

ARNOU, RENE. "Existentialism in France Today," *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, XXIV (1946-1947), 193-99.

A general aspect of French existentialism is given, and a good treatment of the question of contingency that is at the roots of the doctrine. The article describes the existentialist's disgust and distress at the universe and contains a good though brief treatment of Camus and Marcel.

ARENDT, H. "French Existentialism," *The Nation*, February 23, 1946, pp. 226-28.

—. "What is Existenz Philosophy?" *Partisan Review*, Winter, 1946.

ASSUNTO, R. "Ragioni e limiti dell'esistenzialismo," *Domenica*, 21 aprile, 1946.

—. "Le Ragioni di una moda," *La Nuova Europa*, luglio, 1945.

ASTRADA, C. *Idealismo fenomenologico y metafísica existencial*. Buenos Aires: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, 1936.

BARRETT, WILLIAM. *What Is Existentialism?* New York: Partisan Review, 1947.

The book explains the genesis of existentialism and its relationship to Husserl, Hegel, Whitehead, and even Bergson; Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Heidegger, and Sartre. This is a modern historical approach given by a non-Scholastic.

BARZUN, JACQUES. "Ca existe, a Note on the New Ism," *The American Scholar*, October, 1946, pp. 449-54.

BEAUFRET, JEAN. "A Propos de l'existentialisme," *Confluences*, I (1945), 193-99; 307-10; 415-22; 531-38; 637-41; 764-71.

BECK, MAXIMILIAN. "Existentialism," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, V (1944-1945), 126-37.

This presents the epistemological approach to the problem of existentialism.

—. "Kritik der Schelling-Jaspers-Heidegger'schen Ontologie," *Philosophische Hefte*, 1944, pp. 94-164.

—. "Ontologie der Gegenwart," *ibid.*, 1935.

—. "Sein und Zeit. Referat und Kritik," *ibid.*, 1928, pp. 5-44.

BELLEZZA, VITO A. "Nota sull'existentialismo italiano," *Archivio di filosofia*, XV (1946), 143-62.

—. "Studi italiani sull'existentialismo," *ibid.*, XV (1946), 163-217.

BERTRAND, RENE. Note sur l'essence et l'existence," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, LI (1946), 193-99.

BOUTONIER, JULIETTE. *L'angoisse*. Paris: Presse Universitaires, 1945. Pp. 317.

This is a treatment of anguish from the point of view of the experimental psychologist and the philosopher. It is defective in places, but

excellent on the objective theories of anguish—for example, those of Janet, Goldstein, and the behaviorists.

BRICK, WERNER. *An Introduction to Contemporary German Philosophy*. Cambridge, 1947.

This book is recommended for its excellent treatment of Heidegger. BRUNNER, AUGUSTE. "Die Entwertung des Seins in der Existenzphilosophie," *Scholastik*, XII (1937), 233-51.

Heidegger and Jaspers are reduced to the logical conclusion of their premises; namely, being—individual being—personally experienced is, in itself, worthless.

—. *La Personne incarnée*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1947.

—. "Ursprung und Grundzüge der Existenzialphilosophie," *Scholastik*, XIII (1938), 173-205.

This is a treatment of the idealist sources of existentialism, especially in Schelling and Heidegger.

BUCCHERI, S. "La Problematica e la metafisica del nulla," *Rivista di filosofia neoscholastica*, XXXVIII (1946), 122-51.

CALEF, V. "E l'esistenzialismo?" *La Nuova Europa*, 9 ottobre, 1945.

—. "Interpretazione dell'esistenzialismo," *ibid.*, 18 novembre, 1945.

CARABELLESE, PANTALEO. "Esistenzialismo o ontologismo critico?" *Archivio di filosofia*, XV (1946), 61-72.

CASSIRER, E. "Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik," *Kantstudien*, 1931, pp. 1-26.

CASTELLI, ENRICO. "Esistenzialismo cristiano?" *Archivio di filosofia*, XV, (1946), 143-62.

CAYRE, F. "Existentialisme," *L'Année théologique*, VII (1946), 467-70.

This is a note on the natural seeking after God from the existentialist viewpoint.

DANTZIG, TOBIAS. *A la recherche de l'absolu*. Translated by A. Coffi. Paris: Hermann, 1946. Pp. 366.

DA VIE, G. *L'Esistenzialismo*. Budrio: Montanari, 1945.

DE BARTOLOMEIS, F. "A Proposito di esistenzialismo," *La Nuova Europa*, 21 ottobre, 1945.

—. *Idealismo ed esistenzialismo*. Napoli, 1944. Criticized by Benedetto Croce in *Quaderni della critica*, marzo 1945, pp. 107-08.

DE BEAUVIOR, SIMONE. "L'Existentialisme et la sagesse des nations," *Les Temps modernes*, I (1945), 385-404.

—. "Idéalisme moral et réalisme politique," *ibid.*, 248-68.

—. "Littérature et métaphysique," *ibid.*, I (1946), 1153-63.

—. "Oeil pour oeil," *ibid.*, I (1946), 813-30.

—. "Pour une morale de l'ambiguïté," *ibid.*, II (1946), 193-211; 385-408; II (1947), 638-64; 846-74.

De Beauvoir has assembled most of these items in a book entitled *La Sagesse des nations* (Paris, 1948).

DELP, ALFRED. "Modern German Existential Philosophy," *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, XIII (1935-1936), 62-66.

This describes the historical climate in which existentialism arose in Germany and presents a philosophico-humanistic consideration of Kierkegaard, Dilthey, Heidegger, with the major emphasis on the latter.

—. *Tragische Existenz*. St. Louis: Herder, 1935.

This is a brief work on the same subject, probably the model from which the article above was drawn.

DE RUGGIERO, GUIDO. *Existentialism. Disintegration of Man's Soul*. Translated with an Introduction by Rayner Heppenstall. New York: Social Science Publishers, 1948.

This is the best of the short syntheses and critiques that have appeared on Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Heidegger, and Marcel. It does not deal with Sartre. Its greatest defect is the enormous amount of reading it presupposes.

DE VIANA, FÉLIX. "Semana de estudio sobre las corrientes Existencialistas," *Revista de filosofía*, VI (1947), 331-42.

DE WAELHENS, ALPHONSE. "Un Symposion de philosophie française," *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie*, XLIII (1940-45), 66-95.

This is a report on the volume of *Etudes philosophiques* published by the Ecole des Hautes Etudes of Gand in 1939, containing the views of some of France's most popular contemporary philosophers, Bachelard, Dupré, Le Senne, Lavelle, Marcel, Jankélévitch, De Corte, Yves Simon, and Borne.

"Discussion sur le péché," *Dieu vivant*, No. 4, 83-136.

The article contains the views of such notables as Bataille, Danielou, De Gandillac, Hyppolite, Klossowski, Adamov, Maydieu, and Burgelin. It is mentioned here because it contains Sartre's philosophical idea of sin.

*L'Existence*. Paris: Gallimard, 1945. Pp. 197.

This is a collection of essays on existentialism by Camus, Fondane de Gandillac, Gilson, Grenier, Lavelle, Le Senne, Brice Parain, and De Waelhens.

*L'Existentialisme*, numéro spéciale, *Revue de philosophie*, 1947.

This contains an article by F. Cayré, "La philosophie de Saint Augustin et l'existentialisme," pp. 9-31. There is shown the affinity of St. Augustine and the moderns in questions of human inquietude, interior realism, moral dynamism, high intellectuality, as well as the doctrinal divergence on God, the intelligible world, interior values, wisdom. This special number also contains the following articles:

DE CORTE, MARCEL. "Réflexions sur Gabriel Marcel et J.-P. Sartre," pp. 34-48.

This offers Marcel as an antidote to Sartre because his doctrine is more healthy.

DESCOQS, PEDRO. "L'Athéisme de J.-P. Sartre," pp. 39-89.

This examines philosophically the pitfalls of Sartre's *L'Etre et le néant*, resulting in unintelligible being, the impossibility of God, and the motives of that impossibility, temporality, the *en-soi* and the *pour-soi*, with a critique showing the contradictions in Sartre.

DUBARLE, D. "L'Ontologie phénoménologique de J.-P. Sartre," pp. 90-123.

This shows how Sartre's intuition of existence demands a return to the reflective desire for intellectual evidence in our cognition. It reveals the dogmatism implicit in Sartre's presuppositions.

JOLIVET, RÉGIS. "L'Existentialisme de Kierkegaard," pp. 124-43.

This declares that Kierkegaard is not really a philosopher properly so called despite his admirable analyses of despair and anguish.

THIBON, GUSTAVE. "L'Existentialisme de Gabriel Marcel," pp. 144-64.

This explains exploring the individual—he bears witness to himself and uses the existential method to achieve the notion of God.

VERNEAUX, R. "De l'absurde," pp. 165-97.

This is a thorough analysis of the existentialist's concept of the notion of absurdity.

*Esistenzialismo (Acta Pontificiae Academiae Romanae Sancti Thomae Aquinatis*, XIII). Rome: Marietti, 1947.

The volume is derived from the week of studies of the Roman Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, April 8-13, 1947. It contains the following articles:

FABRO, CORNELIO. "Il Significato dell'esistenzialismo," pp. 9-39.

This is a very involved and complex analysis of the meaning of existentialism in the light of Thomist principles.

MARITAIN, JACQUES. "L'Existentialisme de St. Thomas," pp. 40-64.

This article studies the precise sense in which St. Thomas may be said to place a priority of existence over essence. It discusses the existentialism of intellectual and moral judgments.

PICARD, NOVAT. "Nuovi orizzonti dell'ontologia di Martino Heidegger," pp. 65-84.

Analyzing the books and articles of Martin Heidegger, Picard shows his philosophical roots in Kant. In a historical treatment, Picard shows that Heidegger's attachment to ultimate nullity has been somewhat mitigated in the later works.

TOCCAFONDI, EUGENIO. "Caratteristiche dell'esistenzialismo italiano," pp. 85-102.

This is a study of the development of the existentialist idea in Italy in men like Fabro, Bellezza, Sciacca, De Ruggiero, Pareyson, and Lombardi.

GILSON, ETIENNE. "La Conoscenza dell'essere," translated by Pierre Chiminelli, pp. 103-4.

This describes how being enters into the existential judgment and cannot be eliminated, with the further extension of the idea that essences have their roots in existing things, but primarily in God.

ARNOU, RENE. "La 'Rélation absolue à l'Absolu' de Kierkegaard," pp. 115-26.

This treats Kierkegaard's theory that it is laughable to try to prove the existence of God since God is existence itself. His method of arriving at God implies a return to metaphysics and the laws of essence and nature.

PETERSON, ERIK. "Kierkegaard e la teologia protestante," pp. 127-32.

This discusses Kierkegaard's interiority as the foundation of Protestant theology, Barth's especially.

PETRUZZELLIS, NICOLA. "L'Esistenzialismo cristiano di Gabriel Marcel," pp. 133-57.

This deals with Marcel's approach to the irrational and his arriving at faith as discussed in his dramas and philosophical writings.

THUM, BEDA. "Cognizione scientifica e filosofia esistenzialista," pp. 158-65.

This is a study of certitude that is based on fact versus certitude that is based on the subjective self which creates its own certitude. The article is a study in contrasts—exteriority versus interiority, objectivity versus subjectivity.

GIACON, CARLO. "Esistenzialismo e problema critico," pp. 166-69.

This is a brief note on the critical emptiness of existentialism.

PIGLINO, UGO. "Il Razionale e l'irrazionale nell'esistenza," pp. 170-83.

That which is expressible in logical terms and that which is a limit to rational cognition are not necessarily antithetic. Transcendence, moral and aesthetic values, mystery and the supernatural, these admit the movement of reason. Existentialism does not.

BOGLIOLI, LUIGI. "Sul Significato del esistenza umana nella filosofia di San Tommaso," pp. 184-90.

In St. Thomas, human existence is the center of the physical cosmos. The theological implications of a philosophy of existence are expounded.

MORANDO, DANTE. "L'Ultimo Karl Barth," pp. 191-217.

A historical critique of the recent work on Barth, his treatment of the word of God, leading to a new humanism, and Barth as a good antidote to the optimism that makes man creator of his own truth.

MUNOZ-VEGA, PAOLO. "Il Mistero dell'essere e del destino umano nell'agostinianesimo e nell'esistenzialismo," pp. 218-27.

This takes up the existential problem in St. Augustine and the existentialists. Being leads directly to transcendence. Man's situation is suspended between earth and heaven, between the void and the infinite.

MAGNINO, BIANCA. "Il 'Non essere' nel relativismo esistenziale," pp. 228-35.

This discusses the relativism implicit and explicit in existentialism.

FABRO, CORNELIO. "Esistenzialismo e filosofia cristiana," *Divus Thomas*, L (1947), 107-10.

—. "Esistenzialismo e realismo," *Acta Pont. Acad. Rom. S. Th. Aq.*, X (1944), 242-59.

—. *Introduzione all'esistenzialismo*. Milano: "Vita e pensiero," 1943. This is reviewed favorably by H. Dobbelaere in *Ephemerides theologicae lovanensis*, XXII (1946), 426-27.

—. *Problemi dell'esistenzialismo*. Roma: Ave, 1945.

FARRE, LUIS. "La Angustia humana y el absoluto," *La Nueva democracia*, diciembre, 1945.

FESSARD, GASTON. "Existentialisme et Marxisme au Collège Philosophique," *Etudes*, CLII-CLIII (1947), 399-401.

This is a report on Raymond Aron's lecture at Mlle. Marie-Madeleine Davy's Centre de Recherches Philosophiques, of which the Philosophical College is an offshoot. Aron, a former Marxist, showed up the conflict between the two concepts of freedom.

—. "Théologie et histoire," *Dieu vivant*, No. 8, pp. 39-65.

Interpreting the apocalyptic notion of history, Fessard brings out the existential ideas of historicity.

FILIANSI CARCANO, PAOLO. "Carattere e genesi del problema esistenzialistico," *Archivio di filosofia*, XV (1946), 82-101.

FLORA, F. "La Gara dei disperati," *Corriere della sera*, 19 maggio, 1946.

FONDANE, B. *La Conscience malheureuse*. Paris: Denoël et Steele, 1936.

FOULQUIÉ, PAUL. *L'Existentialisme*. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1947. Pp. 128.

Essentialist and existentialist philosophies are here compared, and there is a section on Louis Lavelle, whom Foulquié calls an existential essentialist.

—. *Existentialism*. Translated by Kathleen Raine. London, Dennis Dobson. Pp. 218.

This is a brief readable account of the history and theses of existentialism.

FRANCIA, E. "Chiose all'esistenzialismo," *Il Popolo*, 5 gennaio, 1946.

FRIZELL, BERNARD. "Existentialism. Postwar Paris Enthrones a Bleak Philosophy of Pessimism," *Life*, June 17, 1946, pp. 59-60.

GILSON, ETIENNE. "Thomisme et les philosophies existentielle," *Vie intellectuelle*, Juin, 1945. (There is a translation in *Sapientia*, II [1947], 106-17.)

GIORDANI, ROBERTO. *L'Esistenza come conquista della personalità*. Roma: Darsena, 1945. Pp. 272.

GIROSELLA, J. ROIG. "Trayectoria del existencialismo," *Razón y fe*, CXXXVI (1947), 325-43.

This is a somewhat literary account of the historical backgrounds of existentialism, Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, Locke, and Hume.

—. "Filosofía de la actitud," *ibid.*, CXXXVII (1948), 54-70.

This contains some thoughts on symbolic logic and on Wilhelm Dilthey, who influenced Heidegger.

GONZALEZ ALVAREZ, ANGEL. "Las Dos dimensiones de la existencia en la filosofía existencial," *Revista de filosofía*, IV (1945), 255-85.

—. *El Tema de Dios en la filosofía existencial*. Madrid: Investigaciones Scientificas, 1945. Pp. 326.

GRENE, MARJORIE. *Dreadful Freedom*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1948. Pp. 150.  
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This considers existence as the element which cannot be conceptualized—the problems raised by that fact in meeting the modern problems of philosophy on the basis of Aristotle and St. Thomas.

PHELAN, GERALD B. "The Existentialism of St. Thomas," pp. 25-40.

This studies the importance of "existence" in the philosophy of St. Thomas and St. Thomas's existentialism as based on "the transcendent communicability of being."

HENLE, ROBERT J. "Existentialism and the Judgment," pp. 40-53.

The form of the judgment is basically existential because, in virtue of the copula, it asserts something *in actu esse*.

RENARD, HENRI. "Essence and Existence," pp. 53-66.

This is a discussion of the "existential dynamism" of the philosophy of St. Thomas.

KILZER, ERNEST. "The Modes of Existence," pp. 66 ff.

A discussion of the awareness of self as implying a correlative awareness of what is not the self.

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PRZYWARA, E. *Christliche Existenz*. Leipzig: Hegner, 1934.

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SIMON, YVES. *Par delà l'expérience du désespoir*. Paris: Parizeau, 1946. Pp. 220.

SMITH, VINCENT EDWARD. "Existentialism and Existence," *The Thomist*, XI (1948), 141-96, 297-329.

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 This treats of the *Existenz* idea in Hegel's time and what Hegel missed in the notion. John F. Smith adds a comment to Weiss's article elucidating the opposition of Kierkegaard and others, "Not so much against reason as such, but against the theoretical attitude." *Ibid.*, IX (1948), 322-25.

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## SOREN KIERKEGAARD

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*For Self-examination and Judge for Yourselves!* Translated by W. Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1944. Pp. 243.

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*Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing.* Translated by Douglas V. Steere. New York: Harper & Bros., 1938. Pp. 207.

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## ABOUT KIERKEGAARD

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KUHN, HELMUT. "Existentialism and Metaphysics," *The Review of Metaphysics*, I (1947), 37-60.

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WAHL, JEAN. *Etudes kierkegaardgiennes*. Paris: Aubier, 1938.

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*Vom Wesen des Grundes.* Halle: Niemeyer, 1929.

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—. "Il significato della 'realità' nella filosofia di Martino Heidegger," *ibid.*, 41-49.  
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STERN, GUENTHER ANDERS. "On the Pseudo-Concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, VIII (1947-1948), 337-70.

This is a drastic critique of Heidegger that seems to be very sound.

VANNI ROVIGHI, S. *Heidegger*. Brescia: Scuola Editrice, 1945.

—. "L'Interpretazione heideggeriana di Kant," *Quaderni di Studium*, 1943.

VOGT, A. *Das Problem des Selbstseins bei Heidegger und Kierkegaard*. Emsdetten: Lechte, 1936.

VON BALTHASAR, H. "Heideggers Philosophie vom Standpunkt des Katholizismus," *Stimmen der Zeit*, CXXXVII (1939), 1-8.

WERKMEISTER, W. H. "An Introduction to Heidegger's Existential Philosophy," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, II (1941-1942), 79-87.

As exchange professor at Berlin, the author spent many hours with Heidegger. This article represents the fruit of the discussions he had with Heidegger and is an attempt "to remove at least some of the stumbling blocks that have prevented philosophers here and abroad from understanding correctly both Heidegger's intention and his philosophical position." The article gives the epistemological approach with Dilthey and Scheler mentioned, Kant emphasized.

KARL JASPERS

PRINCIPAL WORKS

*Philosophie*. Vol. I, *Philosophische Weltorientierung*; Vol. II, *Existenzerhellung*; Vol. III, *Metaphysik*. Berlin: Springer, 1932.

*Max Weber*. Oldenburg, 1932. 2d ed. unchanged, Breme: Storm, 1947.

*Vernunft und Existenz*. Groningen: Batavia, 1935.

*Nietzsche*. Berlin: DeGruyter, 1936.

*Descartes und die Philosophie*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1937.

There is a French translation by Pollnov (Paris, 1937).

*Existenzphilosophie*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1938.

"Essence et valeur de la science," *Revue philosophique*, 1939.

*Vom lebendigen Geist der Universität*. Heidelberg: "Wandlung," 1946

*Die Schuldfrage*. Heidelberg: Schneider, 1946

*Nietzsche und das Christentum*. Hameln: Seifert, 1946.

*Vom europäischen Geist*. Munich: Piper, 1947.

This is a speech given at the international reunion of Geneva, 1946.

"La Filosofia dell'esistenza nel mio sviluppo spirituale," *Rivista internationale di filosofia "Logos,"* XXXIV (1941), fasc. 3.

*Die geistige Situation der Zeit*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1931.

ABOUT KARL JASPERS

COLLINS, JAMES. "An Approach to Karl Jaspers," *Thought*, XX (1945), 657-91.

DE TONQUEDEC, JOSEPH. *L'Existence, d'après Karl Jaspers*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1945. Pp. 141.

This is an analysis of the work and thought of Jaspers based principally on the three volumes of the *Philosophie*, the *Existenzphilosophie*, and the *Descartes et la philosophie*.

DE WAELHENS, ALPHONSE. "Un Véritable existentialisme: la philosophie de Karl Jaspers," *Orbe*, II (1946), 11-25.

DUFRENNE, MICHEL and RICOEUR, PAUL. *Karl Jaspers et la philosophie de l'existence*. Paris: Du Seuil, 1947. Pp. 416.

*Esistenzialismo*. Rome: Partenia, 1946. Pp. 239.

This is in volumes one and two of the *Archivio di filosofia*, XV (1946). It contains Jaspers's own article about himself, together with articles by Abbagnano, Battaglia, Massolo, and Mazzantini.

FEITH, RUDOLF ERNST. *Psychologismus und Transzentalismus bei Karl Jaspers.* Bern: Naumann, 1945. Pp. 224.

HERSCH, JEANNE. "Karl Jaspers, signification et efficacité d'un refus," *Suisse contemporaine*, VI (1946), 803-05.

HYPPOLITE, JEAN. "Jaspers," *Dieu vivant*, No. 3, 63-80.

This is an analysis by one of the recognized French philosophers of the day.

MARCEL, GABRIEL. "Situation fondamentale et situation-limitée chez Jaspers," *Du Refus à l'invocation* (Paris: Gallimard, 1940), pp. 284-326.

MARCK, S. "La Philosophie de l'existence dans l'oeuvre de Karl Jaspers et de Martin Heidegger," *Revue philosophique*, Paris, LXI (1936), 197-219.

ORTEGAT, PAUL. "La Philosophie religieuse de K. Jaspers," *Nouvelle revue théologique*, LXX (1948), 257-73.

This is by an authority on both aspects of the existential problem.

PACI, ENZO. *Pensiero, esistenza e valore*. Milan, 1940.

This reproduces three essays on Jaspers that appeared in *Rivista internationale di filosofia "Logos,"* (1940), Nos. 2, 3, 4—"Introduzione all'existenzialismo di Jaspers," "Umgreifende e comunicazione nel pensiero di Jaspers," and "Jaspers e lo scacco del pensiero."

RICOEUR, PAUL. *Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers.* Paris: Temps présents, 1947. Pp. 455.

This is a comparative critique of the fundamental notions of situation, communication, liberty, and transcendence, and the methodologies of Marcel and Jaspers.

WAHL, JEAN. "Jaspers et Kierkegaard," *Etudes kierkegaardiennes* (Paris: Aubier, 1938), pp. 477-509.

—. "Le problème du choix, l'existence et la transcendance dans la philosophie de Jaspers," *ibid.*, pp. 510-52.

#### GABRIEL MARCEL

##### PRINCIPAL WORKS

*Journal métaphysique, 1913-1923.* Paris: Gallimard, 1927.

*Position et approches concrètes du mystère ontologique, Le monde cassé.* Paris: Desclée De Brouwer, 1933.

*Etre et avoir.* Paris: Aubier, 1935.

*Du Refus à l'invocation.* Paris: Gallimard, 1940.

*Homo viator; prolégomènes à une métaphysique de l'espérance.* Paris: Aubier, 1944.

*L'Existence et la liberté humaine chez J.-P. Sartre.* Paris: Temps Présent, 1946.

"Le Témoignage comme localisation de l'existential," *Nouvelle revue théologique*, LXVIII (1946), 182-91.

This is a conference given by Marcel at the Jesuit scholasticate in Louvain, Feb. 13, 1946. Immanent finality of bearing witness to oneself is the key notion of Marcel's existentialism as explained by himself.

"Existentialisme et pensée chrétienne," *Témoignages*, 1947, No. 13, 157-69.

"Journal métaphysique: le sens du profond," *Renaissance*, V (1946), 586-600.

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BESPALOFF, R. "La Métaphysique de G. Marcel," *Revue philosophique*, janvier-février, 1938.

COLLINS, JAMES. "Gabriel Marcel and the Mystery of Being," *Thought*, XVIII (1943), 665-93.

DE CORTE, MARCEL. *La Philosophie de Gabriel Marcel.* Paris: Téqui. Pp. 105.

This is an exposé of Marcel's thought with an essay on the disintegration of the existentialist ontology in the face of realism.

DU BOS, CHARLES. "Gabriel Marcel," *Le Roseau d'or, essais et poèmes*, 1931, pp. 87-165.

FACON, NINA. "Intorno all'ultima filosofia francese; Gabriel Marcel," *Sophia*, XV (1947), 81-88.

FESSARD, GASTON. "L'Oeuvre dramatique de Gabriel Marcel," *Etudes*, CCXXXIV (1938), 738-60; CCXXXV (1938), 40-66.  
This is a study of the transcendent element in Marcel's dramas.

JOLIVET, REGIS. "El Existencialismo cristiano de Gabriel Marcel," *Sapientia*, I (1947), 68-77.

JOUVE, RAYMOND. "Un Théâtre de la sincérité: Gabriel Marcel, métaphysicien et dramaturge," *Etudes*, CCXI (1932), 21-34; 171-84.  
Together with Fessard's articles these cover the Christian and transcendent quality of Marcel's dramas quite completely.

LAVELLE, L. "Un Journal métaphysique," *Le Moi et son destin*. Paris: Aubier, 1936, pp. 51-63.  
One of France's better-known philosophers exposes Marcel's point of view on the ego and its destiny in the world.

*Existentialisme chrétien*. Paris: Plon, 1947. Pp. 324.  
This is a book on Marcel composed of essays by different philosophers and edited with an introduction (pp. 1-9) by Gilson. The essays are as follows:

COLIN, PIERRE. "Existentialisme chrétien," pp. 11-116.

DELHOMME, JEANNE. "Témoignage et dialectique," pp. 117-201.  
This is an essay on the key notion of participation and communion as reflected in Marcel.

TROISFONTAINES, ROGER. "La Notion de 'présence' chez G. Marcel," pp. 202-67.  
The author has written one of the better "petits livres" on existentialism.

DUBOIS-DUMÉE, J.-P. "Solitude et communion dans le théâtre de G. Marcel," pp. 269-90.  
This is an analysis of the gloomy plays of Marcel.

MARCEL, GABRIEL. "Regard en arrière," pp. 291-319.  
This is Marcel's own comment.

MERLEAU-PONTY, MAURICE. "Etre et avoir," *Vie intellectuelle*, octobre, 1936.

MESNARD, PIERRE. "Gabriel Marcel dialecticien de l'espérance," *Vie intellectuelle*, juin, 1946.

MORANDO, DANTE. "L'Esistenzialismo cattolico di Gabriel Marcel," *Rivista rosmariniana di filosofia e di cultura*, L (1946), 11-27.

WAHL, JEAN. "Le Journal métaphysique de G. Marcel," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, janvier-mars, 1930.  
—. "Subjectivité et transcendance," *ibid.*, octobre-décembre, 1937.

## JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

## PRINCIPAL WORKS

*L'Etre et le néant. Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique*. Paris: Gallimard, 1943.  
Pp. 722.

*L'Existentialisme est un humanisme*. Paris: Nagel, 1946. Pp. 141.

This has been translated into English by Bernard Frechtman under the title *Existentialism* (New York: Philosophical Lib., 1947).

*Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions*. Paris: Hermann, 1946.

*L'Imagination*. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1947.

This has been translated into English under the title *The Psychology of Imagination* (New York: Philosophical Lib., 1948).

## ABOUT SARTRE

ALQUIÉ, FERDINAND. "L'Etre et le néant, par J.-P. Sartre," "Cahiers du sud," 1945, No. 273, 648-62; No. 274, 807-16.

BLONDEL, MAURICE. "The Inconsistency of Jean-Paul Sartre's Logic," *The Thomist*, X (1947), 393-97.

This is an excoriation of the word-trickery of Sartre. "It is high time that the French spirit and the French mind reaffirmed their rights to universality and inwardness, instead of allowing themselves to be deceived by an overly visceral imagination."

BOUTANG, PIERRE and PINGAUD, BERNARD. *Sartre, est-il un possédé?* Paris: La Table Ronde, 1946. Pp. 96.

This is a clever *esquisse*, but it is of small critical value.

BROWN, J. L. "Chief Prophet of the Existentialists," *The New York Times Magazine*, Feb. 2, 1947, pp. 20-21.

This contains some biographical and philosophical data on Sartre not easily come by.

CAMPBELL, ROBERT. *Jean-Paul Sartre*. Paris: Ardent, 1945. Pp. 278.

This is a slightly polemic, pro-Sartre, exposition of Sartre's literary texts placed side by side with his philosophical texts.

COLLINS, JAMES. "The Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre," *Thought*, XXIII (1948), 59-100.

This is as complete an analysis of *L'Etre et le néant* as can be found.

COPLESTON, FREDERICK. "Existentialism and Religion," *The Dublin Review*, spring, 1947, pp. 50-63.

Sartre's philosophy is studied from the point of view of God. The treatment is half literary and half philosophical.

—. "Man without God," *The Month*, CLXXXIV (1947), 18-27.

This is a study of the human consequences of a philosophy that a priori shuts the door on God.

—. "The Philosophy of the Absurd," *ibid.*, 157-64.

This is a further elucidation of the preceding.

—. "What Is Existentialism?" *ibid.*, CLXXXIII (1947), 13-21.

This is a half-literary and half-philosophical study which brings together Sartre's novel *La Nausée* and *L'Etre et le néant*.

CUENOT, CLAUDE. "Littérature et philosophie chez J.-P. Sartre," *Renaissances*, 1946, No. 21, 49-61.

DE WAELHENS, ALPHONSE. "L'Existentialisme de M. Sartre, est-il un humanisme?" *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, XLIV (1946), 291-300.

De Waelhens refers to Sartre's little book as an error which will contribute nothing to those who know Sartre's philosophy and mislead those who do not. It is unworthy of *L'Etre et le néant*.

—. "Heidegger et Sartre," *Deucalion*, I (1946), 15-40.

—. "J.-P. Sartre, *L'Etre et le néant*," *Erasmus*, Vol. I, pp. 522-39.

DOUGLAS, K. N. "The Nature of Sartre's Existentialism," *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, April, 1947, 244-60.

GODET, PIERRE. "Note sur *L'Etre et le néant*, de J.-P. Sartre," *Jahrbuch des Schweizerischen Philosophischen Gesellschaft*, V (1945), 56-67.

MARCUSE, HERBERT. "Existentialism: Remarks on J.-P. Sartre's *L'Etre et le néant*," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, VIII (1947-1948), 309-36.

This is an analysis, dissection, and critique of Sartre's main philosophical work, done on phenomenological grounds.

NICOLAI, R. "Borghesia e proletariato in J.-P. Sartre," *Socialismo*, II (1946), No. 1.

PETREMENT, SIMONE. "La Liberté selon Descartes et selon Sartre," *Critique*, I (1946), 612-20.

PHILLIPS, R. P. "L'Existentialisme est un humanisme," *Clergy Review*, XXVI (1946), 538-41.

This is a review of Sartre's book.

PICARD, GABRIEL. "L'Existentialisme de Jean-Paul Sartre," *Mélanges de science religieuse*, III (1946), 315-38.

POLIN, RAYMOND. "Introduction à la philosophie de J.-P. Sartre," *Revue de Paris*, LIII (1946), 91-97.

SCHUETZ, ALFRED. "Sartre's Theory of the Alter Ego," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, IX (1948), 181-99.

This is a subtle criticism of Sartre's middle way between realism and idealism. It considers Sartre's position as untenable.

SMITH, VINCENT EDWARD. "Philosopher of the Absurd," *The Shield*, XXVI (1946), 27 ff.

VIAL, FERNAND. "Existentialism and Humanism," *Thought*, XXIII (1948), 17-20.

This is an analytical comment on Sartre's little book.

WAHL, JEAN. "Essai sur le néant d'un problème," *Deucalion*, I (1946), 40-72.

This has been called by Alfred Schuetz "the best critical discussion of Sartre's philosophical position."

## BOOK REVIEWS

INEVITABLE PEACE. By Carl Joachim Friedrich. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. xii + 294.

At the beginning of the chapter entitled "The Christian Tradition," Professor Friedrich writes:

To look upon nature and reason as antithetical to each other is an ever recurring tendency of human thought. It dominates the great metaphysical speculations of the Middle Ages. But on the other hand, it is well known that modern natural science is founded upon the contrary belief that nature is governed by laws, and that it is the task of man to discover . . . the laws which govern nature and thus to depict nature as the rational cosmos God has willed it to be.

It is this kind of incredible confusion that is repeatedly presented to the reader of this book, and presented moreover in an appropriately pompous way. Professor Friedrich has evidently never heard of the classic definition of nature given by St. Thomas in his commentary on the second book of Aristotle's *Physics*: Nature is a reason (*ratio, logos*) put in things by the divine art, so that they are able to act for an end (*lectio xiv*). Possibly it is this very evident lack of knowledge that causes Professor Friedrich to be misled so simply by the decoy of Kant's "critical realism," a philosophy which, better than any other modern philosophy, carefully couches in "intuitions" its impossible "evidences." What is most impressive about this book is its extraordinary combination of naïveté and self-assurance. Possibly for the same reason Professor Friedrich is led to accept as the residual quintessence of Christian theology the intellectual cowardice of Kant's pietism. If Professor Friedrich wants to see where the Kantian antinomies really lead he ought to read Feuerbach; if, on the other hand, he wants to make a beginning at seeing straight, he ought to pocket his pride, open his eyes, and start reading Aristotle with the help of St. Thomas.

The Kantian thesis which is defended in this book is that the inevitability of peace rests on the idea that man, although a part of nature and subject as such to the laws of nature, carries within himself an order that is other than that of nature and, indeed, is the cause itself of whatever order is "found" in nature. For Kant had accepted Hume's view that causation cannot be derived from experience. It is important to notice that Professor Friedrich agrees that the modern

democratic ideology is tied to that "skeptical uncertainty" of Hume "which is the philosophical counterpart of democratic corruption." The way of escape lies along the line adopted by Kant. If nature is in itself unintelligible it becomes intelligible thanks to the form, the mold, the tool of the human mind; we are justified, then, in supposing that the laws of nature are themselves engaged in bringing about an order higher than that of nature, namely, the realm of the free self-conscious spirit in which man will ultimately realize the prescription of the highest good, universal peace.

But now it must be observed that this self-realization of man by which he becomes aware of his inmost being as a freely determining self-conscious ego implies a connection somewhere, however obscure, between the two realms of nature and spirit. It will be out of this obscurity that Feuerbach will bring forth without ambiguity the new "man-god." But Kant does pretty well himself. The transcendental ideas of God and freedom may have no strict cognitional value; but it is not merely that the practical reason compels us to give assent to these ideas, for the transcendental ideas spring from reason itself and therefore they have a real value in relation to reason as suggesting the very inmost nature of intelligence. That is, the pure reason (although having no value as science) suggests to us that intelligence is our very substance, that ultimately we understand ourselves by ourselves (and not mediately through anything outside), that our knowledge is the cause of the things that we know. We may not know that there is a God; but we have good reasons for believing that there not only is one, but that we are God. Peace will come when men shall be as gods.

What, then, is the point of Professor Friedrich's book? Kant sought to deliver the speculative intelligence from the shackles of metaphysics by confining it to the order of logic; man is emancipated from all that is better than himself. He signalized the new faith in man, which on one side provides the context for the new democratic faith in human freedom and dignity, and on the other bolder and more clear-sighted side provides the groundwork for what the Marxists, quite plausibly in this context, call the last phase of the democratic process. For if the total emancipation of man is the key to the democratic process, are not the Marxists more clear-sighted in seeing that democracy reaches its final stage only when everything that is clothed with the stability of the natural—including the natural bases of society, the family, and the state itself—is destroyed? But it is nothing other than this faith which Professor Friedrich says

animates all the great world religions. It is a faith which all humanism seeks to salvage when faith declines. This

faith provides the only real ground for believing in inevitable peace. It is inevitable only because man cannot escape his own destiny of fulfillment as man.

Professor Friedrich's book reflects pretty well the condition of democratic culture as distinguished, perhaps, from democratic practice. Our democratic practices, rooted in sufficiently sound principles, are defended in the halls of our universities in the terms either of the radical skepticism of Hume or of the blasphemous piety of Kant. In view of the strange combination of intelligence and stupidity that is so hard at work among the self-styled defenders of democracy, one is left with the appalling fear that the intelligence and the affection that are at work here are an intelligence that is spiritually blinded and an affection that is hardened against the good.

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DER PHILOSOPHISCHE GLAUBE. By Karl Jaspers. Munich: R. Piper & Co., 1948. Pp. 136.

The brevity of this volume is no true index of its worth. Readers who are introduced to the existentialist viewpoint by the French writers are often taken aback when reference is made to a Christian existentialism. Yet Sartre himself proposed a broad distinction between atheistic and Christian existentialism, including Gabriel Marcel and Karl Jaspers in the latter class. About Marcel's religious position there is no question, but it is inaccurate to list Jaspers among the Catholic or even the Christian thinkers. This widespread misapprehension is in some measure Jaspers's own fault, since he has maintained a remarkable reserve and ambiguity throughout his discussion of religious questions. An attempt to determine more exactly his religious doctrine on the basis of his prewar writings was made in my article "Philosophy of Existence and Positive Religion" *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, XXIII [Jan., 1946], pp. 82-100). Similar findings were made by Dufrenne and Ricoeur in their careful work, *Karl Jaspers et la philosophie de l'existence* (Paris, 1947; cf. pp. 244 ff. and 389 ff.). From these studies it was clear that Jaspers either had not set forth his entire mind on this question or had not worked out explicitly the consequences of his basic principles.

Since 1938 this problem has engaged more and more of his attention. Jaspers has spoken frequently at meetings of Protestant pastors and scholars and, in the postwar journal *Die Wandlung*, has contributed to a discussion on biblical religion. It is fortunate that he should choose the theme of philosophical faith for his invitation lectures delivered at

the University of Basel in 1947 (a short time before Jaspers himself joined the faculty of that university as professor of philosophy). He examines the subject in a succinct and orderly series of six lectures. The first three conferences help to clarify the meaning of philosophical faith in terms of Jaspers's systematic theories about man, the world, and transcendence. In the last two, attention is directed to the alternatives to philosophy and to the tasks facing philosophy in the near future. The central issue is faced, however, in the fourth lecture, "Philosophy and Religion."

Jaspers's three philosophical mentors are Kant, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. From Kant he derives his conviction that the scientifically knowable world is confined to the appearances of being and that our minds cannot reach demonstratively to the transcendent being, God. Yet Jaspers does not remedy this situation by an immediate appeal to faith in the sense of the Kantian practical reason. Rather, he requires us first to pass through the purgatory prepared by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. The latter announced the death of God and the end of an era based upon theistic belief. To Nietzsche Jaspers owes his contention that none of the historical forms of religious or philosophical wisdom can satisfy contemporary man. Yet there is here a clearer repudiation of Nietzsche's ultimate nihilism and myth-making than in any of Jaspers's previous books. Faith and unfaith are still bound together inextricably in philosophical reflection, but unfaith is now regarded more as a reminder of our freedom to interpret existence than as an equally tenable position. It is the consequence of an immanentist approach to being, whereas philosophy requires one to remain open to transcendence. Faith is the bond of human existence with transcendence; it is our free affirmation that God exists.

In his earlier books Jaspers connected this faith intimately with both the failure of reason to reach the transcendent in its own being and with our "lived" experience of this failure. The very possibility of philosophy rested upon a final faith in the harmony between being and our aspirations toward transcendence. Now, however, the emphasis is placed upon philosophizing as a search after origins. The contingent character of the world and the restless play and yearning of freedom are meaningful only if God is the foundation and primal source of englobing finite reality. This adhesion to God as the authentic being is faith: the consciousness that human existence has significance only as orientated to transcendence. It is a presupposition of all philosophizing, states Jaspers, rather than a result obtained through philosophizing. This is not an adequate reply to those critics who accused Jaspers of rendering philosophy, as a rational discipline, impossible and then of

converting it into a concealed theology. Yet no other response is possible for a thinker who is attempting, on fundamentally Kantian grounds, to find theoretical justification for man's natural inclination toward being as such and toward the unconditioned being.

Moreover, this existential faith is philosophical and not religious. It is here that Jaspers and Kierkegaard part company. Kierkegaard's conception of faith left no room for philosophy, at least in its accepted Hegelian form. And for him, faith in its perfection meant a confession of the mystery of the God-Man. Jaspers tries to distinguish between religious and philosophical faith, admitting that philosophy cannot assimilate religious truth. This is due, not to a difference in content of truth, but to a contrast between a limited historical mode of apprehension and one which aims at universality. Although philosophy should respect religious institutions, it cannot remain content with the inescapably one-sided and partial way in which truth is presented by the historical religions. It seeks a universal content of philosophical faith hidden beneath the particularized forms of religious dogma. Religion as portrayed in the Bible, for instance, does express the great polar tensions of existence, but in an unreflective, nonphilosophical way. Christianity is handicapped by its claim to exclusiveness and especially by affirming the unique divinity of Christ. Jaspers now stands clearly opposed to the orthodox doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation.

This existentialism is based on philosophical faith in God as the being of transcendence. It is prepared to come to terms with a religious faith, provided only that the latter restrict its unconditioned aspect to a historically determined mode of existence, rather than claim universal validity for its creed and cult. The association of transcendence with God distinguishes Jaspers's philosophy from that of Heidegger, whereas he is far more positive and theistic in his approach to religion than is Sartre. But he lacks one entire dimension of Kierkegaard's outlook: a sense of God's love and incarnate presence in time. Hence no attention is paid to the reason advanced by Kierkegaard in favor of the uniqueness and all-inclusiveness of Christianity. Christian faith is both unconditioned *and* universal because its existential and historical center is the divine-human nature of Christ. That Jaspers should not even seriously analyze this view of God's initiative and religious immanence is indicative of the crippling effect of initial epistemological commitments upon all his subsequent investigations of existence and transcendence.

Where Jaspers is not intent upon transforming the core of religion into philosophy, he reveals a sane and vigorous understanding of contemporary speculative and practical problems. His remarks on peren-

nial philosophy (a concept by no means the exclusive preserve of Scholastics), scientism and the idea of progress, the apotheosis of man, and the dialectic of peace and unrest are always clarifying. And for all its systematic narrowness, his study of biblical religion is profound and relevant.

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**PHILOSOPHIE ET INCARNATION SELON SAINT AUGUSTIN.** By Etienne Gilson. Montreal: Institut d'Etudes Médiévaies, 1947. Pp. 55. \$1.00.

**NOMINALISME AU XIVE SIECLE.** By Paul Vignaux. Montreal: Institut d'Etudes Médiévaies; Paris: J. Vrin, 1948. Pp. 97. \$1.25.

In 1947 the Institut d'Etudes Médiévaies Albert-le-Grand began a series, "Conférence Albert-le-Grand." These two books are the first two annual lectures. The Institut and its devoted president, the Reverend Louis-Marie Regis, O.P., deserve the highest congratulations.

M. Gilson's lecture is not just another book about St. Augustine. It is rather as if St. Augustine were speaking, in a modern context, with all his genius and sensitivity to contemporary problems, of that which lay at the heart of his philosophical and theological preoccupations: God and man. M. Gilson begins with the Augustinian (and universally human) attempt to understand God in himself, according to his incomprehensible name, "Who Is." But man, who is enmeshed in the chains of his own becoming and the transitoriness of all about him, cannot hope to come to God except by transcending himself and creatures and time. And, indeed, man cannot understand himself by himself; for when he looks to see what he is, he finds only what he was or what he will be; his being seems to vanish as he approaches it. Who shall save man and bring him to God—if not God? This is why God has come into history as the "God of Abraham"; this is why Christ Jesus has become man—that he may be Emmanuel, "God with us," and that we may finally be—with God.

M. Vignaux is the recognized authority on nominalism and the philosophical and theological movements of the fourteenth century. He here presents three moments in the thought of Ockham. The first takes up the distinction between intuitive and abstractive knowledge, and the function of the "absolute power of God" in Ockhamist reasoning. The second deals with the conceptual knowledge of God and the problem of theology as a science. The third takes up the Ockhamist ontology of the irreducible singular whose indivisibility is so resistant

that it cannot even be thought of by more than one concept, and which nevertheless can be the basis of a univocal science, just as in Scotus God and creature can be known by the univocal concept of being.

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MEDIAEVAL STUDIES. Vol. IX, 1947. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1947. Pp. 304. \$5.00.

There are a number of studies in this issue bearing directly on philosophy. The Reverend I. Th. Eschmann, O.P., continues his "Studies on the Notion of Society in St. Thomas Aquinas" with "Thomistic Social Philosophy and the Theology of Original Sin." Dr. Martin Grabmann presents the results of a manuscript study on "Ein *Tractatus de Universalibus* und andere logische Inedita." The Reverend V. L. Kennedy, C.S.B., presents "The Content of Courson's *Summa*" in the form of its chapter headings. Dr. Etienne Gilson studies the meaning of an unusual philosophical phrase in "*Regio dissimilitudinis* de Platon à Saint Bernard de Clairvaux." There are also two short notes, one by Artur Landgraf on "Die Quellen der anonymen *Summe* des Cod. Vat. lat. 10754," and the other by L. Baudry discussing "Le Texte de la *Summa Totius Logicae*."

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INITIATION A L'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE. By Francois-Albert Angers. Montreal: Fides, 1948. Pp. 308. \$2.00.

This introductory text in political economy presents the general theory and makes its applications to Canadian situations. The author gives brief economic arguments against Communism, socialism, and complete state control (*le dirigisme*), as well as the economic arguments in favor of the co-operative and corporative (guild) movements.

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REGARDS SUR LE CONNAITRE. By Julien Péghaire, C.S.Sp. Montreal: Fides, 1949. Pp. 479. \$3.00, paper.

According to the author, this work is a collection of essays on knowledge which have appeared mainly in the *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa*. He does not mention that chapter 8, "La Cogitative, d'après Saint Thomas d'Aquin" (pp. 309-93), originally appeared in THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XX (1943), 123-40, 210-29, under the title "A Forgotten Sense, the Cogitative, according to St. Thomas Aquinas" (yet

the two versions, except for the first few paragraphs and a few footnotes, agree perfectly).

Other chapters deal with the notion of knowledge (chap. 1), idealism (chaps. 2 and 3), and natural faith (chap. 4). The essays in the second part are more psychological; they treat of the place of experience in philosophy (chap. 5), and especially of experimental psychology (chap. 6); with the problem of faculties (chap. 7), the cogitative (chap. 8), and the intellection of the material singular (chap. 9). The conclusion (chap. 10) compares and contrasts St. Thomas and Descartes.

There is an index.

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J.

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**FILOSOFIA ESPANOLA Y PORTUGUESA DE 1500 A 1650.** By Ramón Cenal, S.J. Madrid: Ministerio de Educacion Nacional, 1948. Pp. xiii + 173, with 48 plates. 45 pesetas.

This bibliography was planned and executed as a guide to the bibliographical exposition prepared by the Junta Nacional del Centenario de Francisco Suárez. It is at the same time an almost complete bibliography of the philosophical and theological works published in Spain and Portugal from 1500 to 1650. Works are listed first alphabetically by authors, and then chronologically under each name. There is an index by years, referring back to the first listing by marginal numbers. The plates are sepia photolithographic reproductions of noteworthy titlepages in the exposition.

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J.

*Saint Louis University*

**ART AND THE SOCIAL ORDER.** By D. W. Gotshalk. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1947. Pp. xiv + 253. \$3.75.

This book is packed with incidental information of value, from which students of the philosophy of art will derive the benefit that any fact provides. The psychological terminology employed in the development of the author's account of the place to be occupied by the arts in a dynamic social order founded on scientific intelligence and orientated towards the best social good is not sufficiently precise, in this writer's opinion, to permit of communication of the author's conception of the nature of *art*, a term which he appears to take to be synonymous with *fine art*. Nor is it at all certain that new social necessities, new materials, and the new outlook consonant with the new social necessities alone contain the possibility of, and the promise of, artistic greatness. We might get a new Sparta, or even the Republic itself, in which case

the future of art, or rather fine art (since even political policing involves a kind of art), would be dim. It would be interesting to know what Francois Villon would have said about the future of art. The artists one meets appear to be interested only in *art now* (though that too has served one English critic as a slogan).

BRIAN COFFEY

*Saint Louis University*

**A SOURCE BOOK IN GREEK SCIENCE.** By Morris R. Cohen and I. E. Drabkin. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1948. Pp. xxii + 579. \$9.00.

This latest of the source books in the history of the sciences which are being published under the general editorship of Gregory D. Walcott is of greater material value, as regards paper, printing, and binding, than many recent scientific publications that we have seen. Students will find the contents of the volume invaluable for the purpose of first readings in the textual sources upon which the history of Greek science is based. The general reading public will find here material in support of the view that science did not originate in the sixteenth century of the present era.

BRIAN COFFEY

*Saint Louis University*

**HASIDISM.** By Martin Buber. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1948. Pp. xii + 208. \$3.75.

Hasidism, which is one of the more important religious movements of modern times because of its relationships to orthodox Judaism and Sabbatianism, undergoes a process of radically naturalistic interpretation at the hands of Professor Buber. The peculiar importance of this valuable document derives both from the fact that Professor Buber's interpretation of Hasidism is also a reinterpretation of Judaism and from the fact that a man of Professor Buber's standing should have produced this work now.

BRIAN COFFEY

*Saint Louis University*

**THE NEXT DEVELOPMENT IN MAN.** By Lancelot Law Whyte. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1948. Pp. xiv + 322. \$3.50.

According to Mr. Whyte, the next stage in our human history can be deducted from the following *postulate*: "Process consists in the development of form, when circumstances permit. This fact must be represented in the general form of natural law and does not require

explanation" (p. 14). The subsequent treatment of the human story is representative of the radical naturalism which is the soul of so many recent world views. The reader is not therefore surprised to discover, on inspection of the dust cover, that the book has received the approval of Professor Einstein, Lewis Mumford, and others like them.

BRIAN COFFEY

*Saint Louis University*

## BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN THE UNITED STATES

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.
2. Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.
3. Books received by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.

ADKINS, NELSON F. *Philip Freneau and the Cosmic Enigma. A Study in the Religious and Philosophical Thought of the Eighteenth Century*. New York: New York Univ. Press; March, 1949. \$2.50.

AMES, RUSSELL. *Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; Feb., 1949. Pp. viii + 230. \$3.50.

Thomas More and his *Utopia* are here considered in relation to political, economic, and social history and theory. The author considers *Utopia* as a program of democratic reform and an exposition of republican principles. To show its concrete relevance, the author relates the imaginative reconstruction of More to the middle-class movements and hopes of his time.

This is a significant contribution to the understanding of a great classic, and can be recommended to those who are interested in political, social, and economic theory, as well as to philosophers and students of literature. The author in a few instances accepts the interpretations of G. G. Coulton, though this is a minor imperfection when compared to the excellence of the work as a whole.

There is a useful bibliography and an index.

ARISTOTLE. *On Man in the Universe. Metaphysics*, translated by Macmahon; *Parts of Animals*, translated by Ogle; *Ethics*, translated by Welldon; *Politics*, translated by Jowett; *Poetics*, translated by Butcher. Edited, revised and abridged with an introduction by Louise R. Loomis. "Classics Club College Editions." New York: W. J. Black. Pp. 486. \$1.25.

AUGUSTINE, St. *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine*. Edited by Whitman J. Oates. New York: Random House, 1948. Pp. 887. \$10.00.

—. *Confessions of St. Augustine*. Translated by J. G. Pilkington. New York: Modern Lib.; April, 1949. \$1.25.

—. *Writings of Saint Augustine*. 2 vols. New York: Cima Pub. Co., 1947, 1948. Vol. I, pp. 450, \$4.50; Vol. II, pp. 489, \$4.00.

BACON, FRANCIS. *Essays and New Atlantis*. With an introduction by Gordon Haight. Spelling and syntax modernized. "Classics Club College Editions." New York: W. J. Black. Pp. 317. \$1.25.

BARNETT, LINCOLN. *The Universe and Dr. Einstein*. New York: Wm. Sloane, 1949. Pp. 127. \$2.50.

BECKWITH, BURHAM PUTNAM. *The Economic Theory of a Socialist Economy*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 452. \$5.00.

BEER, SAMUEL. *The City of Reason*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; March, 1949. Pp. xii + 228. \$4.00.

BELL, BERNARD IDDINGS. *Crisis in Education. A Challenge to American Complacency*. New York: Whittlesey House; March, 1949. \$2.75.

BENTHAM, JEREMY. *A Fragment on Government and An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1948. Pp. 502. \$2.25.

BERGSTRASSER, A. *Goethe's Image of Man and Society*. Hinsdale, Ill.: Henry Regnery Co.; May, 1949. \$4.50.

BERNBAUM, ERNEST. *Guide through the Romantic Movement*. 2d ed., revised and enlarged. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1949. Pp. 362. \$3.00.

BEVERIDGE, WILLIAM HENRY. *Voluntary Action. A Report on Methods of Social Advance*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 420. \$4.50.

BOBER, M. M. *Karl Marx's Interpretation of History*. 2d ed. revised. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Sept., 1948. Pp. xi + 445. \$6.00.

BOOLE, GEORGE. *The Mathematical Analysis of Logic*. New printing. New York: Philosophical Lib.; spring, 1949. \$3.75.

BOWLE, JOHN. *Western Political Thought. An Historical Introduction from the Origins to Rousseau*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 472. \$5.00.

CAIRNS, HUNTINGTON. *Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1949. Pp. xv + 583. \$7.50.

The author analyzes in some detail the legal philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, Francis Bacon, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Hume, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. This is a huge undertaking, and the author has achieved a large measure of success. This important work is made more valuable because of its detailed index. (To be reviewed.)

CICERO. *De Re Publica*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1948. Pp. 169. \$1.75.

CLAUSEN, JENS, and OTHERS. *Experimental Studies on the Nature of Species*. Washington: Carnegie Inst., 1948. Pp. 132. \$3.00; paper, \$2.50.

CLEVE, FELIX M. *The Philosophy of Anaxagoras*. New York: King's Crown Press, 1949. Pp. 167. \$3.00.

This is a serious and detailed attempt to reconstruct the philosophical system of Anaxagoras. The author maintains that the fragments and historical reports do reveal a coherent system. The elements of Anaxagoras are said to be the substantialized opposites (e.g., "hot" and "cold," and not such things as "flesh" and "bone"). The Nous arranges the world according to the inner laws of the elements and their mixtures, by pushing, pulling, or whirling them. This activity of Nous is based on the mutual impenetrability of Nous and the rest of the elements—"Nous is unmixed." Nous is an intelligent, powerful thing (or element) which is still quantified, though it has no sensible qualities. It is not a final, nor a planning cause, but simply an efficient cause of immanent purposes. Individual personalities arise by the local separation of a part of Nous within an enclosing body.

This interpretation implies that Aristotle, and to some extent Plato, misunderstood or changed Anaxagorean doctrine in their reports of it.

There is an index.

COHEN, MORRIS RAPHAEL. *A Dreamer's Journey*. Boston: Beacon Press; March, 1949. Pp. 325. \$4.00.

—. *Studies in Philosophy and Science*. New York: Henry Holt & Co.; Jan., 1949. Pp. 278. \$4.50.

COLERIDGE, SAMUEL TAYLOR. *Philosophical Lectures (1818-1819)*. Edited by Kathleen Coburn. New York: Philosophical Lib.; March, 1949. \$7.50.

COMPTON, ARTHUR H., and OTHERS. *Man's Destiny in Eternity*. Boston: Beacon Press; April, 1949. Pp. 240. \$2.75.

COOK, HERBERT H. *Twentieth Century Progress*. Boston: Meador Pub. Co., 1949. Pp. 856. \$5.00.

CRAIG, HARDIN. *Freedom and Renaissance*. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press; April, 1949. Pp. 144. \$2.50.

CREEL, H. G. *Confucius. The Man and the Myth*. New York: John Day Co.; April, 1949. Pp. 384. \$5.00.

CRONIN, JOHN FRANCIS. *Catholic Social Action*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1948. Pp. 272. \$3.50.

DAMPIER, SIR WILLIAM CECIL. *A History of Science*. 4th ed., revised and enlarged. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 554. \$3.95.

DANTE ALIGHIERI. *The Divine Comedy*. With translation and comment by John D. Sinclair. New York: Oxford Univ. Press; spring, 1949. 3 vols. \$15.00 per set.

DE BEAUVIOR, SIMONE. *The Ethics of Ambiguity*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; March, 1949. \$3.00.

DESSAUR, F. E. *Stability*. New York: Macmillan Co.; May, 1949. \$3.50.

DEVORE, NICHOLAS. *New Frontiers in Psychology*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; spring, 1949. \$3.00.

DEWEY, JOHN. *Reconstruction in Philosophy*. Boston: Beacon Press; March, 1949. Pp. 265. \$2.75.

DILLARD, DUDLEY. *The Economics of John Maynard Keynes. The Theory of a Monetary Economy*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1948. Pp. 379. \$5.00; text ed., \$3.75.

DUNNE, J. W. *An Experiment with Time*. New York: Macmillan Co.; April, 1949. \$3.50.

EASTBURG, FREDERICK E. *Psychology and Philosophy of Truth*. Boston: Bruce Humphries; Jan., 1949. Pp. 78. \$2.50.

This little group of introductory sketches is divided into three parts. The first part gives a rapid review of some systems of psychology, of philosophy (from the point of view of truth and knowledge), and ethics. There seems to be a preference for purposivism, intuitionism and Christian ethics in the respective groups. The second part deals briefly with group personality, the unconscious, and some aspects of mental illness. The third part deals with the body-mind problem, and with the meaning of science. The book in general tends to stress intellectual, spiritual, and religious values.

There is no reference to contemporary Thomism or Aristotelianism.

ELIOT, T. S. *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.; March, 1949. \$2.50.

EMERSON, RALPH WALDO. *Essays, Poems and Addresses*. With an introduction by Gordon S. Haight. "Classics Club College Editions." New York: W. J. Black. Pp. 300. \$1.25.

FEJTO, FRANCOIS. *Heine. A Biography*. Translated by Mervyn Savill. Denver: Univ. of Denver Press, 1949. Pp. 300. \$4.00.

FERGUSON, WALLACE KLIPPERT. *The Renaissance in Historical Thought. Five Centuries of Interpretation*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948. Pp. 442. \$5.00.

FISCHER, SIEGFRIED. *Principles of General Psychopathology*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; spring, 1949. \$4.75.

FEIGL, HERBERT, and SELLARS, WILFRED (eds.). *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949. Pp. 636. \$5.00.

FREUD, SIGMUND. *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*. Translated by James Strachey. New York: W. W. Norton; Feb., 1949. \$2.00.

—. *The Future of an Illusion*. New York: Liveright Pub. Corp.; Feb., 1949. \$2.50.

GABE, W. J. *Beyond the Intellect*. 2d ed. Pasadena: P. D. & Ione Perkins, 1949. Pp. 24, Paper, 50¢.

—. *Tales of Tokuzan*. Pasadena: P. D. & Ione Perkins, 1949. Pp. 23. Paper, 50¢.

GARDINER, HAROLD CHARLES (ed.). *The Great Books*. New York: Devin-Adair, 1949. Pp. 126. \$2.00.

GILSON, ETIENNE. *Being and Some Philosophers*. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies; April, 1949. Pp. 250 (approx.).

GOETHE, VON, JOHANN WOLFGANG. *Wisdom and Experience*. Translated by Hermann S. Weigand. New York: Pantheon Books; March, 1949. \$3.75.

GOODHART, ARTHUR L. *English Contributions to the Philosophy of Law*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press; spring, 1949. Pp. 48. \$1.50.

GRACE, SISTER MELANIA, and PETERSON, GILBERT C., S.J. *Books for Catholic Colleges*. Chicago: American Lib. Association, 1948. Pp. 144. \$3.75.

HADAMARD, JACQUES. *Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; Feb., 1949. \$2.50.

HALL, MANLY PALMER. *Very Sincerely Yours. A Collection of Personal Letters to Students*. Los Angeles: Philosophical Research Soc., 1948. Pp. 139. \$2.50.

HARDIN, GARRETT. *Biology—Its Human Implication*. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman; spring, 1949. \$5.00.

HARRIS, VICTOR. *All Coherence Gone*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; March, 1949. Pp. 292. \$5.00.

HAUBER, ULRICH ALBERT. *Essentials of Zoology*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949. Pp. 404. \$4.00.

HAYES, CARLTON J. H. *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1948. Pp. 335. \$4.00.

HERRICK, C. JUDSON. *George Ellet Coghill: Naturalist and Philosopher*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; April, 1949. Pp. 284. \$5.00.

HILL, J. W. F. *Medieval Lincoln*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1948. Pp. 504. \$9.50.

HOFFMAN, J. S., and LEVACK, PAUL. *Burke's Politics*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf; Feb., 1949. \$4.75.

HOLLINGWORTH, HARRY LEVI. *Psychology and Ethics. A Study of the Sense of Obligation*. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1949. Pp. 256. \$3.50.

HUTCHINSON, ELIOT D. *How To Think Creatively*. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press; Jan., 1949. \$2.75.

JOAD, C. E. M. *Decadence*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; March, 1949. \$4.75.

JONES, MARC EDMUND. *George Sylvester Morris: His Philosophical Career and Theistic Idealism*. Philadelphia: David McKay Co., 1948. Pp. 446. \$3.75.

KANT, IMMANUEL. *Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy*. Translated and edited by Lewis White Beck. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949. Pp. xv + 370. \$5.00.

This is a new translation of *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, *Critique of Practical Reason*, *An Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals*, *What Is Enlightenment?* *What Is Orientation in Thinking?* *Perpetual Peace*, *On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives*, and selections from *The Metaphysics of Morals*. The translation is careful; it does not seem to have quite the readability of Kemp Smith's efforts.

The translator has supplied a fifty-page introduction, which gives a brief biography, a rapid account of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and a presentation of the Kantian ethical theory, together with critical modifications along the lines first indicated by Windleband and Richert.

KEITH, SIR ARTHUR. *A New Theory of Human Evolution*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; March, 1949. \$4.75.

King's Good Servant, The. Papers read to the Thomas More Society of London. Westminster: Newman Book Shop, 1949. Pp. 112. \$2.25.

KLUCKHOLN, CLYDE. *Mirror for Man. The Relation of Anthropology to Modern Life*. New York: Whittlesey House, 1949. \$3.75.

KUHN, HELMUT. *Encounter with Nothingness. An Essay on Existentialism*. Hinsdale, Ill.: Henry Regnery Co.; April, 1949. \$3.00.

LAIRD, JOHN. *On Human Freedom. The Forwood Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Given in the University of Liverpool in November, 1945*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 152. \$2.00.

LAMONT, CORLISS. *Humanism as a Philosophy*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; March, 1949. \$3.75.

The author himself realizes that this is not a book about humanism in general, but about a particular type (p. 18). According to him, there are eight points that characterize it: (1) antisupernaturalism; (2) complete evolutionism; (3) nonexistence of a soul; (4) self-sufficiency of man; (5) freedom of will; (6) this-worldly ethics; (7) value of art; (8) humanitarianism.

The chapter giving the history of this type of humanism is full of half-truths, and contains a number of historical errors, as well as some very strange historical appreciations. The chapter "refuting" the immortality of the soul is amazingly naïve. The author's inclusion of the Soviet tyranny "within the ranks of democratic humanists" (p. 332) may be taken as an example of his ivory-towered seclusion from reality.

LAOTSE [Lao Tzu]. *The Wisdom of Lao Tze*. New York: Modern Lib., 1948. Pp. 346. \$1.25.

LASKI, HAROLD J. *Liberty in the Modern State*. New York: Viking Press; March, 1949. \$2.75.

LEAVENS, ROBERT FRENCH. *Great Companions*. Boston: Beacon Press; March, 1949. Vol. I, pp. 669. Vol. II, pp. 684. \$3.00 per vol. \$5.50 both.

LEE, IRVING J. *The Language of Wisdom and Folly*. New York: Harper & Bros.; March, 1949. \$4.00.

LEE, OTIS. *Existence and Inquiry*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949. Pp. ix + 323. \$4.00.

Modern philosophy, according to the author, is in as critical a state as the rest of modern culture. One of the signs of this is the widespread discussions of knowledge, language, method, and the like. These things, taken together, are what the author means by "inquiry." By "existence" he means what others would call "reality," "being," "concrete entity." Modern types of inquiry began with Descartes and Locke—the method of analysis. This was followed by the dialectic—of idealism and materialism. The new active empiricism in Britain and America brought forth the logic of consequences, pragmatism.

The author contends that all three of these have some value, but are also incomplete and to some extent erroneous. Understanding them as well as he does, he is able to make an intelligent and critical appraisal. The critique of pragmatism is especially pointed. The author concludes that philosophy has its own mode of inquiry, which is basically analytic and must work with concepts of form and energy (not in the physical or chemical sense); it must begin with, and end in, the concrete existent. Existence, for its part, is composed of various types of concrete entity.

The author scarcely mentions Thomism, and shows no signs of familiarity with it. But Thomists will find the book very useful in understanding modern philosophy, and as they come to see the book's movement, will warm to its conclusions.

There is an index.

LEIGHTON, ALEXANDER H. *Human Relations in a Changing World*. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.; April, 1949. \$4.50.

LOCKE, JOHN. *Social and Political Essays. Second Treatise on Civil Government; First Letter on Toleration; Essay on Education*. With an introduction by Howard Penniman. "Classics Club College Editions." New York: W. J. Black. Pp. 413. \$1.25.

LOWITH, KARL. *Meaning in History*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949. Pp. ix + 257. \$4.00.

The author maintains that all philosophies of history are either based on the classical cyclic interpretations of the universe or on the Christian faith in the kingdom of God. He tries to prove this position by studying modern (non-Christian) philosophies of history, then medieval theologies of history, and finally the biblical view of history. The criticism of modern views of "endless progress" is clear-cut and telling.

The somewhat excessive distinction drawn between the philosophy and theology of history seems to be based on an excessive contrast and separation between faith and reason. In spite of this, the book is well worth reading.

LYSENKO, TROFIN DENISOVICH. *The Science of Biology Today*. New York: International Publs., 1948. Pp. 62. \$1.25.

*Manual of Civilization*. New York: William-Frederick Press, 1949. Pp. 133. \$2.50.

According to the publishers' blurb, "in deference to the author, who regards himself rather as a compiler, we leave out his name." The book—intended, as it seems, to be a compilation of the best of human experience—is a disorganized, virulent, and often self destructive summary of crude antireligious and antiphilosophical argument; on its positive side it presents an outmoded individualistic materialism. It combines personal irresponsibility with an all-provident community. An intolerably rigid and inclusive state socialism is presented under the fair name of democracy. The difference between the author's version of "democracy" and the ideal of world Communism is undiscoverable, except that the latter term seems not to be used.

MARCEL, GABRIEL. *The Philosophy of Existence*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; March, 1949. \$2.75.

MC CALL, RAYMOND J. *Basic Logic*. 2d ed. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1948. Pp. 196. \$2.00.

MC GUIRE, PAUL. *There's Freedom for the Brave*. New York: Wm. Morrow & Co., 1949. \$4.00.

MICHAELS, PETER. *Perverse Generation*. New York: Sheed & Ward; April, 1949. \$2.50.

MONTAIGNE. *Selected Essays*. Translated with an introduction by Donald M. Frame. "Classics Club College Editions." New York: W. J. Black. Pp. 312. \$1.25.

MORE, THOMAS, ST. *Utopia and Letters*. Edited with an introduction by Mildred Campbell. Contains Roper's *Life of More*. Spelling and syntax modernized. "Classics Club College Editions." New York: W. J. Black. Pp. 353. \$1.25.

MORGAN, BARBARA SPOFFORD. *Man's Restless Search*. New York: Harper & Bros. \$2.50.

MURDOCK, KENNETH BALLARD. *Literature and Theology in Puritan New England*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; fall, 1949.

MURPHY, GARDNER. *Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.; March, 1949. \$5.50.

NEILL, THOMAS P. *Makers of the Modern Mind*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co.; April, 1949. \$5.00.

NELSON, BENJAMIN N. *The Idea of Usury*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; May, 1949. Pp. 196. \$3.00.

NELSON, LEONARD. *Socratic Method and Critical Philosophy*. Selected essays translated by Thomas K. Brown III. Foreword by Brand Blanshard. Introduction by Julius Kraft. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. xxii + 211. \$3.75.

These essays have a twofold relevance, suggested by the title. One is Nelson's conception of the way in which philosophy must be taught. The other is his notion of what philosophy is. Both ideas are of tremendous value today; historicism and skepticism are by no means absent from American thought.

Nelson follows Fries in transposing the Kantian critique into a psychological one. What has kept him from a thorough revaluation of Kantian critique and metaphysics seems to be his misunderstanding of Aristotle and his apparently complete ignorance of medieval thought. Thus, he bases the a priori on the exclusion of both the Humean empiricism and deductive systematization (dogmatism). Being wholly ignorant of the Thomist theory of science and the function of first principles in that theory, Nelson was never stimulated to look in that direction for a fourth alternative. Even though his reasoning is thus incomplete, it is incisive and masterful. It is recommended reading for mature students and professors.

There is an index.

NEWMAN, JOHN HENRY, CARDINAL. *Sermons and Discourses*. Edited by Charles Frederick Harrold. 2 vols. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1949. Vol. 1, pp. xviii + 348; Vol. 2, pp. xvii + 382. \$3.50 per vol.

Volume I contains 29 sermons, delivered during the period 1825 to 1839. The editor's intention in selecting these sermons has been to show the development of Newman's religious thinking and oratorical skill. The introduction is short and masterly, as we have come to expect; it contains an adroit argument for religious reading such as this.

Volume II contains 23 sermons, from the period 1839 to 1857. The editor believes that the sermons preached after 1857 do not compare in content and quality with earlier ones. The introduction calls attention to the characteristics of the sermons selected, and briefly fills in the background for several of the more famous sermons.

NIKHILANANDA, SWAMI. *Essence of Hinduism*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1948. Pp. 118. \$1.75.

ORGAN, TROY WILSON. *An Index to Aristotle*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; Jan., 1948. Pp. 181. \$5.00.

A long-felt need is met here. Bonitz's *Index* is too complete and therefore too complex for a beginning student or for a rapid but well-rounded background view of Aristotle's philosophical and scientific doctrines. Besides, many who wish to work in Aristotle have little or no knowledge of Greek.

This index is based on the Oxford translation edited by W. D. Ross and J. A. Smith. References are to the standard Bekker numbers. Occasionally, where the English word is ambiguous, the Greek word which it translates is given.

PARSONS, TALCOTT. *Essays in Sociological Theory, Pure and Applied*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949. Pp. 379. \$4.50.

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